Re: Cantwell Bill

Perry wrote,

>For those who haven't been paying attention, the Cantwell Bill could
>die in the intelligence committee. Please pay attention to Stanton
>McCandlish's alert from EFF and act on it TODAY. Call up those
>congressmen! When I called, most of them indicated they hadn't heard
>from people. Make the phone ring off the hook with concern that this
>measure pass!

I *cannot* figure out why nobody has responded in a week to this
new revelation, as it has total relevance to the Cantwell Bill!
Once again,

Sumex-aim.stanford.edu, the internet's biggest Mac ftp archive has
been *EXPORTING* MacPGP2.2, many times a day, every day for over
a YEAR. This is automatic, since there are mirror sites in most
countries on the internet, including Singapore and China. *Had*
someone picked up on this sooner, there would still be time to spread
the word to the point where congresscritters would know this was
going on.

I don't care any more. Y'all deserve what y'git. I send my fax.

Somebody writes:
> Sumex-aim.stanford.edu, the internet's biggest Mac ftp archive has
> been *EXPORTING* MacPGP2.2, many times a day, every day for over

The reason I don't consider your Stunning Revelation an important news
flash is that it's just one example of the many ways crypto is actually
exported.  For example, PGP 2.6 was overseas within hours of its release.

A more direct comparison is with DES: NIST has DES code available in
soft copy in Appendix A of its publication fips181.txt, accessible in
their public FTP directory with no warnings about export restrictions.

The Cantwell stuff is extremely important for commercial products, but
for private crypto (e.g. non-profit and non-infringing PGP
implementations) it simply decriminalizes the existing vigorous export
activity; rather like decriminalizing the use of marijuana.

	Jim Gillogly
	Highday, 24 Forelithe S.R. 1994, 19:35