FLASH: Vice President Gore Questions Current Key Escrow Policy!

National Information Infrastructure Advisory Committee met today in
Washington at the Old Executive Office Building.  In comments made after a
question and answer period,  Vice President Al Gore said that key escrow
policy announced last Friday (2/4/94) had serious flaws and that he hope
the issue of who holds the keys and under what terms would be given more
serious, careful consideration.  

Gore made it clear that some amount of control of cryptography technology
was necessary for national security.  However, the key escrow policies
announced by the Departments of Justice, Commerce & State, and the NSA,
were "low level decisions" that got out before thorough analysis.  In a
conversation with Mitchell Kapor, Esther Dyson, and Mike Nelson (of the
White House Staff), Gore said that he would prefer that the keys be held by
some part of the Judiciary branch, or perhaps even by trusted, private
escrow agents.  He made it clear that he believed that the escrow agents
named in last Friday's announcement (National Institute of Standards &
Technology and the Treasure Department) were no appropriate key holders. 
Mike Nelson also indicated that there was real interest in a software-based
escrow system instead of the hardware-based SKIPJACK standard

Those of us who heard Gore were quite surprised.  His remarks suggest that
the key escrow policies to date do not have full support of the White
House.

Still, Gore was quite firm in asserting that some control of encryption
technology is essential to national security.  "Encryption and codebreaking
have determined the outcome of world wars.  He stated (incorrectly) that
most our industrialized allies place must stricter controls in encryption
that the US does.  In fact, almost all COCOM countries allow the export of
DES-based products, though some do not allow DES to be imported.

The whole question of encryption was raised when Mitchell Kapor told the
Vice President that over half of the Advisory Council members had serious
reservations about the current Clipper/Skipjack policies.  Gore and Kapor
agreed that the Advisory Council should be used to have a serious dialogue
about encryption policy.  Given Gore's departure from the current Clipper
proposals, there might actually be something to talk about.

==========
NOTE: This DOES NOT mean that Clipper is going away.  Part of stopping
Clipper is to lift export controls on encryption and enable US companies to
start producing products that enable all of us to protect our privacy with
strong encryption.

I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at cantwell@eff.org. In the
Subject header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body of
your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF will
deliver printouts of all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong showing
of support from the Net community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her colleagues
on Capitol Hill that encryption is not only an industry concern, but also
a grassroots issue. *Again: remember to put "I support HR 3627" in your
Subject header.*

P.S. If you want additional information about the Cantwell bill, send
e-mail to cantwell-info@eff.org. To join EFF, write membership@eff.org.
For introductory info about EFF, send any message to info@eff.org.

The text of the Cantwell bill can be found on the Internet with the any of
the following URLs (Universal Resource Locaters):

ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
http://www.eff.org/ftp/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/EFF/legislation/cantwell.bill

**************************************************************************
Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking a peeping
tom to install your window blinds.    - John Perry Barlow, EFF co-founder

The Electronic Frontier Foundation is working to protect your privacy.  To
help stop Clipper and eliminate export controls on cryptography, support a
bill introduced in the House of Representatives, HR 3627.  To support the
bill, send email to <cantwell@eff.org>.

......................................................................
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel              <djw@eff.org>
Electronic Frontier Foundation                        202-347-5400 (v) 
1001 G St, NW  Suite 950 East                         202-393-5509 (f)
Washington, DC 20001

*** Join EFF!!!  Send mail to membership@eff.org for information ***




-- 
Stanton McCandlish * mech@eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist
F O R   M O R E   I N F O,    E - M A I L    T O:     I N F O @ E F F . O R G 
O  P  E  N    P  L  A  T  F  O  R  M     O  N  L  I  N  E    R  I  G  H  T  S
V  I   R   T   U   A   L   C  U   L   T   U   R   E      C  R   Y   P   T   O

Frankly, it looks to me like the gov't is playing "good cop, bad cop",
with Gore being the "Good Cop" and anonymous faceless bureaucrats
being the "bad cop".

I hope nobody falls for this...

						- Bill

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> **************************************************************************
> Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking a peeping
> tom to install your window blinds.    - John Perry Barlow, EFF co-founder

> The Electronic Frontier Foundation is working to protect your privacy.  To
> help stop Clipper and eliminate export controls on cryptography, support a
> bill introduced in the House of Representatives, HR 3627.  To support the
> bill, send email to <cantwell@eff.org>.

I wish I knew how to help you wake up and smell the contradiction here.
In one breath you acknowledge that government is an enemy of privacy,
and in the next you encourage acting to endorse and empower that very
government by petitioning it.

Secede now!  Then your works need not be exported from US because they
wouldn't be there to begin with!

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

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