Clipper

If the govt and all its agencies used Clipper for all their communications,
they would be vulnerable to attack from foreign govts that have bought the
keys from spys.  Despite being in escrow, I can't imagine they are really
as secure as everyone seems to think.  If random govt agencies can get the
keys for legal wiretaps, spys will also be able to do so.

Does Clinton have the right to listen in on NSA communication?  If he tried
he might find that they aren't using Clipper internally (or that they keys
aren't in the proper escrow locations).

> Does Clinton have the right to listen in on NSA communication?  If he tried
> he might find that they aren't using Clipper internally (or that they keys
> aren't in the proper escrow locations).

Of course they aren't using Clipper, at least not for anything
sensitive.  They know better than that.  Clipper is not a secure
system.  Skipjack may be wonderful, but the whole setup totally
lacks key security.  Given their institutional paranoia, they
wouldn't touch Clipper with a 1024-bit prime.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu> wrote:
> Of course they aren't using Clipper, at least not for anything
> sensitive.  They know better than that.  Clipper is not a secure
> system.  Skipjack may be wonderful, but the whole setup
> totally lacks key security.  Given their institutional paranoia,
> they wouldn't touch Clipper with a 1024-bit prime.

Skipjack might have a decent design, but considering that it uses 10
byte keys, it will probably be feasible to mount a brute-force attack on
it within a decade or so.  (As is currently possible with DES 7-byte
keys.)