NODE 052ac4deRe: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)Thu, 18 Nov 93 07:51:31 PST
> My only problem with this is knowing how to organize the
>"guerilla cell structures" or whatever it was he mentioned. Anyone have
>a ref for something that discusses guerilla cell organizations?
The classic Russian model (late 1800's through the October Revolution) was
to have three-person cells, each of which had one person who knew one
person above them in the hierarchy and someone who knew one person below
them. This makes for good security as there is no redundant information in
the network and one failure breaks the chain.
I don't have any specific citations in mind, but the Russian history
instructors at A&M might be a good place to start.
Best regards,
Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
pay me and make you feel foolish."
NODE c63936e5The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
"Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:06:29 PST
This is kind of off-topic, but I thought the classic three-person cell was
as follows:
A
/ \
B - C
/ \
D G
/ \ / \
E - F H - I
where a line shows cell membership. So A commands a cell of himself, B and
C but knows no one below. A is either the leader, or is known by one member
above. B knows D is the leader of another cell, but does not know who E and
F are (or even if they exist). Similarly for C.
This organization is vulnerable in two ways: any one person can give up
three others; and the chain can be followed (e.g. compromising B can lead to
compromising D and then to E, etc.). Because information has to flow
between the cells, there is potential for compromise.
I can't think of a way around this problem. If information flows from B to
E, either B must know of E's existence or non-existence.
--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842 PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.
NODE c6c1e6d9The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
Chester Edelman <coe@panix.com>Thu, 18 Nov 93 10:21:33 PST
> Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 12:04:51 -0500
> From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
>
> This is kind of off-topic, but I thought the classic three-person cell was
> as follows:
>
> A
> / \
> B - C
> / \
> D G
> / \ / \
> E - F H - I
>
> where a line shows cell membership. So A commands a cell of himself, B and
> C but knows no one below. A is either the leader, or is known by one member
> above. B knows D is the leader of another cell, but does not know who E and
> F are (or even if they exist). Similarly for C.
>
> This organization is vulnerable in two ways: any one person can give up
> three others; and the chain can be followed (e.g. compromising B can lead to
> compromising D and then to E, etc.). Because information has to flow
> between the cells, there is potential for compromise.
>
> I can't think of a way around this problem. If information flows from B to
> E, either B must know of E's existence or non-existence.
See R. A. Heinleins's ``Moon is a Harsh Mistress'' for some discussion
of this topic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chet Edelman "Truth is a blanket that leaves your feet out in the cold" D.P.S.
EMAIL: coe@panix.com
SNAIL: 1718 Ocean Avenue, Brooklyn NY 11230
VMAIL: (718) 338-1432
NODE 96e10477Re: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:51:32 PST
"Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" writes:
[[..deletia..]]
>
>This organization is vulnerable in two ways: any one person can give up
>three others; and the chain can be followed (e.g. compromising B can lead to
>compromising D and then to E, etc.). Because information has to flow
>between the cells, there is potential for compromise.
>
>I can't think of a way around this problem. If information flows from B to
>E, either B must know of E's existence or non-existence.
>
The cell structure of 3 people wouldn't necessarily need to know
the "True Names" of anyone in other cells. That's what the
crypto-anarchy tools are for: anonymous credentials, DC-nets and
webs-of-trust, digital signatures, etc. These tools can be used
for "authenticating" the other cells, and communicating with them
without compromising (well... hopefully) your True Name and security.
Knowing only anonymous Ids of other "persons" in the other cells is
useless to the "authorities". Unless of course they can get your
passwords and keys and spoof you. Now how can we make a protocol for
protection against such spoofing? Some sort of Zero Knowledge proof scheme?
--
Allan Bailey, allan@elvis.tamu.edu | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite
iversity in Infinite Combinations | allan.bailey@tamu.edu
GCS -d+ p--- c++++ l+++ u++ e++ m++ s n+ h+ f g+ w+ t+ r y+
"Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it."
-- George Bernard Shaw
"Armadillos....those are the meanest suckers you're ever gonna wanna see...
But you gotta kill 'em the first time, otherwise they get this revenge thing
in their heads and they come lookin' for ya......."
-- (i got this from the 'zine Armadillo Culture)
NODE 17bb977aThe Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
"Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>Thu, 18 Nov 93 11:04:34 PST
Sorry, I was a little unclear. When I worried about someone in a cell being
compromised, I assumed that through social engineering (like throwing in
jail, serving with subpoenas, seizing property, etc.) someone had pressured
or tricked this person into revealing hir secret keys.
If you know you're being pressured and can use a backup
works-but-I'm-in-trouble key, that's a partial solution.
--Alan
NODE 591353dfRe: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)Thu, 18 Nov 93 11:24:33 PST
>
>Sorry, I was a little unclear. When I worried about someone in a cell being
>compromised, I assumed that through social engineering (like throwing in
>jail, serving with subpoenas, seizing property, etc.) someone had pressured
>or tricked this person into revealing hir secret keys.
>
>If you know you're being pressured and can use a backup
>works-but-I'm-in-trouble key, that's a partial solution.
>
AAAHHH!!!! EXCELENT IDEA!!!
Think about it. It's a beautiful extension to PGP, the "I'm-being-coerced"
password. Seems to work, but deletes everything irreparably(sp?).
I don't think the PGP coders will put something like this in,
but the people in my RoD-cell will definately have it as soon as
I'm done. =)
--
Allan Bailey, allan@elvis.tamu.edu | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | allan.bailey@tamu.edu
GCS -d+ p--- c++++ l+++ u++ e++ m++ s n+ h+ f g+ w+ t+ r y+
"Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it."
-- George Bernard Shaw
"Armadillos....those are the meanest suckers you're ever gonna wanna see...
But you gotta kill 'em the first time, otherwise they get this revenge thing
in their heads and they come lookin' for ya......."
-- (i got this from the 'zine Armadillo Culture)