NODE 69fd0f5aNew Remailer Up.
nobody@qwerty.orgTue, 1 Feb 94 22:10:49 PST
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Greetings.
New remailer: qwerty@netcom.com.
No logs. Only a "counter" that works by appending the word "R" or "ER" to a
text file so I can get an idea if anyone is using it. However, I'm sure the
Netcom and other site's mail logs will be enough to track serious abusers
of anonymity down, without my help. This remailer is dedicated to honest
people who desire PRIVACY.
(The extra "-" and "space" characters at the beginning of some lines are an
artifact of my signing this with PGP).
Accepts standard,
::
Request-Remailing-To: address
(space)
message
or standard,
::
Encrypted:PGP
(blank line)
- -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3
Blah blah blah.
- -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
(blank line)
Optional message here.
in which the first two lines of the decrypted message contains,
::
Request-Remailing-To: address
(blank line)
Spelling mistakes will land mail in my mail box where I will emotionlessly
delete them. Leaving out the blank lines may cause messages to dissapear.
Public key for Qwerty Remailer <qwerty@netcom.com>,
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3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=BXnK
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
See the PGP FAQ for how to use encrypted remailers. Send mail to
na38138@anon.penet.fi with subject "Bomb me!" for Gary Edstrom's PGP FAQ
and my "Here's How to MacPGP!" guide.
That's NA (not AN), thirty-eight, one-thirty-eight.
Thanks to Hal Finney for sending me updated perl scripts and a working copy
of UNIX PGP2.3a. I am looking into ViaCrypt UNIX PGP 2.4 as well.
Send mail regarding the remailer to qwerty@netcom.com.
-Xenon
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
iQCVAgUBLU77FgSzG6zrQn1RAQHlvgQAj2S4bYB+5dEDubfzk8etdBOSbehxfF/o
B8ycAHgbHjs0SI9HEb0Xm9RJP+ZLtFfD8J7KgOWe0cJlWdy8NKwJxh55Uqn6yiQn
IHB2M9x51nXD3ySCIH8f2USXuHYj8qiInzvQwP6naNiC0vU9E+4ab02Th+IbC8zL
n9Jthe+vTf8=
=MEvY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
NODE 91f32fa7Re: New Remailer Up.
"Jon 'Iain' Boone" <boone@psc.edu>Wed, 2 Feb 94 07:00:55 PST
nobody@qwerty.org writes:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> Greetings.
>
> New remailer: qwerty@netcom.com.
>
> No logs. Only a "counter" that works by appending the word "R" or "ER" to a
> text file so I can get an idea if anyone is using it. However, I'm sure the
> Netcom and other site's mail logs will be enough to track serious abusers
> of anonymity down, without my help. This remailer is dedicated to honest
> people who desire PRIVACY.
Is the sendmail (I assume you are using sendmail for SMTP services) daemon
set up so that it *doesn't* log to /usr/spool/mqueue/syslog [or any other
syslog facility]? Otherwise, it may well be possible to track the usage
of the remailer through browsing the syslog logs.
This is one of the problems (it seems to me) with using a remailer and
*not* having root access. Unless you can convince your sysadmin to
remove the syslog mechanism that sendmail uses, you may be exposing your
users (presumably by accident).
Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone@psc.edu | (412) 268-6959
PGP Public Key fingerprint = 23 59 EC 91 47 A6 E3 92 9E A8 96 6A D9 27 C9 6C
NODE cf701defNew Remailer Up.
hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)Wed, 2 Feb 94 07:40:56 PST
>> New remailer: qwerty@netcom.com.
> Is the sendmail [...] daemon
> set up so that it *doesn't* log to /usr/spool/mqueue/syslog [...] ?
> This is one of the problems (it seems to me) with using a remailer and
> *not* having root access.
The remailers could implement their own outoing SMTP, to get rid of
one end of the log, albeit the less important end.
They could also run a SMTP server on a non-reserved TCP port, but that
would require a few things:
-- The remailer would have to be in the process table at all times and
listening to some TCP port. Right now the remailer is activated by
incoming mail and appears only transiently in the process table.
-- The remailer chain would have to know to use the alternate port
when sending. This should require new syntax for setting up source
routes.
It would, however, eliminate the standard mail logging.
Eric