SKIPJACK PANEL

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  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Is it just me, or is anyone else dubious about Dorothy Dennings
and company running their various Skipjack tests ON AN *NSA*
CRAY COMPUTER?  Since many of the objections to the whole plan
arouse because of doubts about the intentions of the NSA, why
would D.D. et al. trust them to run these critical tests?  How
difficult would it be for the NSA to spoof its own computer?

Next big news items:  United Nations hires Serbian troops to
report on human rights violations in Bosnia.  Farmer Brown puts
fox in charge of henhouse.  Film at eleven.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
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Sandy Sandford writes:
> 
> Is it just me, or is anyone else dubious about Dorothy Dennings
> and company running their various Skipjack tests ON AN *NSA*
> CRAY COMPUTER?  Since many of the objections to the whole plan
> arouse because of doubts about the intentions of the NSA, why
> would D.D. et al. trust them to run these critical tests?  How
> difficult would it be for the NSA to spoof its own computer?
> 
> Next big news items:  United Nations hires Serbian troops to
> report on human rights violations in Bosnia.  Farmer Brown puts
> fox in charge of henhouse.  Film at eleven.

This is but one of the obvious flaws in the whole Clipper scheme.
I think the whole Clipper debate can be boiled down to this one
important fact:
                  * It is not in the interest of the NSA for
                    Clipper/Skipjack to be secure, therefore
                    they will find a way to make sure that
                    either the algorithm or the chip itself
                    contains a NSA backdoor before the chip
                    is sold to the American public.

The whole escrow scheme is an obvious wild goose chase as well.  We all
know that the NSA operates by importing large amounts of information
(oceans of data) and uses it's computers to extract the goodies.  The
would not be able to do this if they had to obtain a warrant for each
conversation that constitutes a part of the ocean of data.  The whole
escrow aspect of the system is obviously bogus.

To review:  1) The key escrow aspect is a wild goose chase.
            2) The security of the algorithm is also a wild goose chase.
            3) The backdoor must be in the chip hardware itself.

Therefore even if Clinton and the NSA deside to make the two key escrow
agents the E.F.F. and the A.C.L.U, and Denning and her crew declare the
algorithm to be secure, I will still advocate a complete boycott of the
Clipper/Skipjack technology because the backdoor will be in those
tamper-proof chips. 


Thug

Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1993 13:52 EDT
    From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)

    To review:  1) The key escrow aspect is a wild goose chase.
		2) The security of the algorithm is also a wild goose chase.
		3) The backdoor must be in the chip hardware itself.

Dr. Thug ignores the most obvious weakness, which is likely in the key
generation process.  By selecting the key from a relatively small
keyspace (say 40 bit equivalent, rather than the 80 bit nominal
keyspace) the cost of exhaustive search can be dramatically lowered to
those who know the basis of key selection, without any outward evidence
of tampering, weakness of the algorithm, weakness of the chip,
vulnerability to external attacks, special hardware to respond to
trapdoor codes, etc.

Examining the chip hardware for correctness will not discover this
attack.  Only providing users with the ability to program their own
keys, together with public disclosure of the Skipjack algorithm and
verification of its implementation can help.

If there are a significant number of weak keys in the Skipjack algorithm
(which is explicitly denied in the panel report) then even this approach
could be dangerous.