Crypto, satellites, & China

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A story in the 3/14/94 issue of _Aviation Week_ reports that Hughes
and Martin Marietta have satisfied the State Department and will now
be able to launch the Optus B3 comsat. All the quotes below are from
the article; it didn't have any detail on the cryptostuff.

State had held up the launch because the Optus B3 payload included a
"sensitive decryption chip". The USG made trade with China subject to
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) after China was suspected
of selling missiles to Pakistan.

Hughes agreed to remove the chip, which "guards the satellite's
steering commands"; once removed, State lifted the export restriction.

"By removing the chip, authority for approving the launch was shifted
to the Commerce Dept. from an interagency review commission headed by
the State Dept. that had far less leeway to act."

I never knew that encryption fell under MTCR in addition to ITAR.
Presumably any crypto hardware or software which can be used to
protect missile or satellite telemetry or commanding can be
restricted.

If anyone has more details on the MTCR and its application, I'd love
to hear it.

- -Paul Robichaux

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG      | Out the 10Base-T port, through the router, 
perobich@ingr.com           | over the leased line, off the bridge, past
Intergraph Federal Systems  | the firewall... nothing but net.
	       Of course I don't speak for Intergraph.

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paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux) writes:
> I never knew that encryption fell under MTCR in addition to ITAR.
> Presumably any crypto hardware or software which can be used to
> protect missile or satellite telemetry or commanding can be
> restricted.

It's my understanding that, according to international missile
treaties (probably the MTCR), missile telemetry data must be
transmitted in the clear.  This is ostensibly so that the various
world powers can be assured that a "test" missile launch really is a 
test and is not going to wipe out someone's capital.  It's also so
that various intelligence agencies can have accurate estimates of
everyone's capabilities.  This knowledge is widely viewed as
stabilising.

> It's my understanding that, according to international missile
> treaties (probably the MTCR), missile telemetry data must be
> transmitted in the clear.  This is ostensibly so that the various
> world powers can be assured that a "test" missile launch really is a 
> test and is not going to wipe out someone's capital.  It's also so
> that various intelligence agencies can have accurate estimates of
> everyone's capabilities.  This knowledge is widely viewed as
> stabilising.

No, I think the MTCR is like ITAR: it restricts who may export what.
The MTCR is the rationale behind why we don't export rocket engines to
countries like Pakistan who are believed to be developing IRBMs. Of
course, some dual-use technology probably slips through, just as it
has with ITAR and COCOM.

All of the strategic arms reduction treaties include a provision for
telemetry monitoring, but I didn't think "ordinary" satellite launches
were covered. Especially in the case of commanding; you really don't
want J. Random Hacker to reorient the attitude or orbit of your
comsat.

-Paul


-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG      | Out the 10Base-T port, through the router, 
perobich@ingr.com           | over the leased line, off the bridge, past
Intergraph Federal Systems  | the firewall... nothing but net.
	       Of course I don't speak for Intergraph.