Server clusterfuck

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From: Derek Atkins <warlord@ATHENA.MIT.EDU>
 
Sigh... You know, when things are on a delicate balance, a single
message sent too soon can really screw things up.
 
I can tell you for certain that your questions *will* be answered in
due time, please wait for the final arrangements to be made.  No, PGP
2.5 is *NOT* available (this second).  Yes, there is one in the works,
and I expect it Real Soon Now.
 
Also, please do not condemn Bal or his keyserver for not accepting
keys from versions of PGP before 2.4 -- as I understand it, that was
part of the agreement in order to make 2.5 happen, but I really don't
know all the details.
<-
 
Then this should have be stated in the "press release" message he sent.
As should have the details, what were available, of the PGP 2.5 release.
The fact that the limitations on the keyserver were imposed only makes
me wonder more.
 
I hope the code of 2.5 is looked at real carefully.
 
-uni- (Dark)

> Then this should have be stated in the "press release" message he sent.
> As should have the details, what were available, of the PGP 2.5 release.
> The fact that the limitations on the keyserver were imposed only makes
> me wonder more.

My point is that this was not an official "press release", and IMHO
the message should *NOT* have been sent untl an official PGP 2.5 press
release is made.  At this point in time, it is still unclear when PGP
2.5 is going to be released (although I suspect that it will be
released RSN).

As I said, I do know that the limitation son the keyserver were part
of the bargain to get a legal non-infringing freeware version of
PGP...  Take that any way you want.  Onoce I see the code and can
peruse it, I will probably trust 2.5 as much as I have trusted other
versions of the code.

> I hope the code of 2.5 is looked at real carefully.

Trust me, it will be!

-derek

> As I said, I do know that the limitation son the keyserver were part
> of the bargain to get a legal non-infringing freeware version of
> PGP...  Take that any way you want.

Let's see if I understand this correctly.  There is some deal, between
parties as yet unnamed, but presumably including PKP/RSADSI as one of
the parties.  This deal licences RSAREF for use in a new version of PGP,
and requires one particular keyserver to be crippled in such a way that
it ceases to accept keys that appear to have been created by certain
versions of PGP.  Right?  I wonder what advantage PKP/RSADSI sees in
crippling this one keyserver, since everybody can simply continue to use
non crippled keyservers.

--apb (Alan Barrett)