(None)

gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal) writes:

> All sounds reasonble *except*... this is the internet, man!  We can afford
> to do this once every 15 minutes, can't we?
     Unless the messages are given a delivery latency of <insert random
time>, Traffic Analysis will allow for the tracking of messages. If, OTOH,
messages _are_ given a latency, but are garaunteed to be out of the
remailer in, say, 12 hours, it makes the task of tracking messages
anywhere from one degree more difficult to exponentially more difficult,
depending on how many messages flow in 12 hours. If you allow for dummy
messages to pad traffic, TA could be avoided almost entirely except by the
most anal of attackers.

                                        --jeff
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Unless the messages are given a delivery latency of <insert random
   time>, Traffic Analysis will allow for the tracking of messages. 

For the Nth time, it's not latency, it's reordering which is important.

If you have a large enough message flow, adding latency gives you
sufficient reordering.  If your message flow is small, latency doesn't
sufficiently reorder.  Large and small here are message interval times
relative to added latency times.

Random reordering induces random added latencies.  The converse does
not always hold.

Eric