Work the work!

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On Tue, 1 Jun 93 09:56:45 -0700,
 Eric Hughes <uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes> wrote -
 
> We are trying to build a sandbox, and the government is trying to
> restrict the use of sand.
 
 We are indeed doing just this. Although the small minority of us
 compu-professionals are writing code, flailing congressmen, etc., it
 takes more than what is currently being acknowledged to get things
 changed. I will not, however, discontinue my diatribe with my elected
 representatives on the topic of our electronic rights to privacy
 under the first and fourth amendments. (I'm having too much fun doing
 something that I seriously, and perhaps foolishly,  believe in.) Is
 there something going on with the EFF that we should know about?
 
> That said, I also urge those who are writing code to continue.  To
> those of you not writing code, however, I say start talking to your
> friends and neighbors and communities and newspapers.
 
> Now.
 
We are working on it. A vote of confidence towards crypto-freedom.
Are we east-coast-niks welcome in this process? Is policy being drawn
by a few EFF persona without consultation of the masses?
 
Eric, before you say "Now,", you'd best detail us. I know what you
mean, however, many of the crypto-warriors which may follow do not. It
may be a good idea to _now_ place a broad policy statement.
 
Cheers.
 
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Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.

Paul, you of all people don't need to feel slighted when I urge people
to do something, anything, about the wiretap chips.  Therefore, let me
rephrase my exhortation to the list at large.

If you are doing something, continue.  If you are not, start.

The particulars of what one does are not so nearly important to me as
that one does something.  Anyone who understands at least one tenth of
this list understands more than your average reporter.  While I would
like all the details to be perfectly accurate everywhere, this is not
going to happen.  Even if you don't feel like you are an expert, you
are more expert than most.  With the aid of the documents in the ftp
site, and a few hours time, you can become even more expert.

> Is there something going on with the EFF that we should know about?

The EFF is going to be involved with the cryptography issue.  More
than that and I defer to John Gilmore, who is on the EFF board and
this list and who can speak more authoritatively than I.

>I know what you
>mean, however, many of the crypto-warriors which may follow do not. It
>may be a good idea to _now_ place a broad policy statement.

Here is my own very short version of my policy toward the wiretap
chips:

"The government has no right to restrict my use of cryptography in any
way.  They may not forbid me to use whatever ciphers I may like, nor
may they require me to use any that I do not like."

The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's issue by
comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key escrow system
'work.'  Do not be suckered into talking about an issue that is not
important.  If someone want to talk about potential back doors, refuse
to speculate.  The existence of a front door (key escrow) make back
door issues pale in comparison.  

If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works, refuse to
elaborate.  Saying that this particular key escrow system is bad has a
large measure of complicity in saying that escrow systems in general
are OK.  Always argue that this particular key escrow system is bad
because it is a key escrow system, not because it has procedural
flaws.

This right issue is that the government has no right to my private
communications.  Every other issue is the wrong issue and detracts
from this central one.  If we defeat one particular system without
defeating all other possible such systems at the same time, we have
not won at all; we have delayed the time of reckoning.

Trenchantly yours,

Eric

I have shied away from any "political" action against Clipper because I am
unsure how a Canadian can help...  I would like to think that the Canadian
government will not follow the US lead, but I'm sure that its just a
matter of time.  I am open to suggestions...  How do I avoid being told
that I'm fighting "someone elses" war?

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Tue, 1 Jun 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:

> If you are doing something, continue.  If you are not, start.

>I have shied away from any "political" action against Clipper because I am
>unsure how a Canadian can help...  

Preempt government restrictions by fighting for the explicit right to
strong cryptography.  Point out how those foolish folks south are
going to screw themselves over by government mandated cryptography.

One of the arguments that is being made in this country against the
wiretap chip is that it will harm overseas business.  In Canada you
can turn this around and show what a great economic boon you have
available.  You can point out that the US has abandoned their foreign
markets in secure communications, which will, of course, be the only
kind of communications of the future.

Get Northern Telecom on your side.

Eric

> One of the arguments that is being made in this country against the
> wiretap chip is that it will harm overseas business.  In Canada you
> can turn this around and show what a great economic boon you have
> available.

Another argument the U.S. government is making is that they surveyed
encryption policy in various countries and "it's not beyond the pale
to limit domestic encryption -- France does it, for example".  

If Canada takes a strong stance on domestic encryption, then it is a
counter-example rather than an example of repression.  The Australian
example of deploying GSM in the face of law-enforcement objections has
already been used in testimony to NIST (and I'm sure we'll use it
to convince Congress as well).

You could also argue for removing Canadian restrictions on export of
cryptography.  Currently the Canadian regulations are just
rubber-stamps of the US regulations.  This has the advantage that it's
legal to export US crypto to Canada -- e.g. crypto code developed in
the U.S. can be legally moved outside the range of U.S. law.  This was
useful for PGP; it is legal to use and possess PGP in Canada since
US patent law doesn't apply.  But it limits the development of an
export crypto industry for Canadians, and it furthers the image of
Canada as being under the U.S. government's thumb.

	John Gilmore