4 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child
Hi all!
Just wonder if anyone had a closer look at the "Advanced security" option
built in the Microsoft Windows for Workgroups 3.11. You can use a soft
of a public/private key when sending a mail via fax (Class 1) driver
Micrsoft Fax at Work. The key seems to be quite short and I wonder if that's
a real secure solution comparing eg. to PGP?
(ab)> Just wonder if anyone had a closer look at the "Advanced security" option > built in the Microsoft Windows for Workgroups 3.11. You can use a soft > of a public/private key when sending a mail via fax (Class 1) driver > Micrsoft Fax at Work. The key seems to be quite short and I wonder if that's > a real secure solution comparing eg. to PGP? If it really is public key, and if the keys really are quite short, then its probably really *not* secure. Remember than a 129-digit (~425 bit) RSA key was broken in 8 months! A 384-bit RSA key is therefore not secure! -derek
Andrzej Bursztynski wrote: > Just wonder if anyone had a closer look at the "Advanced security" option > built in the Microsoft Windows for Workgroups 3.11. You can use a soft > of a public/private key when sending a mail via fax (Class 1) driver > Micrsoft Fax at Work. The key seems to be quite short and I wonder if that's > a real secure solution comparing eg. to PGP? > Like the guy from Microsoft, I don't know specifically what's in Microsoft Windows for Workgroups 3.11. But something to remember is that RSA Data Security Inc. has been concentrating on signing deals with Microsoft, Apple, Lotus, IBM, WordPerfect, Oracle, etc., to include strong crypto in their products. I don't happen to know if Windows for Warehouses (er, Workgroups) contains RSA, but it wouldn't surprise me at all. Anyone know? That we are comparing commercial crypto to "a real secure solution" like PGP, as in the question Andrzej asked, is an ironic twist. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."
Tim May writes:
| But something to remember is that RSA Data Security Inc. has been
| concentrating on signing deals with Microsoft, Apple, Lotus, IBM,
| WordPerfect, Oracle, etc., to include strong crypto in their products.
They also license Sun, who cut the modulus too low for 'secure
RPC.' This allowed Brian LaMacchia and Andrew M. Odlyzko to
crytpanalyze secure RPC.
Paying RSA money does not magically create a secure system for
you. It merely licenses their patents, which can be a very solid base
on which to build.
Adam
>From: "Brian A. LaMacchia" <bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
>Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
>In-Reply-To: Eric Hughes's message of Fri, 20 May 94 09:55:36 -0700,
> <9405201655.AA11052@ah.com>
>
>Right. Basically, what we found was that you needed the same amount of
>computation to factor a (k+10)-digit composite as to compute discrete
>logarithms in a field with k-digit modulus p. The discrete log problem
>is brittle---you do a lot of precomputation for a particular modulus p
>and then finding individual discrete logs in GF(p) is easy---so you
>need to think carefully about the lifetime of the information you're
>going to encrypt and choose the size of your modulus accordingly.
>
> --bal
@article{nfscrack,
author = {Brian A. LaMacchia and Andrew M. Odlyzko},
journal = {Designs, Codes, and Cryptography},
pages = {46--62},
title = {Computation of Discrete Logarithms in Prime Fields},
volume = {1},
year = {1991},
}
--
Adam Shostack adam@bwh.harvard.edu
Politics. From the greek "poly," meaning many, and ticks, a small,
annoying bloodsucker.