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Undersigned is non-computing, non-cyphering reporter at Boston Globe working on a little story on the solution of RSA129 (I believe the primes will be published April 23, or so). Looking for people who loaned computer cycles for the project, hoping to hear why they did, what fun if any it was, and what's it like when they tell you to shut down...sense of loss? Whatever M. R. Montgomery The Boston Globe montgo@nws.globe.com
When you write your story, *please* help correct what already seems to be a widespread misconception by emphasizing that solving RSA129 does *not* mean that the RSA public key cryptosystem has been "broken". It only means that one *particular* and relatively short RSA key, chosen long ago for test purposes, has been broken by brute computational force. An equally intensive effort would have to be mounted from scratch to break any other RSA key of the same length; this is why it's good practice to change "real" keys from time to time. And, of course, the longer the RSA key, the more work it is to crack. Barring major breakthroughs in the underlying algorithms for attacking RSA, which have not occurred, a sufficiently long key (e.g., 1024 bits) will be secure for quite some time even with present trends in brute-force computer power. The real importance of the RSA129 effort is that it provides a new experimental "data point" on the security of a particular key length. This is a good example of the seemingly paradoxical principle that publishing the design of a cryptographic system and inviting attacks by all comers can actually help to strengthen it in actual use. This is in sharp contrast to, say, Clipper/Skipjack, where the NSA classifies the algorithm and says "trust us, it's secure". The NSA may believe that it's secure. It may even *be* secure (except, of course for the gaping front door of key escrow). But without a sustained, long-term public review there's no way to know if they missed something. Phil