Re: Random Numbers

I admit I'm guilty of being somewhat ignorant of how PGP
implements randseed.bin.  My experience with PGP indicates that
it's pretty well-thought-out in general, so perhaps I'm repeating
the obvious.

	One possibility is to treat part of the random seed as
if it was your secret RSA key. Systems like PEM store the RSA
key encrypted on disk someplace - you could also store an
encrypted random seed which you decrypt when you retrieve the
secret key, use to bootstrap your PRNG, and then replace with
some output from the PRNG when you're done. That way, the seed
is (by definition) hidden, and an attacker is going to have
much more trouble attacking your PRNG by searching your random
seed space.

mjr.

mjr@TIS.COM writes:
>         One possibility is to treat part of the random seed as
> if it was your secret RSA key. Systems like PEM store the RSA
> key encrypted on disk someplace - you could also store an
> encrypted random seed which you decrypt when you retrieve the
> secret key, use to bootstrap your PRNG, and then replace with
> some output from the PRNG when you're done. That way, the seed
> is (by definition) hidden, and an attacker is going to have
> much more trouble attacking your PRNG by searching your random
> seed space.

You don't want to do that...  that would amount to using one seed
(probably when you created your key) and then generating a key from
that.  Since the relationship between a random seed and the IDEA key is
known, one can be reproduced from the other.  (to go from key to seed
would take considerably longer, but it's doable)  Since you are storing
what effectively amounts to the random number generated from the seed in
place of the seed, all an adversary has to do is get one of your IDEA
keys from a message that he can read.  Once he has that, he gets the
seed used, and then just works it forward from there.  Instead of having
2^128 possible keys, you've just let him narrow it down to a couple
hundred or so.  There's a reaason that you have to give it a new seed
rather often.

 -----------------------------------------------------------------
  Tom Strong              N3NBB              ts49+@andrew.cmu.edu