Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]

ted, i think that with just a little of the right technical stuff, it is
very easy to establish a nym in today's nets.  e.g., if you buy a cheap
unix box, it comes with uucp, so you can hook up to one of many anonymous
uucp sites.

that's easy.

i know of several slip/ppp endpoints that aren't password protected.  more
every day, in fact.

that's easy.

perhaps it's this easy with fido.  the point of remailers is to enable this
technology to the technologically challenged.  (as well as to explore the
technical and social space that nyms define.)

	peter

From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
   Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 11:03:53 EST

   ted, i think that with just a little of the right technical stuff, it is
   very easy to establish a nym in today's nets.  e.g., if you buy a cheap
   unix box, it comes with uucp, so you can hook up to one of many anonymous
   uucp sites.

   that's easy.

Buying a unix box and finding a UUCP connection is still a lot more
effort than getting a new anonymous remailer pseudomnym.  It certainly
costs a lot more money!  And if you continuously mailbomb someone, the
victim still has the (somewhat tenuous) recourse of asking the upstream
uucp site to cut off the miscreant.

There are controls to reduce how much someone can abuse the network.

   i know of several slip/ppp endpoints that aren't password protected.  more
   every day, in fact.

   that's easy.

And if those endpoints were abused, the owners of said endpoints would
probably clamp down and protect them.  (If they're used too much, they'd
probably clamp down anyway, since presumably they didn't pay good money
for those resources to give them away free to anyone who can dail up to
them.)

There are controls to reduce how much someone can abuse the network.

You seem to be proposing that all such controls be removed.

						- Ted

> Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 13:24:58 -0500
> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
> 
> There are controls to reduce how much someone can abuse the network.

they are no more stringent than those employed by remailer operators.

> You seem to be proposing that all such controls be removed.

you are reading me wrong.

	peter

>   i know of several slip/ppp endpoints that aren't password protected.  more
>   every day, in fact.

>probably clamp down anyway, since presumably they didn't pay good money
>for those resources to give them away free to anyone who can dail up to

I was wondering about that -- I kind of assumed that Peter meant
"real" endpoints that were unprotected because they provided service
that way. For example, UUNET has (had?) a 1-900-GETSRCS (or something
like that) UUCP dialin, the phone company mediated money handling,
uunet didn't care who you were -- but as far as I know it would only
allow file transfer.
	Are there any slip/ppp/uucp+rmail points that are "open" that
aren't likely to dry up if they get widely announced? If so, please
announce them!
								_Mark_

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>>   i know of several slip/ppp endpoints that aren't password protected.  more
>>   every day, in fact.
>
>       Are there any slip/ppp/uucp+rmail points that are "open" that
>aren't likely to dry up if they get widely announced? If so, please
>announce them!


I was doing some password ginding a few days ago (I do this as a favor for
a few people, and I sometimes  throw passwd files from friends systems
into the "soup").  Recently I cracked a friends dialup slip password, it was
a hard choice on if I should "slip in" or not (the possiblities of the
practcal jokes was endless).  If I was attampting a malicious attack or
to compromise system integrity for future attacks


                        -Pete

btw: if I "sliped in" I would have just run changed their Xwindow backgrounds
    to say they should correct the situation (nothing malicious).



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> 	Are there any slip/ppp/uucp+rmail points that are "open" that
> aren't likely to dry up if they get widely announced? If so, please
> announce them!

no can do -- in fact, i regret opening my mouth in the first place.
(i should have used a nym!)

	peter