Detweiler abuse again

I got a lot of complaints today about copies of Tim's old "Blacknet" posting
being sent to inappropriate groups:

>  From paw@coos.dartmouth.edu  Mon Feb 14 09:34:13 1994
>  Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 12:31:44 -0500
>  From: paw@coos.dartmouth.edu (Pat Wilson)
>  To: hfinney@shell.portal.com, root@portal.com, postmaster@portal.com
>  Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet
>  Newsgroups: comp.sys.sun.admin
>  References: <199402120837.AAA22008@jobe.shell.portal.com>
>  Status: R
>  
>  In comp.sys.sun.admin you write:
>  
>  >Introduction to BlackNet
>  
>  [etc]
>  
>  I believe that this is an illegal and unethical use of the Net 
>  for commercial purposes (to say nothing of bounds of decency).  
>  This posting lends credence to all sorts of (US) gov't paranoia.
>  Please cease and desist immediately.  
>  
>  Non-anonymously,
>  
>  -- 
>  Pat Wilson
>  Maanger, Academic Unix Systems Group
>  Dartmouth College
>  paw@northstar.dartmouth.edu
>  
>  From mcr@unison.com  Mon Feb 14 10:11:51 1994
>  Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 10:11:22 -0800
>  To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
>  From: mcr@unison.com (Michael Riehle)
>  X-Sender: mcr@hal822.unison.com
>  Subject: Introduction to Blacknet
>  Status: R
>  
>  This message appears to be from someone who is offering an illegal service
>  and is certainly not welcome.  I can't tell if this person is serious or if
>  this is just a sick joke.  It certainly isn't appropriate regardless.
>  
>  >Date:         Mon, 14 Feb 1994 00:50:01 +0000
>  >Reply-To: HP-3000 Systems Discussion <HP3000-L@UTCVM.UTC.EDU>
>  >Sender: HP-3000 Systems Discussion <HP3000-L@UTCVM.UTC.EDU>
>  >Comments:     This message is NOT from the person listed in the From line.  It
>  >is from an automated software remailing service operating at that address. 
>  >Please report problem mail to <hfinney@shell.portal.com>.
>  >Comments:     Warning -- original Sender: tag was NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU
>  >From: nobody <nobody@SHELL.PORTAL.COM>
>  >Subject:      Introduction to Blacknet
>  >To: Multiple recipients of list HP3000-L <HP3000-L@UTCVM.UTC.EDU>
>  >
>  >Introduction to BlackNet
>  >
>  > [...]
>  
>  From kwthomas@nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu  Mon Feb 14 12:38:27 1994
>  Date: Mon, 14 Feb 94 14:37:01 CST
>  From: kwthomas@nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu (Kevin W. Thomas)
>  To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
>  Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet
>  Newsgroups: comp.sys.sun.admin
>  In-Reply-To: <199402120837.AAA22008@jobe.shell.portal.com>
>  Organization: National Severe Storms Laboratory
>  Cc: root@shell.portal.com, root@jobe.shell.portal.com
>  Status: R
>  
>  In article <199402120837.AAA22008@jobe.shell.portal.com> you write:
>  >Introduction to BlackNet
>  >
>  >BlackNet is currently building its information inventory. We are interested
>  >in information in the following areas, though any other juicy stuff is
>  >always welcome. "If you think it's valuable, offer it to us first."
>  >
>  >- trade secrets, processes, production methods (esp. in semiconductors)
>  >
>  >BlackNet can make anonymous deposits to the bank account of your choice,
>  >where local banking laws permit, can mail cash directly (you assume the
>  >risk of theft or seizure), or can credit you in "CryptoCredits," the
>  >internal currency of BlackNet (which you then might use to buy _other_
>  >information and have it encrypted to your special public key and posted in
>  >public place).
>  
>  This doesn't belong in "comp.sys.sun.admin", or any other Usenet group.  It's
>  postings like this that give Usenet a bad name.
>  
>  	Kevin W. Thomas
>  	National Severe Storms Laboratory
>  	Norman, Oklahoma
>  
>  From lab@biostat.mc.duke.edu  Mon Feb 14 14:05:15 1994
>  To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
>  Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet
>  In-reply-to: nobody@shell.portal.com's message of Mon, 14 Feb 1994 11:32:23 -0800
>  Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:04:09 -0500
>  From: "Lance A. Brown" <lab@biostat.mc.duke.edu>
>  Status: R
>  
>  What _IS_ this doing in misc.health.diabetes?
>  
>  Thanks,
>    Lance
>  
>  
>  nobody  <nobody@shell.portal.com> writes:
>  > Introduction to BlackNet
>  
>  
>  > Your name has come to our attention. We have reason to believe you may be
>  > interested in the products and services our new organization, BlackNet, has
>  > to offer.
>  > [...]
>  
>  From appel@cea.Berkeley.EDU  Mon Feb 14 14:24:03 1994
>  To: hfinney@shell.portal.com, root@shell.portal.com
>  Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet
>  In-reply-to: nobody@shell.portal.com's message of Sat, 12 Feb 1994 03:49:18 -0800
>  Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 14:23:06 -0800
>  From: Shannon Appel <appel@cea.Berkeley.EDU>
>  Status: R
>  
>  Please be aware that your anonymous remailer is being abused.  The
>  following inappropriate post was recently sent to a rec.games.frp
>  group.  Please see that this type of thing does not happen again.
>  
>  Shannon
>  --
>  > Introduction to BlackNet
>  > 
>  > 
>  > [...]

I set up a log file for "blacknet" postings, and got this:

> From hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu  Mon Feb 14 17:46:41 1994
> Received: from nova.unix.portal.com (nova.unix.portal.com [156.151.1.101]) by jobe.shell.portal.com (8.6.4/8.6.4) with ESMTP id RAA11362 for <hfinney@shell.portal.com>; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:46:41 -0800
> Received: from punisher.caltech.edu (punisher.cco.caltech.edu [131.215.48.151]) by nova.unix.portal.com (8.6.4/8.6.4-1.13) with ESMTP id RAA03081 for <hfinney@shell.portal.com>; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:46:41 -0800
> Received: from alumni.cco.caltech.edu by punisher.caltech.edu with ESMTP 
> 	(8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA14916; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:46 -0800
> Received: from localhost by alumni.cco.caltech.edu 
> 	(8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA23534; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:42 -0800
> Received: from handel.cs.colostate.edu by alumni.cco.caltech.edu with SMTP
> 	(8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA23522; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:34 -0800
> Message-Id: <199402150145.RAA23522@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
> Received: by handel.cs.colostate.edu
> 	(1.37.109.4/16.2) id AA28603; Mon, 14 Feb 94 18:45:32 -0700
> Date: Mon, 14 Feb 94 18:45:32 -0700
> From: lawrence detweiler <detweile@CS.ColoState.EDU>
> To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
> request-remailing-to: comp.sys.ti.explorer@news.cs.indiana.edu
> subject: Introduction to Blacknet
> 
> Introduction to BlackNet
> 
> 
> Your name has come to our attention. We have reason to believe you may be
> interested in the products and services our new organization, BlackNet, has
> to offer.
> [...]

It seems Larry is sending this posting to lots of inappropriate groups
using several different mail-to-news gateways.  This is a good way to
get remailers shut down, which may be his ultimate goal.

I call upon remailer operators to block incoming messages from Detweiler's
known aliases.  Thos using the slocal-based "cypherpunks" remailer perl
scripts can add the following lines near the front of their maildelivery
files.

# Filter Detweiler
From ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu  file  ?  /dev/null
From 	an12070@anon.penet.fi  		 file  ?  /dev/null
From 	detweile			 file  ?  /dev/null

Unless his access to the remailer network is blocked, he will be able to
continue to abuse the system until it gets shut down.

The alternative would be to block my remailer's access to all known
mail-to-news gateways, but I am reluctant to take that step because of
the loss of this ability for those who legitimately need it.  If his abuse
keeps up, though, that may be the only choice left.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

I support Hal's proposal that as many remailer operators as possible
attempt to filter Detweiler's postings. All it will take for Detweiler
to get through is one who doesn't filter, and who supports encryption,
but this will still make it harder for folks like Detweiler to abuse
the system.

Cryptographically speaking, in a sense, there is no such thing as
"abuse." That is, we can't wring our hands and ask the "authorities"
to "do something." That's the old way of looking at things.

The new way is to use filters, to have postage paid mailers (someday),
and to have users do filtering of their own. Filtering those who
"abuse" the systems we have is just part of the "reputation system" we
are pushing for.

A few comments on Hal's posting:

> I got a lot of complaints today about copies of Tim's old "Blacknet" posting
> being sent to inappropriate groups:

Needless to say, it wasn't me who posted this. Ironically, I've never
posted it to Cypherpunks, either. I sent it out to several folks prior
to a nanotech meeting, to make some points about the impossibility of
bottling up the knowledge of how to do nanotechnology (someday), and
apparently one of the recipients sent it through a remailer to
Cypherpunks. From there, it went out to several other lists and
newsgroups.

Life in the age of cyberspace.

...much stuff deleted...

> > Received: from handel.cs.colostate.edu by alumni.cco.caltech.edu with SMTP
> > 	(8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA23522; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:34 -0800
> > Message-Id: <199402150145.RAA23522@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
> > Received: by handel.cs.colostate.edu
> > 	(1.37.109.4/16.2) id AA28603; Mon, 14 Feb 94 18:45:32 -0700
> > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 94 18:45:32 -0700
> > From: lawrence detweiler <detweile@CS.ColoState.EDU>
> > To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
> > request-remailing-to: comp.sys.ti.explorer@news.cs.indiana.edu
> > subject: Introduction to Blacknet
...

> It seems Larry is sending this posting to lots of inappropriate groups
> using several different mail-to-news gateways.  This is a good way to
> get remailers shut down, which may be his ultimate goal.

This certainly seems to be the case. Detweiler is apparently devoting
his entire life to this sort of nonsense. He keeps escalating the
level of attack.

> I call upon remailer operators to block incoming messages from Detweiler's
> known aliases.  Thos using the slocal-based "cypherpunks" remailer perl
> scripts can add the following lines near the front of their maildelivery
> files.
> 
> # Filter Detweiler
> >From ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu  file  ?  /dev/null
> >From 	an12070@anon.penet.fi  		 file  ?  /dev/null
> >From 	detweile			 file  ?  /dev/null

> Unless his access to the remailer network is blocked, he will be able to
> continue to abuse the system until it gets shut down.

Yes, things are very serious. He'll probably change remailers and will
likely pick other articles from Cypherpunks he thinks will do maximum
damage, either in spreading views the recipients will be shocked by,
or just in using the remailers to mailbomb them and thus increase the
pressure to (somehow) shut the remailers down.

Should we "tone down" our speculations and scenarios? Probably too
late, anyway, as Detweiler already has dozens of controversial posts
he can use...the "Secrets of Stealth" post comes to mind, as well as
many of the calls to arms and proposals for digital money for tax
evasion. In any case, I don't think we should let his abuses stifle
our free discussion of ideas and plans. That would be conceding defeat
and adopting a wimp's outlook. Best that we learn to deal with it in
other ways.

As serious as this is, we knew this kind of concerted attack on the
remailer network was going to happen eventually.

My condolences to Hal and the other operators for having to face this
new threat. Maybe we can learn from it and emerge stronger.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

Tim,

> I support Hal's proposal that as many remailer operators as possible
> attempt to filter Detweiler's postings. All it will take for Detweiler
> to get through is one who doesn't filter, and who supports encryption,
> but this will still make it harder for folks like Detweiler to abuse
> the system.

I disagree.  While I can honestly say that I don't like most Detweiler
posts, I feel that he is showing us the possibility of how remailers
can (and are) being abused.  I think censorship is the wrong answer.
I think there needs to be some accountability, even if it is anonymous
accountability.

"How do we acount for something that's anonymous?" I hear you ask me.
Well, I don't have the answer to that.  Maybe our idea of anonymity is
slightly in error.  Maybe we need something like penet, where you
actually get a return ID, to have some sort of anonymity.  I don't
know 100% for sure that Detweiler is an12070, although I do believe it
is his address.

Although I don't agree with his means, I do feel that once in a while
Detweiler does post something useful.  He does have something to say,
although he has a real backwards way of saying it.  (So backwards that
he causes people to stop listening before he makes his point).

But I feel censorship is *always* the wrong solution, unless it is
done at the end-point.  I.e., I can *choose* not to read posts from
detweiler, or an12070, but that is my choice.  I do not think anyone
has the right to say to me that I *cannot* read his posts.  It should
be my perogative.  Maybe we should change our systems to allow for
anonymous accountability?

Just a thought (or series thereof ;-)

-derek

Derek Atkins writes:

> I disagree.  While I can honestly say that I don't like most Detweiler
> posts, I feel that he is showing us the possibility of how remailers
> can (and are) being abused.  I think censorship is the wrong answer.
> I think there needs to be some accountability, even if it is anonymous
> accountability.

It's really not censorship for Hal or any other remailer operator to
say _his_ machines, accounts, reputation, etc., will be used to mail
death threats to whitehouse.gov, for example, or mailbombs to
newsgroups and mailing lists.

(I'll concede that I sometimes use the word "censorship" in this same
sense Derek was using it, as in "Apple is censoring its employees." I
suppose we need a word for this sense, the non-government censorship
sense.)

But semantics aside, "there ain't no such thing as a free lunch," and
part of the evolutionary development of remailers and anonymous
systems will include various "non-ideal" intermediate stages. Until we
have digital postage, for example, the recipient of Detweiler's
mailbombs has to pay for them. This is a contributing factor that
points to the need to filter at the input to the remailer.

(Note that this filtering is not happening at Detweiler's machine, or
with armed goons going to his house to stop him, etc.)

In Chaum's DC-Net, "disruption" is the problem he devotes most of his
attention to. Not the basic idea, which is explicated in the first few
pages of the paper ("The Dining Cryptographers Problem," Journal of
Cryptology, Vol 1 No 1, 1988), but the implications of a malicious
disruptor intent on shutting the DC-Net down.

What we have in Detweiler is just the first instance of such a
disruptor in our (limited) version of a DC-Net.

With all due respect to my colleague Derek, with whom I agree in many
ways, saying we don't believe in censorship is not an answer.

Derek's further comments about some kind of receipt that comes
back....I'll have to think about that further. My hunch is that that
may break the total anonymity (that we strive for as a principle) and
should be avoided. I'd recommend we all go back and look at the
DC-Nets paper. This paper, by the way, was scanned in and OCRed by the
"Information Liberation Front" (another one of Detweiler's faves) and
is available, last time I checked, in the Cypherpunks archives at
soda.berkeley.edu.

> But I feel censorship is *always* the wrong solution, unless it is
> done at the end-point.  I.e., I can *choose* not to read posts from
> detweiler, or an12070, but that is my choice.  I do not think anyone
> has the right to say to me that I *cannot* read his posts.  It should
> be my perogative.  Maybe we should change our systems to allow for
> anonymous accountability?

Yes, but Hal has not obligation to accept messages from known
disruptors, any more than you have an obligation to "never censor"
people by keeping them out of your house.

Long term, users will have to learn ot have "positive reputation"
filters, or to hire their own screeners or moderators, but in the
short term, Detweiler's mail bombing of dozens of lists with posts
about Nazis, BlackNet, kiddie porn (I predict this next), and tax
evasion will almost certainly result in most of all of the remailers
being shut down by legal pressures.

No simple solutions.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

I wrote:

> It's really not censorship for Hal or any other remailer operator to
> say _his_ machines, accounts, reputation, etc., will be used to mail
                                                      ^ not 
> death threats to whitehouse.gov, for example, or mailbombs to
> newsgroups and mailing lists.

I meant of course "will not be used."

This mental slip of leaving out a "not," especially when I mean it
vehemently ("will NOT be used"), has happened to me several times on
this list and on Extropians. Normally I don't correct minor spellung
errurs, but in this case this could be misinterpreted with disastrous
effects (by someone wishing to do so).

Sorry for the bandwidth.

--Tim May

> Derek's further comments about some kind of receipt that comes
> back....I'll have to think about that further. My hunch is that that
> may break the total anonymity (that we strive for as a principle) and
> should be avoided. I'd recommend we all go back and look at the

I'm not sure that I really meant to have a receipt, more or a
return-path.  Maybe even a cryptographiccally secure return path.  I
think a question is: who are we protecting against?  Are we protecting
against the remailer operators?  Or are we trying to protect from a
third party?

I think we should go back and re-examine our goals for anonymity.

> Yes, but Hal has not obligation to accept messages from known
> disruptors, any more than you have an obligation to "never censor"
> people by keeping them out of your house.

To me, this is like NEARNet saying that they have no obligation to
accept packets from a known disruptive user.  No, I don't believe that
that is the answer.  Then again, I don't think that a remailer should
run out of an account, but rather on a machine, but that's a different
story.  I consider a remailer a service, and as such, the service
should be available to all comers.  (With digital postage this
paradigm makes much more sense).  I do not think of it like a home.

I also agree that positive reputation is important, but I think that
is much more difficult to implement than a more secure anonymous
system.

To reiterate: I do think that something needs to be done, but I think
we should analyze what we are trying to accomplish rather than rushing
off and saying "just don't service this abusive customer".

-derek

Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>  writes:
>
> I'm not sure that I really meant to have a receipt, more or a
> return-path.  Maybe even a cryptographiccally secure return path.  I
> think a question is: who are we protecting against?  Are we protecting
> against the remailer operators?  Or are we trying to protect from a
> third party?

  I think that we are trying to protect against 3rd parties.  With the
  X-A-R-P:/X-A-S-P: scheme I posted, each remailer *could* log who it
  came from and who it was going to -- it's optional.  But, (with the
  appropriate delays and padding to prevent traffic analysis), a third
  party would not be able to figure that out.

> To me, this is like NEARNet saying that they have no obligation to
> accept packets from a known disruptive user.  No, I don't believe that
> that is the answer.  Then again, I don't think that a remailer should
> run out of an account, but rather on a machine, but that's a different
> story.  I consider a remailer a service, and as such, the service
> should be available to all comers.  (With digital postage this
> paradigm makes much more sense).  I do not think of it like a home.

  I would argue that you are correct.  Anonymous remailing is a new service.
  It should have new servers that run on a well-known port (so that any user
  can start one up) and hacks could be put into most of the current mail
  agents to support using an anoymous remailer.  We don't even have to follow
  RFC 822 in the format of our messages, though I think we should.

> I also agree that positive reputation is important, but I think that
> is much more difficult to implement than a more secure anonymous
> system.

  Yes.  The easiest way to build a reputation is to assign some unique
  public/private key pair to each anonymous user and require all remailed
  messages to be signed.  Then, you as a user can choose to ignore or
  read messages from that id.  Additionally, it does allow for the
  server daemon to reject postings from "abusive" ids or simply not forward
  the posting, but rather a notice stating the ID and subject line of the
  message, making it available in a public place like anonymous ftp or
  gopherspace for those who *do* want to read it.  

  The really nice thing about this is that it won't prevent people from
  having their anonymity, but it will cut down on the actual damage that
  abusers can do.

> To reiterate: I do think that something needs to be done, but I think
> we should analyze what we are trying to accomplish rather than rushing
> off and saying "just don't service this abusive customer".

  I agree.  I think anonymous remailing should be as close to universal as
  possible.  If there *is* a way to service everyone, I think we should do
  it.  Resorting to non-service of "abusers" should be the last resort.

 Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone@psc.edu | (412) 268-6959 | PGP Key # B75699
 PGP Public Key fingerprint =  23 59 EC 91 47 A6 E3 92  9E A8 96 6A D9 27 C9 6C

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Mon, 14 Feb 1994, Timothy C. May wrote:

> Derek Atkins writes:
>
> > I disagree.  While I can honestly say that I don't like most Detweiler
> > posts, I feel that he is showing us the possibility of how remailers
> > can (and are) being abused.  I think censorship is the wrong answer.
> > I think there needs to be some accountability, even if it is anonymous
> > accountability.
>
> It's really not censorship for Hal or any other remailer operator to
> say _his_ machines, accounts, reputation, etc., will be used to mail
> death threats to whitehouse.gov, for example, or mailbombs to
> newsgroups and mailing lists.

While it is not censorship as such, it rather seems against our stated goals as 
cypherpunks to advocate such filtering...not because of what it blocks from our 
own sites, but it _does_ affect those downstream.  To give an example of why 
this is important, last July (June?) the University of Canterbury in 
Christchurch New Zealand began filtering all alt.sex.* newspostings from their 
site.  Well this in itself was perhaps harmless, the topology of NZ's corner of 
the net is such that as a result _all_ net-sites in the entire of NZ's South 
Island lost these newsgroups.  While I'm not saying that the University were 
outside of their rights, we must keep the wider issues in view at all times.

Another key point is that we not let our own personal feelings interfere with 
our political actions.  I'm sure most of us here were offended by the 
suggestions in the heat of the anonymity debate that all anonymous postings to 
newsgroups be killed...yet here are cypherpunks advocating the filtering of all 
Detweiler and Detweiler-seeming posts.  Sure, the guy's a prick, but should we 
let him turn us into fascists?

				Jim Wise
				wisej@acf4.nyu.edu
				jaw7254@acfcluster.nyu.edu
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Derek Atkins says:
> I disagree.  While I can honestly say that I don't like most Detweiler
> posts, I feel that he is showing us the possibility of how remailers
> can (and are) being abused.

One reasonable solution to abuse is to block the use of remailers by
potential abusers. Julf does this with his system. Remember this is
distinct from censorship -- you are not telling someone "you can't use
any system", you are telling them "you can't use my hardware to do
what you want; find someone else's hardware".

Perry

Uh, sorry to ask, but why is he still on cypherpunks if his abuse stems 
from knowledge gained on this list?

____        Robert A. Hayden          <=> hayden@krypton.mankato.msus.edu
\  /__          -=-=-=-=-             <=>          -=-=-=-=-
 \/  /   Finger for Geek Code Info    <=> In the United States, they
   \/  Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> first came for us in Colorado...
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
(GEEK CODE 1.0.1)  GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++
		       n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

> Uh, sorry to ask, but why is he still on cypherpunks if his abuse stems 
> from knowledge gained on this list?
> 
> ____        Robert A. Hayden          <=> hayden@krypton.mankato.msus.edu

First, the BlackNet piece dates from last fall, when Det was still on
the list (he asked to be removed in November or thereabouts).

Second, he may be subscribed under one of several aliases. I think
not, though.

Third, apparently someone is forwarding to him some or all of the
posts. Probably just some, would be my guess.

--Tim May



-- 
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Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
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