Re: NIST proposes software key escrow development

an12070@anon.penet.fi said:
>I think it would be utmost folly for software developers to work with the NIST
>and NSA on this or invest any time or capital.

Clearly this is true for cypherpunk sw developers, but others see an
opportunity to make some bucks.

>The fundamental 
>requirement for NSA approval is the implementation of Skipjack in 
>*software* in such a way that the algorithm is *protected* like it is in 
>the booby trapped Clipper chips-- that is, impossible to deduce.
>
>But this appears to be complete *fantasy*. Any such system must rely on
>some kind of a hardware approach.

Not necessarily. Zero knowledge proof techniques, for instance, can be
applied to make source code as impenetrable as one wishes. This tends to
carry a heavy runtime overhead, of course.

And even hardware solutions can be reverse engineered. In fact, it's
guaranteed to happen eventually. Triple layer metal interconnect chips
can be selectively peeled via ion beam etching to reveal them to scanning
tunneling electron microscope probing. Camouflage in the form of unnecessary
functional units that mask actual operation can be uncovered by data flow
analysis. Such a project would be extremely expensive...but someone will
eventually do it. The Mafia or the KGB, for instance, if no one else.

>Doesn't anyone have the faint glimmer of the idea that NSA, the *premier*
>cryptographic agency in the *world*, with unsurpassed technological and
>engineering prowess in the area, would have already *figured out* how to do 
>this if it was *at all* feasible?

I think everyone assumes that the NSA is technologically several steps
ahead of the game at all times, and clearly they have their own agenda.
Some people just don't see their hidden agendas as threatening. C'est
la vie. I think it makes for a very interesting chess game, myself. The
NSA is attempting checkmate, but they're not strongly enough positioned
to do so. In chess parlance, it's a bluff, but one with enough steel behind
it to force a response, which gives them a minor but real tactical advantage.
The obvious counter-response is to advance a pawn towards queening...which
is already in progress.

I'm reasonably happy with what the NSA appears to be doing in regard to
foreign intelligence gathering; it's their domestic agenda that threatens
the constitution. But that's in the nature of spook organizations.

"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."
	Doug

> Not necessarily. Zero knowledge proof techniques, for instance, can be
> applied to make source code as impenetrable as one wishes. This tends to
> carry a heavy runtime overhead, of course.

Could you go into more detail on this?  Thanks!
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"

> > Not necessarily. Zero knowledge proof techniques, for instance, can be
> > applied to make source code as impenetrable as one wishes. This tends to
> > carry a heavy runtime overhead, of course.
> 
> Could you go into more detail on this?  Thanks!
> -- 
> Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

I didn't write the item above, but I'll add my comments anyway.

Zero knowledge interactive proof systems are a critical part of modern
crypto. Here's the brief summary from the Cypherpunks Glossary,
available by anon. ftp at soda.berkeley.edu in pub/cypherpunks/misc as
glossary.text.gz.

***     zero knowledge proofs -- proofs in which no 
knowledge of the actual proof is conveyed. Peggy the Prover 
demonstrates to Sid the Skeptic that she is indeed in 
possession of some piece of knowledge without actually 
revealing any of that knowledge. This is useful for access to 
computers, because eavesdroppers or dishonest sysops cannot 
steal the knowledge given. Also called minimum disclosure 
proofs. Useful for proving possession of some property, or 
credential, such as age or voting status, without revealing 
personal information.


By the way, this Glossary was distributed at the very first
Cypherpunks meeting, a year ago. While never intended as an FAQ, it
still may be of value to subscribers here.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

> > > Not necessarily. Zero knowledge proof techniques, for instance, can be
> > > applied to make source code as impenetrable as one wishes. This tends to
> > > carry a heavy runtime overhead, of course.
> > 
> > Could you go into more detail on this?  Thanks!
> > -- 
> > Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
> 
> I didn't write the item above, but I'll add my comments anyway.
> 
> Zero knowledge interactive proof systems are a critical part of modern
> crypto. Here's the brief summary from the Cypherpunks Glossary,
> available by anon. ftp at soda.berkeley.edu in pub/cypherpunks/misc as
> glossary.text.gz.

Thanks for the definition (but I knew that, anyway).  Sorru I wasn't clear -
what I was looking for was examples of how zero-knowledge proof techniques
could make source code impenetrable.

Source would be nice, too... ;)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"