NODE d2632a13URGENT: Please Tell Congress to Allow Encryption Export
corpuz@internex.net (Chris Corpuz)Thu, 4 Aug 94 10:11:11 PDT
House Intelligence Committee holds key to Crypto Export
ask@eff.org June 9, 1994 *DISTRIBUTE WIDELY*
Today, the U.S. State Department controls the export of most
encryption, working closely with the National Security Agency (NSA) to
limit products that provide real privacy, from cell-phones to PC
software. A bill introduced by Rep. Maria Cantwell would instead give
authority over non-military crypto exports to the Commerce Department.
Commerce has much more reasonable regulations, with "First
Amendment"-style unlimited publishing of publicly available software,
including PGP, Kerberos, RIPEM, RSAREF, and mass-market commercial
software. The bill also prevents the Commerce Dept. from tightening
the regulations even if NSA somehow gets its tentacles into Commerce.
A few months ago, you-all sent over 5600 messages to Rep. Cantwell in
support of her bill, H.R. 3627. As a result, on May 18, the bill
passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by being incorporated into
the Export Administration Act of 1994, H.R. 3937.
Now the battle has become more intense. This portion of H.R. 3937 has
been referred to the House Intelligence Committee with the intent to
kill or severely maim it. We need your help again, to urge the
Intelligence Committee to keep crypto export liberalization intact.
The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the only watchdogs for
the NSA, tend to follow the agency's wishes when they wave the magic
"national security" wand. They need plenty of input from the public
that tells them that the nation will be *more* secure with good
encryption, even though the NSA will be less happy.
Not just computer users, but all users of telephones, cable TV, health
care, and credit information systems would benefit from this change.
The security of these applications is built on the foundation laid by
the operating systems and network protocols on which they run. If
this bill is passed, you will see high quality encryption built into
Microsoft Windows, into the MacOS, into major Unix workstations, into
the Internet, into cellular phones, into interactive television. The
software already exists for confidentiality, privacy, and security of
local and networked information, but it's not built-in to these
systems because of the export ban. Today, each company could build
two operating systems, one gutted for international use, but this
would be costly and confusing for them and their customers, and would
not allow international networks such as the Internet or telephones to
be made secure and private. With this bill, these limits disappear.
Furthermore, the Clinton Administration plans to permit high volume
exports of Clipper products, while continuing to require tedious
paperwork for truly secure encryption products. The bill would give
Clipper and other crypto software more even-handed treatment.
The bill also eliminates a senseless situation on the Internet.
Today, crypto software can only be freely distributed from non-U.S.
archive sites. It would eliminate that problem as well as the threat
of prosecution against U.S. freeware authors of crypto software.
This is the dream we've all been working toward. Here's how you can
help to make this dream a reality. The Intelligence Committee must
make its decision on the bill before June 17, so time is critical:
1) Fax a short letter TODAY to the chair of the Intelligence
Committee, Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS). Ask him in your own
words to leave the encryption provisions of H.R. 3937 intact. Use a
positive tone ("Please support...") rather than a flame or a rant.
One paragraph is fine. State your title and organization if you will
look more important or better informed than the average citizen. Rep.
Glickman's committee fax number is +1 202 225 1991. This is the best
option, since individual letters are given the most weight by members
of Congress, particularly when sent on letterhead paper.
2) If you are unable to fax a letter, send an e-mail message to Rep.
Glickman at glickman@eff.org. Software or staff at the Electronic
Frontier Foundation will either fax it in, or print it out and
hand-deliver it for you.
3) Send a copy of this message to everyone you know in Kansas, and
personally urge them to write to Rep. Glickman today. Letters from
constituents get a lot more weight, since they are from people who
could actually vote for or against him in the next election.
4) If your own Representative is on the Intelligence Committee, send
him or her a copy of what you sent Rep. Glickman. There's a list of all
such Reps. below. Even if we lose this battle, you will have started
educating your own Rep. about crypto policy.
5) Become a member of EFF. Our strength comes from our members' strength.
Send a note to membership@eff.org asking how to join.
Thanks again for your help! You can check at any time on the current
status of the campaign at the location below. Send any comments on
this campaign to campaign@eff.org.
John Gilmore
Chairman, EFF Crypto Committee
EFF Board of Directors
Member of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
Member of International Association for Cryptologic Research
House Intelligence Committee Members
------------------------------------
Subcommittee phone: +1 202 225 4121
Subcommittee fax: +1 202 225 1991 <== send your fax HERE <==
p st name phone fax
___________________________________________________________________________
D KS Glickman, Daniel +1 202 225 6216 private Chair
D WA Dicks, Norman D. +1 202 225 5916 +1 202 226 1176
D CA Dixon, Julian C. +1 202 225 7084 +1 202 225 4091
D NJ Torricelli, Robert +1 202 224 5061 +1 202 225 0843
D TX Coleman, Ronald D. +1 202 225 4831 +1 202 225 4831
D CO Skaggs, David E. +1 202 225 2161 +1 202 225 9127
D NV Bilbray, James H. +1 202 225 5965 +1 202 225 8808
D CA Pelosi, Nancy +1 202 225 4965 +1 202 225 8259
D TX Laughlin, Gregory H. +1 202 225 2831 +1 202 225 1108
D AL Cramer Jr, Robert (Bud) +1 202 225 4801 private
D RI Reed, John F. +1 202 225 2735 +1 202 225 9580
D MO Gephardt, Richard A. +1 202 225 2671 +1 202 225 7452
R TX Combest, Larry +1 202 225 4005 +1 202 225 9615
R NE Bereuter, Douglas +1 202 225 4806 +1 202 226 1148
R CA Dornan, Robert K. +1 202 225 2965 +1 202 225 3694
R FL Young, C. W. (Bill) +1 202 225 5961 +1 202 225 9764
R PA Gekas, George W. +1 202 225 4315 +1 202 225 8440
R UT Hansen, James V. +1 202 225 0453 +1 202 225 5857
R CA Lewis, Jerry +1 202 225 5861 +1 202 225 6498
R IL Michel, Robert H. +1 202 225 6201 +1 202 225 9461
The full text of this alert is stored at:
ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export.alert
gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export.alert
http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export.alert
BBS (+1 202 638 6120, 8N1): "Alerts" file area, export.alt
The actual text of this part of H.R. 3937 is at:
ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt
gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export, hr3937_crypto.excerpt
http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt
BBS: "Privacy--Crypto" file area, hr3937.crp
For current status on the bill:
ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export_alert.update
gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export_alert.update
http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export_alert.update
BBS: "Alerts" file area, export.upd
A general Web page on crypto export policy is at:
http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html
----- End Included Message -----
************************************
Chris Corpuz *
InterNex Information Services, Inc.*
1050 Chestnut St., Suite 202 *
Menlo Park, CA 94025 *
v.(415) 473-3060 *
f.(415) 473-3062 *
************************************
NODE 7675e09aRe: URGENT: Please Tell Congress to Allow Encryption Export
"Perry E. Metzger" <perry@imsi.com>Thu, 4 Aug 94 10:32:31 PDT
LOOK AT THE DATE.
This is OLD! The events it talks of are all over! Why are you
distributing it again? The intelligence committee already gutted the
bill a long time ago. Its too late. Please do NOT repost messages like
this, especially not ones that contain old information that has
already been sent to all the people you are sending the message to.
Perry Metzger
Chris Corpuz says:
> House Intelligence Committee holds key to Crypto Export
> ask@eff.org June 9, 1994 *DISTRIBUTE WIDELY*
>
> Today, the U.S. State Department controls the export of most
> encryption, working closely with the National Security Agency (NSA) to
> limit products that provide real privacy, from cell-phones to PC
> software. A bill introduced by Rep. Maria Cantwell would instead give
> authority over non-military crypto exports to the Commerce Department.
> Commerce has much more reasonable regulations, with "First
> Amendment"-style unlimited publishing of publicly available software,
> including PGP, Kerberos, RIPEM, RSAREF, and mass-market commercial
> software. The bill also prevents the Commerce Dept. from tightening
> the regulations even if NSA somehow gets its tentacles into Commerce.
>
> A few months ago, you-all sent over 5600 messages to Rep. Cantwell in
> support of her bill, H.R. 3627. As a result, on May 18, the bill
> passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by being incorporated into
> the Export Administration Act of 1994, H.R. 3937.
>
> Now the battle has become more intense. This portion of H.R. 3937 has
> been referred to the House Intelligence Committee with the intent to
> kill or severely maim it. We need your help again, to urge the
> Intelligence Committee to keep crypto export liberalization intact.
>
> The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the only watchdogs for
> the NSA, tend to follow the agency's wishes when they wave the magic
> "national security" wand. They need plenty of input from the public
> that tells them that the nation will be *more* secure with good
> encryption, even though the NSA will be less happy.
>
> Not just computer users, but all users of telephones, cable TV, health
> care, and credit information systems would benefit from this change.
> The security of these applications is built on the foundation laid by
> the operating systems and network protocols on which they run. If
> this bill is passed, you will see high quality encryption built into
> Microsoft Windows, into the MacOS, into major Unix workstations, into
> the Internet, into cellular phones, into interactive television. The
> software already exists for confidentiality, privacy, and security of
> local and networked information, but it's not built-in to these
> systems because of the export ban. Today, each company could build
> two operating systems, one gutted for international use, but this
> would be costly and confusing for them and their customers, and would
> not allow international networks such as the Internet or telephones to
> be made secure and private. With this bill, these limits disappear.
>
> Furthermore, the Clinton Administration plans to permit high volume
> exports of Clipper products, while continuing to require tedious
> paperwork for truly secure encryption products. The bill would give
> Clipper and other crypto software more even-handed treatment.
>
> The bill also eliminates a senseless situation on the Internet.
> Today, crypto software can only be freely distributed from non-U.S.
> archive sites. It would eliminate that problem as well as the threat
> of prosecution against U.S. freeware authors of crypto software.
>
> This is the dream we've all been working toward. Here's how you can
> help to make this dream a reality. The Intelligence Committee must
> make its decision on the bill before June 17, so time is critical:
>
> 1) Fax a short letter TODAY to the chair of the Intelligence
> Committee, Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS). Ask him in your own
> words to leave the encryption provisions of H.R. 3937 intact. Use a
> positive tone ("Please support...") rather than a flame or a rant.
> One paragraph is fine. State your title and organization if you will
> look more important or better informed than the average citizen. Rep.
> Glickman's committee fax number is +1 202 225 1991. This is the best
> option, since individual letters are given the most weight by members
> of Congress, particularly when sent on letterhead paper.
>
> 2) If you are unable to fax a letter, send an e-mail message to Rep.
> Glickman at glickman@eff.org. Software or staff at the Electronic
> Frontier Foundation will either fax it in, or print it out and
> hand-deliver it for you.
>
> 3) Send a copy of this message to everyone you know in Kansas, and
> personally urge them to write to Rep. Glickman today. Letters from
> constituents get a lot more weight, since they are from people who
> could actually vote for or against him in the next election.
>
> 4) If your own Representative is on the Intelligence Committee, send
> him or her a copy of what you sent Rep. Glickman. There's a list of all
> such Reps. below. Even if we lose this battle, you will have started
> educating your own Rep. about crypto policy.
>
> 5) Become a member of EFF. Our strength comes from our members' strength.
> Send a note to membership@eff.org asking how to join.
>
> Thanks again for your help! You can check at any time on the current
> status of the campaign at the location below. Send any comments on
> this campaign to campaign@eff.org.
>
>
> John Gilmore
> Chairman, EFF Crypto Committee
> EFF Board of Directors
> Member of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
> Member of International Association for Cryptologic Research
>
>
> House Intelligence Committee Members
> ------------------------------------
>
> Subcommittee phone: +1 202 225 4121
> Subcommittee fax: +1 202 225 1991 <== send your fax HERE <==
>
> p st name phone fax
> ___________________________________________________________________________
> D KS Glickman, Daniel +1 202 225 6216 private Chair
> D WA Dicks, Norman D. +1 202 225 5916 +1 202 226 1176
> D CA Dixon, Julian C. +1 202 225 7084 +1 202 225 4091
> D NJ Torricelli, Robert +1 202 224 5061 +1 202 225 0843
> D TX Coleman, Ronald D. +1 202 225 4831 +1 202 225 4831
> D CO Skaggs, David E. +1 202 225 2161 +1 202 225 9127
> D NV Bilbray, James H. +1 202 225 5965 +1 202 225 8808
> D CA Pelosi, Nancy +1 202 225 4965 +1 202 225 8259
> D TX Laughlin, Gregory H. +1 202 225 2831 +1 202 225 1108
> D AL Cramer Jr, Robert (Bud) +1 202 225 4801 private
> D RI Reed, John F. +1 202 225 2735 +1 202 225 9580
> D MO Gephardt, Richard A. +1 202 225 2671 +1 202 225 7452
> R TX Combest, Larry +1 202 225 4005 +1 202 225 9615
> R NE Bereuter, Douglas +1 202 225 4806 +1 202 226 1148
> R CA Dornan, Robert K. +1 202 225 2965 +1 202 225 3694
> R FL Young, C. W. (Bill) +1 202 225 5961 +1 202 225 9764
> R PA Gekas, George W. +1 202 225 4315 +1 202 225 8440
> R UT Hansen, James V. +1 202 225 0453 +1 202 225 5857
> R CA Lewis, Jerry +1 202 225 5861 +1 202 225 6498
> R IL Michel, Robert H. +1 202 225 6201 +1 202 225 9461
>
> The full text of this alert is stored at:
>
> ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export.alert
> gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export.alert
> http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export.alert
> BBS (+1 202 638 6120, 8N1): "Alerts" file area, export.alt
>
> The actual text of this part of H.R. 3937 is at:
>
> ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt
> gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export, hr3937_crypto.excerpt
> http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt
> BBS: "Privacy--Crypto" file area, hr3937.crp
>
> For current status on the bill:
>
> ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export_alert.update
> gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export_alert.update
> http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export_alert.update
> BBS: "Alerts" file area, export.upd
>
> A general Web page on crypto export policy is at:
>
> http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html
>
>
>
> ----- End Included Message -----
>
>
>
> ************************************
> Chris Corpuz *
> InterNex Information Services, Inc.*
> 1050 Chestnut St., Suite 202 *
> Menlo Park, CA 94025 *
> v.(415) 473-3060 *
> f.(415) 473-3062 *
> ************************************
>
>
NODE 1fc59e0aRe: URGENT: Please Tell Congress to Allow Encryption Export
"Ian Farquhar" <ianf@simple.sydney.sgi.com>Thu, 4 Aug 94 15:35:12 PDT
On Aug 4, 10:08am, Chris Corpuz wrote:
> The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the only watchdogs for
> the NSA, tend to follow the agency's wishes when they wave the magic
> "national security" wand.
Reading this, I was reminded that I have rarely seen any mention on the net
as to one of the reasons why the "national security" wand is so effective with
many politicians.
Imagine this: you're a politician. If you're a US politician in particular
you will be correctly told that you are, by virtue of your position, a target
for a lot of "extremeist" groups and terrorism. You will then be told that one
of the main weapons on your side is the tremendous security infrastructure
which has been constructed to intercept and prevent acts of violence against
the government (ie. you). They'd probably then drop little pieces of
information - strictly secret of course to make sure that you treated them
with the proper respect - which would leave you with the impression that
these guys do such a good job of protecting YOUR ass. They might even have
some intelligence showing your name on some documents from some politicial
organisation with a violent tendencies, and who wouldn't be a bit
worried after that?
After this little speech, you'll have had the presence and influence of
the various security services entwined with the protection of your very
life. It's been personalised for you in a very intimate way, and for most
politicians, this is works. It's always worth bearing in mind when you see
one of them do an abrupt 180 degree turn after a visit from the spooks.
Ian.