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Wasted BAndwidth

2 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child

NODE 0dc55758Wasted BAndwidth
Forwarded message:
> 	You are right that because of the right free speach, it is
> impossible to prohibit remailers.  However, while I don't believe in
> prior restraint; but I do believe in personal responsibility.  It is
> certainly true that it is possible to construct a remailer service,
> using cryptography, such that it would be impossible to trace it back to
> the original sender.  This class of remailer would generally not provide
Well Ted I am not here to make ad-hominen attacks AND... 
there are a number of issues raised... 

Personal responsibility is a choice accepted by the person exercising
THEIR right of free speech... it is important to remember
that it is #1 and foremost a CHOICE... you CANT force an
attitude of personal responsibility

> So in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility?  Well, I
> would argue that the buck should stop at the remailer site.  They are
> the closest link to the chain of liability, and they have intentionally
> performed measures which make it impossible find the next link in the
> chain of liability.  So, let the liability rest with the remailer site!
> Now, I'm not a lawyer, and as far as I know, this legal theory hasn't
> been tested in a court.  So only time will tell what happens when these
> remailers hit the real world.
> 
> As far as remailers like Julf's are concerned, I very much like the idea 
> which Tim Moors suggested --- which is to have some method which the
> identity between the input and output address could be revealed.  This
> provides general anonymity, but one that can be breached when someone
> has abused that anonymity, as convicted by a jury of their peers.
> Perhaps the way this could be reflected into the "real world" legal
> system is that remailers which do keep a mapping between input and
> output addresses, and which are willing to reveal them under appropriate
> circumstances, would be exempt from being held liable for what comes out
> of their remailer.
> 
> Perhaps these are not the right sets of tools to be used to provide some
> sort of controls over remailers so that the negative effects of these
> remailers can be controlled.  But it is our responsibility to consider
> them, and not just pretend they don't exist.   I hope we don't have the
> attitude of "Vonce the rockets go up, who cares vere they come down?
> That's not my department....."
> 
> 						- Ted
> 

 Ted ,
	you seem more concerned with how you and the particular cabal
who agrees with you are going to control how others use their machines
and software to ensure THEIR right of choice...
Sorry but the attitudes you personally espouse just dont wash in the real
world...Liability law is civil LAW... in most cases there are NO
treaties between countries for laws such as libel...
Anonymity will flourish... and in the VERY near future... it wont be
dependent on the good-will of a sysadm or a government...
there simply WONT be the means to control spread of anonymity tools
Your viewpoint brings to mind an OLD saying
"Those who would trade a little freedom for security deserve neither"
and I apologize if I have misquoted here...I am afraid the scam
of social control and responsibilty that you and others such as 
government practice and espouse is about over...
"may you have an Interesting life"
         cheers
         kelly
p.s. Atlas is shrugging
--
NODE db6b5839Re: Wasted BAndwidth
(I'm also marc@mit.edu.  This is my work account.  Anyway....)

I think Ted is merely trying to be realistic.

Let me put it this way:  You tell something embarrasing, but true,
about Big Organization With Lots Of Money And Guns (BOWLOMAG).
They're not going to *care* that the last remailer on the chain (who
will, presumably, be identifiable) wasn't responsible for the message
which was sent.  They're just going to invade the building the
remailing host is in, kill everyone in the room, and destroy the
machine, and all the machines around it.  If they don't know which is
the remailer, they'll just blow up the whole block.  They don't care.
They're BOWLOMAG.

After this happens a few times, remailer operators are going to think
twice about passing anything which goes through their site.  They
don't want to be BOWLOMAG's next victim.  And this is exactly what
BOWLOMAG wants.  Control by fear.

Is this a likely scenario?  Probably not.  But in today's society, the
very organizations you are rightly trying to protect yourself against
are the ones with all the Money and Guns.  And they could care less
that it's mathematically impossible for you to monitor messages.  They
merely want it to stop.  Will they blow up buildings?  Not likely.
But I'm sure for every Steve Jackson Games we hear about, there are
other instances we don't.  And the Secret Service is a much easier
target than the CIA.

>> Personal responsibility is a choice accepted by the person exercising
>> THEIR right of free speech... it is important to remember that it is
>> #1 and foremost a CHOICE... you CANT force an attitude of personal
>> responsibility

You can't force and attitude of personal responsibility, it is true.
But you can still make people be responsible for their actions.  Even
if you don't think libel or slander is wrong, if I know who you are,
and I can prove it, I can still sue you.

As long as people are slinging quotes around:

    Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it.
	    - George Bernard Shaw, Liberty

    The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
    collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
    of their number, is self-protection.
	    - John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ch.1

People who want complete anonymity, without any way to make people
answer for they actions, seem to want liberty without the
responsibility.  And, they would remove my ability to protect myself,
by hiding the identity of my attacker.  Is this what we want?

Pseudonymity has its place in a free society, but there *must* be
bounds on it.  The recent idea of digital juries is a good one.
(Maybe it's not new; I like it anyway.)  This is better than trusting
the government.  

I do not advocate censorship.  I advocate responsibility.

		Marc