REMAIL: list

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Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
 6: cdodhner@indirect.com
 7: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 8: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
11: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 
13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
14: remailer@utter.dis.org 
15: remailer@entropy.linet.org
16: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#6		no encryption of remailing requests
#7-#15		support encrypted remailing requests
#16		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#14,#15,#16	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#9,#14,#15      running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

The public keys for the remailers which support encrypted remailing
requests is also available in the same directory.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.


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After being largely off-line for most of the summer, I came back to
find that my remailer had been bit-bucketing most encrypted messages,
apparently due to PGP 2.3's lack of backward compatibility.
(There'd better be a good reason for that, PGP team.) I'll get
around to building 2.3 RSN.  There will also be a momentary
interruption of encryption service when this old Sequent machine
gets swapped out from under the Sequent binary...

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

Eli Brandt writes:

> After being largely off-line for most of the summer, I came back to
> find that my remailer had been bit-bucketing most encrypted messages,
> apparently due to PGP 2.3's lack of backward compatibility.
> (There'd better be a good reason for that, PGP team.) I'll get
> around to building 2.3 RSN.  There will also be a momentary
> interruption of encryption service when this old Sequent machine
> gets swapped out from under the Sequent binary...

Glad to have Eli back! (and we missed you at the Extropaganza last
weekend)

This underscores one of the persistent problems with remailers: the
generally flaky nature!

(No insult or criticism intended...the folks who run remailers are to
be commended, but the fact is that "multiple hop" remailing routes are
are a real gamble these days, what with so many remailers temporarily
or permanently disabled or (somehow) not passing messages through.)

Karl Barrus's list of functional remailers is a great first step, but
we need to somehow establish a better "market system" of remailers
(digital postage woud be a boon here) so that the upness or downness
of remailers would be more predictable.

Like others, I suspect, I have to "ping" the remailers before sending
anything, and then hope and pray they aren't taken offline for
maintenance (or whatever) between the time I ping them and the time I
use them for something important.

If Sameer Parekh's "instant remailer" code multiplies the number of
remailers by some factor, we will even more urgently need to deal with
this issue of remailer reliability.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) writes:

>C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
>by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
>posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)

No need to change anything.  Just add a pool address to the
"Request-remailing-to:" line.

-- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |

miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman) writes:

>ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) writes:

>>C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
>>by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
>>posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)

>No need to change anything.  Just add a pool address to the
>"Request-remailing-to:" line.

Actually, an even better idea is to add the header

	Return-receipt-to: <pool address>

at the final hop.  This will send a note to the pool only if the
recipient system accepts the messaFrom owner-cypherpunks  Sat Sep  4 06:45:41 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA01922; Sat, 4 Sep 93 06:40:44 PDT
Received: by toad.com id AA01877; Sat, 4 Sep 93 06:37:26 PDT
Return-Path: <frissell@panix.com>
Received: from panix.com ([198.7.0.2]) by toad.com id AA01872; Sat, 4 Sep 93 06:37:22 PDT
Received: by panix.com id AA15005
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for cypherpunks@toad.com); Sat, 4 Sep 1993 09:34:21 -0400
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 1993 09:34:21 -0400
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Message-Id: <199309041334.AA15005@panix.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Gubment Bombmaker`s 

To: cypherpunks@toad.com

N >it has a ISBN number, can be found, and ordered via Books in print,
N >however will be confiscated by customs at the canadian border as that
N >sort of thing is contraband in canada - I don't know about england...

From the Loompanics Catalog:

"Special Notification Regarding Books Seized by the Authorities

Loompanics Unlimited cannot be responsible for any shipment of books 
seized by any government body.  This applies in particular to Canada, 
where many books are banned, and to prisoners, whose keepers often 
confiscate books.  If you are a prisoner or a Canadian, you are advised to 
check with your authorities before ordering books.  We cannot be 
responsible for books siezed by ANY government, since neither UPS nor Post 
Office insurance covers such a situation.  Be warned!"

Elaine Elansky has set up an account to receive contributions to her son's 
defense fund (he remains in jail in Hartford, CT for his BBS-related 
'crimes'.

They need money.  Send it to:

Michael Elansky Fund
25 Maiden Lane 
West Hartford, Connecticut  06117

or

Michael Elansky Fund
Account # 02060573652
Society for Savings
342 North Main Street
West Hartford, Connecticut 06117

Thank you,

Duncan Frissell

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0

tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>Like others, I suspect, I have to "ping" the remailers before sending
>anything, and then hope and pray they aren't taken offline for
>maintenance (or whatever) between the time I ping them and the time I
>use them for something important.

C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)
indicating that a message actually was sent from the final hop. The
sender can be sure the message made it if they see this posting. If
anyone wants to get even more fancy, the final remailer might also post
to the pool when the message bounced to the final address back to the remailer.

Obviously, without reliability the anonymity is worthless.

L. Detweiler said:
> C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
> by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
> posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)
> indicating that a message actually was sent from the final hop. The
> sender can be sure the message made it if they see this posting. If
> anyone wants to get even more fancy, the final remailer might also post
> to the pool when the message bounced to the final address back to the remailer.
	That definitely looks like a wise idea.
	Maybe if I can figure it out, among the writing of the
install-script I can add this little feature. Which newsgroup? Should
someone create an alt.remail? How exactly would it be implemented? I'm
thinking that simply the user would do:


::
Request-Remailing-To: sameer@netcom.com
Remail-ID: 572374237

	And the remailer would post to alt.remail:

Message with Remail-ID: 572374237 was remailed.
	Does that look good?


-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com