Gore's "new and improved" key escrow proposal

Just think how easy it would be to comply with software key escrow requirements:
imagine a new PGP option -- +encrypt_to_escrow_agents=on

The escrow agent's PGP public key could be shipped with every copy of PGP...
naturally, every PGP user will be required by law not to override this
option if the Vice President gets his way.

 --- sound of tongue being removed from cheek ---

I have tried to think of a positive use for key escrow.  The only  thing that I
have come up with so far is kind of like having local key escrow within one 
company, or something like that.  Kind of like having a master key that fits
all the offices in one wing of a building, or something like that.  That could
be good in some business uses, provided you could pick your own trusted master
key holder.  I don't think that is what Al Gore has in mind.

> Just think how easy it would be to comply with software key escrow
> requirements: imagine a new PGP option -- +encrypt_to_escrow_agents=on

I think that this is an exceellent idea, not one to be laughed at. Voluntary
compliance is a good thing. Something I'm toying with is the possibility of
putting a voluntary tax in my program. 1% of all transactions would go to
paying for educational access and access for poor people. If you don't want
to contribute, just turn it off. As long as either the vendor or the customer
has the option on, 1% will find its way to those groups. Vendors and
customers would even be able to charge groups that do not participate extra
as a penalty for not being socially conscious. Government intervention with
guns is not necessary for warm fuzzy things to occur.

Voluntarilly participating in things like escrow and "warm fuzzy liberal
taxes" has the potential to take the bite out of legilation intended to
regulate us. (And remember, another name for secret-split key escrow is
KEY BACKUP, a very important function in any cryptographic system that's
intended to last and be reasonably universal.)

Cheers,

JWS

Actually, that should be

+encrypt_to_escrow_agent=vice-president@whitehouse.gov
or
+encrypt_to_escrow_agent=prz@acm.org

(You get to choose your own escrow agent :-) ).

This should be trivial to implement; just treat it as an implicit
recipient in all PK-encrypted messages.

						- Bill

I think we need to distinguish between encrypted *storage* and
encrypted *communications*.  Voluntary key escrow may make sense for
encrypted stored business files, but communications is a different
story. Since there should be nobody out there recording packets, there
is no need to back up or escrow the keys used to encrypt them.

Phil

> 
> I think we need to distinguish between encrypted *storage* and
> encrypted *communications*.  Voluntary key escrow may make sense for
> encrypted stored business files, but communications is a different
> story. Since there should be nobody out there recording packets, there
> is no need to back up or escrow the keys used to encrypt them.
> 
> Phil

But I leave nearly all PGP-encrypted messages to me in encrypted form,
using the "decrypt to screen" option. So communicated and stored
messages are largely the same.

I'm not supporting key escrow, mind you.


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
"National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

But I leave nearly all PGP-encrypted messages to me in encrypted form,
   using the "decrypt to screen" option. So communicated and stored
   messages are largely the same.

This is exactly the situation I referred to yesterday.  It's extremely
common, I suspect.  Tim does it, I do it, and I've no reason to
believe that most people do it differently.

Keeping the messages around encrypted with your private key does _not_
have forward secrecy.  Forward secrecy is a valuable property, and it
behooves us to think about how to achieve it.

Eric

On Mon, 25 Jul 1994, Phil Karn wrote:

> I think we need to distinguish between encrypted *storage* and
> encrypted *communications*.  Voluntary key escrow may make sense for
> encrypted stored business files, but communications is a different
> story. Since there should be nobody out there recording packets, there
> is no need to back up or escrow the keys used to encrypt them.

Good point.  The line between storage and transmission gets kind of 
fuzzy, however, if transmitted messages get stored in encrypted form.  I 
think that if I were designing an encryption system to be used for both 
in my own business, I would probably consider a compartmented escrow 
system for both kinds of messages, with a different escrow public key for 
each department.  That is would be a good balance between two evils:  
unauthorized disclosure of proprietary communications, and loss of 
encrypted data due to loss of a key or loss of an employee.  Naturally, 
this would not be as convenient for law enforcement agents and spies, but 
I suppose that my own escrow data base would still be subject to the same 
subpoena process as the rest of my records, but I would be more likely to 
know when information was being leaked.

                  ___________________________________________________________
 |\  /| |        |                                                           |
 | \/ |o|        | Michael Paul Johnson  Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 |
 |    | | /  _   | mpj@csn.org aka mpj@netcom.com m.p.johnson@ieee.org       |
 |    |||/  /_\  | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ          CIS: 71331,2332 |
 |    |||\  (    | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ  -. --- ----- ....|
 |    ||| \ \_/  |___________________________________________________________|

> I have tried to think of a positive use for key escrow.  The only
> thing that I have come up with so far is kind of like having local key
> escrow within one company, or something like that.  Kind of like
> having a master key that fits all the offices in one wing of a
> building, or something like that.  That could be good in some business
> uses, provided you could pick your own trusted master key holder.  I
> don't think that is what Al Gore has in mind.

Actually, I can think of one major use.  If I encrypt my personal
files, I might want my heirs to be able to recover them after my
death.  For example, I might keep my electronically-encrypted will in
escrow, such that upon my death the keys can be obtained and the
document opened.

This does not mean that I implicitly trust the government to escrow my
keys.  However it does mean that there are legitimate uses for
escrowed technology.  I just think that the government shouldn't be in
charge of it, and that citizens have the right to choose the level of
privacy and security that they desire for themselves.

Just to quickly change the topic, and answer someone's question for
earlier today or yesterday (sorry, I've been really hosed and haven't
had a chance to really delve into the flurry of email that I've
received recently)...  Not everyone on this list is an anarchist.  For
example, I do not consider myself an arachist.  I think some
leadership is needed, since not everyone is capable of being a leader,
and I wouldn't trust just anyone to make decisions for me.  I'm on
this list because I value electronic privacy and encryption
technologies, and I believe that the power of encryption will better
enable the common man to hold his (or her) privacy in the electronic
information world.

Anyways, enough spewing.  Enjoy!

-derek

         Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, G MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
    Home page: http://www.mit.edu:8001/people/warlord/home_page.html
       warlord@MIT.EDU    PP-ASEL     N1NWH    PGP key available

This area of research has been explored by Matt Blaze in some detail
-- he's done some "good" key escrow systems for just the case of "your
chief programmer is hit by a bus." However, let us never confuse
voluntary key management techniques used in an organization with
mandatory national key escrow big-brotherism.

Perry


Derek Atkins says:
> > I have tried to think of a positive use for key escrow.  The only
> > thing that I have come up with so far is kind of like having local key
> > escrow within one company, or something like that.  Kind of like
> > having a master key that fits all the offices in one wing of a
> > building, or something like that.  That could be good in some business
> > uses, provided you could pick your own trusted master key holder.  I
> > don't think that is what Al Gore has in mind.
> 
> Actually, I can think of one major use.  If I encrypt my personal
> files, I might want my heirs to be able to recover them after my
> death.  For example, I might keep my electronically-encrypted will in
> escrow, such that upon my death the keys can be obtained and the
> document opened.

On Fri, 22 Jul 1994, Michael Johnson wrote:
> all the offices in one wing of a building, or something like that.  That could
> be good in some business uses, provided you could pick your own trusted master
> key holder.  I don't think that is what Al Gore has in mind.
So lets deliver this before he can deliver his.

What we need to do is use the concepts of fair key escrow.  This can be 
done using the pgp as a framework, just as you said.


Berzerk