clipper and export

Is anyone else distrubed by the way that encryption export policy and the
clipper chip seem to be linked {in administration policy, and in the
press?
The letter from Gore to Cantwell certainly indicates this. He got her
to refrain from trying to liberalize export by saying that he'd look
into relaxing clipper. 
This seems awfully insidious, for a variety of reasons. I think everyone
has got to make greater efforts to seperate these two issues in the public
s mind. If we need to prevent encryption export for national security
reasons, as the administration alleges, then that doesn't neccesarily
have any relation on whether we need to adopt key escrow too.And if 
key escrow is neccesary for law enforcement, as they allege, that doesn't
say _anything_ about whether encryption export should be liberalized
or not. 
Of course, scrutinizing administration policy revelas the link without
too much dificulty. They want to make clipper a de facto standard, and
the only way they're going to be able to accomplish this is by 
refusing to allow exportation of anything _but_ clipper. But the 
administration isn't publically giving this line of reasoning, because
it makes them look bad, and shows that they are mis-using the legislation
that allows them to ban exportation of encryption for their own pro-Clipper
strategies. But they still manage to link the two issues, as in the 
"compromise" with Ms. Cantwell, without giving any good reason
for the two issues to be related!
I don't think we should let them get away with this. If the two
issues are going to be linked like this, we the public have got to demand
and explanation or rational for doing this. Why did the administration
basically offer to re-think clipper _if_ Cantwell didn't try to 
liberalize export? And when they can't give a good answer, we the cypherpunks
have got to offer our explanation.
 
As it is, they're getting a tactical olitical freebie. They've managed to 
link the issues of export restrictions and clipper such that Joe Public
sees how the policies are linked, _without_ giving any actual reasons
for the link, because those reasons would make them look so bad.

Jonathan Rochkind wrote:

> Is anyone else distrubed by the way that encryption export policy and the
> clipper chip seem to be linked {in administration policy, and in the
> press?

Well, we helped made this connection happen! We, in the sense of the
overall letter-writing campaign...all those exhortations for us to
please get the Cantwell Bill moved along, those daily updates, etc.
EFF, CPSR, EPIC, and messages here on Cypherpunks and in other fora
(or forums).

> The letter from Gore to Cantwell certainly indicates this. He got her
> to refrain from trying to liberalize export by saying that he'd look
> into relaxing clipper. 
> This seems awfully insidious, for a variety of reasons. I think everyone

To be expected, given the nature of the lobbying effort.

> I don't think we should let them get away with this. If the two
> issues are going to be linked like this, we the public have got to demand
> and explanation or rational for doing this. Why did the administration

I agree with Jonathan's sentiments, though I get nervous hearing
buzzwords like "demand" and "let them get away with this." The will do
what states always do, accomodate interests. Maria Cantwell has,
partly by our actions, become a "player" in this high-stakes game. Her
motivations and goals may or may not agree with some of ours, and
certainly they collide with some views (e.g., I doubt she's an
anarchist).

Though I sent the obligatory "I oppose Clipper" and "I support the
Cantwell Bill" messages, I think we as Cypherpunks have a more
powerful hand to play than getting involved too deeply in the
Washington lobbying that's obviously going on here.

I reject key escrow, and I don't worry overmuch about export of crypto
or what it does to the competitiveness of Novell and Microsoft. (By
this I mean that end-to-end encryption is usually a big win over
product-integrated, officially-sanctioned crypto....and no export laws
will stop powerful, unofficially-sanctioned end-to-end crypto from
being used.)

Sure, support open export. But don't make it the cause celebre of
Cypherpunks, or the outcome that Jonathan bemoans will be inevitable.


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
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"National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

Tim May:

| I reject key escrow, and I don't worry overmuch about export of crypto
| or what it does to the competitiveness of Novell and Microsoft. (By
| this I mean that end-to-end encryption is usually a big win over
| product-integrated, officially-sanctioned crypto....and no export laws
| will stop powerful, unofficially-sanctioned end-to-end crypto from
| being used.)

	The benifit to product integrated crypto is that if Microsoft
puts RSA into Chicago, there are suddently 60 mil. RSA users.  OTOH,
if Microsoft puts A5 into Chicago, there are suddenly zillions of A5
users.  There is a benefit to having big companies like IBM, HP, or
Sun provide strong crypto, and that is it makes it look more
respectable to the large corporation.

Adam


-- 
Adam Shostack 				       adam@bwh.harvard.edu

Politics.  From the greek "poly," meaning many, and ticks, a small,
annoying bloodsucker.

Jonathan Rochkind wrote:
| Is anyone else distrubed by the way that encryption export policy and the
| clipper chip seem to be linked {in administration policy, and in the
| press?
| ... If we need to prevent encryption export for national security
| reasons, as the administration alleges, then that doesn't neccesarily
| have any relation on whether we need to adopt key escrow too.

From the beginning, it has been clear to me that the whole thing about
crypto export prohibitions enhancing national security is just a smoke
screen.  While there may be a germ of truth to those kinds of statements,
the _real_ reason for propping export controls up when they are no longer
effective, and no longer make sense, is to fragment the worldwide market
and give weakened state-sponsored encryption a window of opportunity to
become a standard.

As such, I'm not upset at how the administration finally is publicly
acknowledging their abuse of export control law for anti-democratic ends.
I'm just upset at their abuse, and consider it highly unethical, even
criminal.

It's ironic that those who are engaging in these unethical, anti-
democratic acts are also asking us to trust them with access to our most
private conversations...


Rich

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