Re: cfp '94 transcript

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[...]

(Unknown)                     My name is Barbolin (?) from GRC (?). 

I have a question concerning the algorithm that is used in the
Clipper Chip, Skipjack..[]..There is a certain amount of conjecture
that in fact the algorithm contains a deliberately encoded weakness
that will allow the NSA, without access to the escrow keys, to be
able to intercept communication in their mission to monitor on-
shore and off-shore communications..[]..

BAKER                         I'll answer it yes or no if you'll
tell me exactly the question.

UNKNOWN                       Does it or does it not contain a
weakness that allows you to intercept the communications without
access to the escrow keys.  


BAKER                         No.       

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ObNit:  As has been said before by others, there's more to  
Clipper/EES than just the Skipjack algorithm.  I think simply asking  
if "the [Skipjack] algorithm contains a deliberately encoded  
weakness" leaves too much room for a "truthful" No answer.

People have posted descriptions of mechanisms that could be used to  
leak key information which do not rely on a deliberately weakened  
encryption algorithm.  (depends on how broadly you define  
"algorithm").

A better question to ask would be...

Are there any software or hardware mechanisms, or combinations of  
software and hardware mechanisms, present in the Clipper/EES system  
that supports or enables decryption of intercepted Clipper/EES  
communications without access to escrowed unit keys?

Does that cover it well enough?

Jim_Miller@suite.com

> UNKNOWN                       Does it or does it not contain a
> weakness that allows you to intercept the communications without
> access to the escrow keys.  
> 
> BAKER                         No.       
> -----------
> ObNit:  As has been said before by others, there's more to  
> Clipper/EES than just the Skipjack algorithm.  I think simply asking  
> if "the [Skipjack] algorithm contains a deliberately encoded  
> weakness" leaves too much room for a "truthful" No answer.

I'm not sure what the NSA policy is on this.  However, at that
same conference Jim Settle from the FBI told us plainly that
he is allowed to lie, and that the courts have confirmed this
right.  I doubt Baker would have confessed to a back door even
if one existed and the question was complete.

> I'm not sure what the NSA policy is on this.  However, at that
> same conference Jim Settle from the FBI told us plainly that
> he is allowed to lie, and that the courts have confirmed this
> right.  I doubt Baker would have confessed to a back door even
> if one existed and the question was complete.
 
Exactly right. The FBI may lie to you, but you may not lie
to them (see 18 USC 1001).


--Mike

C'punks,

On Mon, 28 Mar 1994, Jim Miller wrote:

> . . .
> 
> A better question to ask would be...
> 
> Are there any software or hardware mechanisms, or combinations of  
> software and hardware mechanisms, present in the Clipper/EES system  
> that supports or enables decryption of intercepted Clipper/EES  
> communications without access to escrowed unit keys?
> 
> Does that cover it well enough?

I don't think so.  There might be some aspect of the "escrowed" keys that 
would allow them to be accessed from duplicates or some other end run.  
The question should include inquiries that address the accessibility of 
the keys outside of the "warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause" 
view that many people have fallen for.

 S a n d y