Spoofing Nuclear Weapons and PGP

Responding to msg by dichro@tartarus.uwa.edu.au (Mikolaj 
Habryn) on Thu, 25 Aug  5:51 PM

>not really certain. *shrug* sorry. Read some books on 
>it - the  amount of literature which should be 
>classified but is freely available  is mind-boggling.


To tie this back to crypto and technology:

Under a sub-sub-sub-contract I once worked on some phony CAD 
drawings for the nuclear weapons production process, plotting 
false info that still appears in popular books, some of which 
has been posted here.

The docs were then encrypted and stegonagraphied for 
authenticity.  We were told that they were turned loose on the 
market for this product in other countries.

I don't know if the USG was involved, there no security 
clearances.  It may have been a commercial scam.

Also, growing up not to far from LANL, I was told that kids of 
staff were encouraged to chat about B-this  and W-that by the 
security people there as part of the fog around that outfit.

This supports the suggestion for profligate use of PGP as a 
stratagem, to make it harder to tell the trivial from the 
other.

Or is public encryption a stratagem to focus on software rather 
than hardware?

Anybody hear anything about covert ID in new-generation CPUs, 
like done with supercomps?


John

John Young says:
> Under a sub-sub-sub-contract I once worked on some phony CAD 
> drawings for the nuclear weapons production process, plotting 
> false info that still appears in popular books, some of which 
> has been posted here.
> 
> The docs were then encrypted and stegonagraphied for 
> authenticity.  We were told that they were turned loose on the 
> market for this product in other countries.

Its been a long time coming.

*Plonk*.

Perry