Re: WB: public kiosks

>Public kiosks are OK as a simple and moderately effective technique for
>assuring anonymity, and they're ideal for a security-naive person who
>is unable to verify the security of a more complex system.  But for
>my own use, I am much more confident in the security guarantee given by
>encryption on a portable computer and anonymizing using Chaum-style
>remailers...

Indeed. By definition, a public kiosk is in a public area, with open
access to all including the Bad Guy's agents and investigators. And
tracking people's physical movements in public places is an art that
investigators have had many years to refine and perfect. Many more
than, say, factoring large RSA public keys...

Phil

I thank Marc Ringuette and Phil Karn for their comments on public
kiosks.  They remind me that public kiosks are not a panacea, and that
we need to educate others to that awareness.

Nevertheless, let us remember the econmonics of the situation.  It is
expensive to follow people around--more expensive, say, than an
illegal tap on a home phone line.  By increasing the cost of the
suppression of information, one ensures that more information, in the
aggregate, is released.

We may not be able to provide for any particular individual's privacy,
but we can take actions for which we know that we will increase the
total amount of privacy (however hard that would be to strictly
define).

Eric