Message Haven explanation

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Hm... after reading various replies about the message haven I
described, I've concluded my original explanation was terrible and
confusing ;)

Background: I've noticed that about the only opposition voiced to
anonymous mail is the fact somebody can harrass another user (however,
they can also be used to forward Clarinet posts, for example).  Also,
systems such as Julf's, convenient as it is, require tables which map
psuedonym to true identity.  The message haven is my idea of how to
get around these two problems.  (I'm not saying Julf is untrustworthy
or something, this is just an idea to try out!)

The way I see it working is you would create a message containing what
you want to say, what to name the next reply, and anything else...
perhaps a new public key to encrypt the reply with.  You encrypt this
message with the public key for whoever you want to communicate with,
and send it to the haven with instuctions to file it under a name you
specify.  Your partner would browse the message haven, and retreive
the message.  He would frame a response, include what to name the next
reply, maybe include another key, etc., encrypt his message with your
public key, and send it back to be filed under the name you specified.

The very first message to a person would have to be titled something
obvious to them (i.e. "To Pr0duct Cypher", "To Deadbeat", "To
Wonderer", "To L. Detweiler" or whoever), unless you can pre-arrange
this.

So far, the haven just accepts messages and files them.  Maybe it
could take a digital cash payment to file in an area where the message
will be available for longer.  The haven doesn't even have a public
key (unless it runs a bank and has a public key for the bank portion).

Now, if the message haven keeps logs of what messages you read, it
will be able to figure out who you are communicating with.  One
possibility is to take all the message, so even if the haven fully
logs, it will derive no information.  This is only if you actually
care that the haven can figure out who you are communicating with.  If
not, just grab the messages for you.

Some people are suggesting retrieving a subset of the messages.  Yes,
this will work, but only if you take the same subset all the time.
For example, you take your messages and message addressed to users A,
B, C, and yourself.  (There would be a complication if all the other
users changed public keys simultaneously).  If you don't take the same
subset all the time (say you retrieve A, B, C, and yourself once, and
then X, Y, Z, and yourself another time.  It should be pretty clear
who you are!), you expose your identity.  Also, you would need to take
all the messages of the other users (say A, B, C, and you have 5
messages each.  You take all of yours, and just 1 from each of the
others.  Again, it should be pretty obvious who you are).

Maybe the easiest thing to do is simply use a brand new public key
every time, then you can take random messages.  Indeed, you could even
fool the haven into thinking you are communicating with someone else
by always retrieving their messages, if you use a new public key each
time.

Some schemes have been suggested in which you tell the haven what
messages you want.  It would send them along with some random ones.  I
don't like this idea since it requires the haven to be able to connect
your pseudonym with your true identity, and it's more complicated, as
far as the haven goes, and as far as you (if you want to use a new
key).  And if you are already telling the haven your identity, you may
as well just browse it and retrieve the messages intended for you.

So, hopefully that is a bit clearer.  Comments are welcome!

Karl Barrus
klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu

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> Background: I've noticed that about the only opposition voiced to
> anonymous mail is the fact somebody can harrass another user (however,

Well then, just have people anonymously mail messages to the
haven, with complete headers etc.. then to check your mail
you just ftp over and read the (automaticly maintained)
index file for messages that have a "TO: yourname@yoursite.com"
header, and don't worry about the 'downloading every
message' idea. This is the simplest solution I can think of
for the problem you state above, althoug it would be a big
improvement if the ftp server had a special command that
means "gimme my mail" or something... so a casual browser
wouldn't discover the names and email addresses of
*everyone* who was receiving anon mail.

Happy Hunting, -Chris.

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner @ indirect.com      | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
cypherpunks         WOw            dCD           Traskcom          Team Stupid
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PGP NSA ViaCrypt Phrack EFF #hack LOD/H 950 FBI MindVox ESN KC NUA murder
QSD Hacker DEFCON SprintNet MCI AT&T HoHoCon DNIC TRW CBI 5ESS KGB CIA
RSA Communist terrorist assassin encrypt 2600 NORAD missile explosive hack
phreak pirate drug bomb cocain payment smuggle A.P. bullets semi-auto stinger
revolution H.E.A.T. warheads porno kiddiesex export import customs deviant
bribe corrupt White House senator congressman president Clinton Gore bootleg
assasinate target ransom secret bluprints prototype microfilm agents mole
mafia hashish everclear vodka TnaOtmSc Sony marijuana pot acid DMT Nixon
yeltsin bosnia zimmerman crack knight-lightning craig neidorf lex luthor
kennedy pentagon C2 cheyenne cbx telnet tymenet marcus hess benson & hedges
kuwait saddam leader death-threat overlords police hitler furer karl marx
mark tabas agrajag king blotto blue archer eba the dragyn unknown soldier
catch-22 phoenix project biotech genetic virus clone ELINT intercept diplomat
explosives el salvador m-16 columbia cartel

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