6 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child
(Thug writes) > According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio > signal encryption is really a non-issue. They could have the most secure ... > What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability > to the cellular telephone switches? I mean, if a conversation is scrambled ... If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments pushing the issue? Eric Fogleman
(Eric Fogleman writes) > (Thug writes) > > According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio > > signal encryption is really a non-issue. They could have the most secure > ... > > What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability > > to the cellular telephone switches? I mean, if a conversation is scrambled > ... > > If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments > pushing the issue? > > Eric Fogleman The first reason is that they want to steer people's attentions away from the real issues. Thus if they are defeated on this one, they can say "Oh well, we'll be nice guys and you chaps this one.. but from now on leave us alone and let us go about our business of protecting you from yourselves." Basically, they want to fight us every step of the way, to make sure we don't get close enough to really start eating into their security.. The second reason of course is that they want to play super g-men, and ride around in vans full of cellular equipment following their suspects around the city. It's just too damn boring for them to dail up a REMOB at the cellular switch and listen in that way in the confort of their own offices. They need outdoor recreation, they need to feel like they're all James Bond or something. That's what the second reason is. Practically speaking though, cellular encryption does hamper their ability to listen in. Because sometimes they don't have access to the REMOB at a cellular switch, like when they are listening in without a warrant. If they access the REMOB, that would be noted in a log somewhere and then they could have problems if the suspect finds out they were wiretapping without a warrant. If they just pick it off the air, they don't need a warrant. If they do a wiretap the old way, they do. Hence, secure cellular encryption would actually prevent unauthorized wiretapping, which is something they never seem to mention to the people they are empowered to protect. Thug
I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz". Give it a rest, will ya?
> > I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is > mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz". > Give it a rest, will ya? Maybe I'm a little out-of-sorts today, but... I've heard (via Tv reports, reading, etc) that PhiberOptik (paraphrasing here) "...knows more about Phone Systems than most Bell engineers". Why on Earth would you respond the way you did, rather than: 1. Ignoring it 2. Providing pointers to technical sources 3. Refuting it with information. I flame about *lots* of stuff, though I am, after all, a Sensei. Lose sight of your ability to teach, and you are nothing more than another Technocrat. -- Charlie Wareing [:-)> * "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" chasw@ncselxsi.uucp * "If it's jammed, force it. If it ELXSI 6400s fixed while you wait. * breaks, it needed replacing anyway."
> > > > > I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is > > mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz". > > Give it a rest, will ya? > > Maybe I'm a little out-of-sorts today, but... > > I've heard (via Tv reports, reading, etc) that PhiberOptik (paraphrasing > here) "...knows more about Phone Systems than most Bell engineers". Why > on Earth would you respond the way you did, rather than: > > 1. Ignoring it > 2. Providing pointers to technical sources > 3. Refuting it with information. > > I flame about *lots* of stuff, though I am, after all, a Sensei. Lose > sight of your ability to teach, and you are nothing more than another > Technocrat. > > > > -- > Charlie Wareing [:-)> * "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" > chasw@ncselxsi.uucp * "If it's jammed, force it. If it > ELXSI 6400s fixed while you wait. * breaks, it needed replacing anyway." > > OK, you forced me into it. Sigh. The reason for the short quip is because I know the person who posted it, and I get rather impatient after the thousandth time hot air starts up the silly rumor mill. A telecom manufacturing company by the name of Teltone makes a product called a REMOBS, for REMote OBservation System (their part number M240, M241, M242). Somewhere along the line, numerous years ago, someone must've thought this was a "cool" name, and wrote a text file which was uploaded to various "underground BBS's", making up a whole fantasy story that this is some top secret system, and one could simply dial into it, enter a code in touch-tone, enter a phone number, and proceed to listen in on a conversation. THIS IS COMPLETE NONSENSE. Because of this misinformation, every time some kid comes across some unknown phone number (anything from phone company test lines, to beepers), they claim they've found a "REMOB". There's always some blatant liar who contributes to the propaganda by claiming they listen in to phone lines. The actual product (go ahead and order the specs), is to sample trunk quality by making a metallic connection. The archaic M240 from the 70's, was for electromechanical switches, the M241 was a portable model, and I believe the M242 was for electronic switches. They do have a remote feature, which allows one to enter a code and specify a sequence of digits indicating a certain trunk (depending on however it was wired in). It's a rather low-tech piece of equipment, and suffice to say, the BOCs DO NOT USE IT. There are a number of trunk and line testing systems which have been in standard use in the RBOCs for years. The fabled "REMOB" is not one of them. In brief, the Switching Control Centers (SCCs) and Network Terminal Equipment Centers (NTECs) use a system called CAROT (Centralized Automatic Reporting On Trunks), a batch system that in turn uses the complement of standard test lines (1004Hz S/N, type 105 ATMS, short ckt, open ckt, impedance, etc, etc.) to provide more than adequate testing of trunks. Digital switches (i.e. 5ESS and DMS100) have their own trunk testing facilities. As far as line testing goes, the Repair Service Bureau (RSB) uses a plethora of systems. Namely LMOS/MLT (Loop Maintenance Operations System/Mechanized Line Testing), Tracker, Predictor, etc., etc. I could go on and on, but I think I've made my point. It's a SCIENCE, and it's silly to even consider such an irrelevant piece of garbage as a REMOBS. It's a gross and purposeless rumor, and now you see why I hesitated wasting the time in explaining all this, because it comes up OVER and OVER and OVER.
Eric Fogleman writes: >If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments >pushing the issue? Cryptography is all economics. Every barrier adds cost to interception. Eric