(fwd) "Will You Be a Terrorist?"

Cypherpunks,

Not all of you like posts that mention "guns" in any form, so if this
the case for you, hit "D" now.

I think the recently-passed Crime Act has implications for what some
are calling "terrorist speech" and that Cypherpunks remailers may be
construed as "PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS" in the
context of being "communications equipment."

Consider this "food for thought."

An excerpt, and commentary by the original anonymous poster, is
included below.

I know that our favorite optimists, Duncan Frissell and Sandy
Sandfort, are fond of saying that it's already over, that we've
already won, that the state is powerless, etc., but when I read the
text of the Crime Bill (available from ftp.nra.org in
pub/legislation), I just can't buy that.

I see a growing police force, I see U.N. blue helmets, I see many more
prosecutions for a growing list of crimes, I see my gun rights being
taken away, and on and on.

In the section below, read carefully the sections about providing
support for "terrorists." Note that belonging to a pro- or
anti-abortion group in which _one_ of the members uses violence (a
fistfight, a jostling of a cop, or a shooting...) makes the group a
"terrorist" group, under the new language of the Crime Act.

I will not be surprised to hear that the Cypherpunks group is
classified as a terrorist group, for a variety of reasons (not the
least of which was the "liberation" of the RC4 code, the
Mykotronx-government deal info, the debates about undermining the
government, the talk of assasination markets, etc.).

Sorry, but I just can't "Don't worry, be happy."

--Tim May


Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: "Will You Be a Terrorist?"
Message-ID: <199409120907.AA15385@xtropia>
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 1994 02:07:16 -0700
X-Mailer: mail-news 2.0.3
Remailed-By: remail@extropia.wimsey.com
Comments: This message was anonymously remailed. Do not reply to the address in 

[Check it out - Cross-posted from Fidonet:]

    The "Crime Bill" passed by Congress recently (truename: Violent
 Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) has a frightening
 provision that hides a boogeyman under its superficially appealing
 surface:
    *----------*          *----------*          *----------*
SEC. 120005. PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS.

    (a) Offense.--Chapter 113A of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by adding the following new section:

``Sec. 2339A. Providing material support to terrorists

    ``(a) Definition.--In this section, `material support or resources'
means currency or other financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons,
lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and
other physical assets, but does not include humanitarian
assistance to persons not directly involved in such violations.
    ``(b) Offense.--A person who, within the United States, provides
material support or resources or conceals or disguises the
nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or
resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section 32,
36, 351, 844 (f) or (i), 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1363, 1751,
2280, 2281, 2331, or 2339 of this title or section 46502 of
title 49, or in preparation for or carrying out the concealment
of an escape from the commission of any such violation, shall
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
    ``(c) Investigations.--
            ``(1) In general.--Within the United States, an
        investigation may be initiated or continued under this
        section only when facts reasonably indicate that--
                    ``(A) in the case of an individual, the
                individual knowingly or intentionally engages,
                has engaged, or is about to engage in the
                violation of this or any other Federal criminal
                law; and
                    ``(B) in the case of a group of
                individuals, the group knowingly or
                intentionally engages, has engaged, or is about
                to engage in the violation of this or any other
                Federal criminal law.
            ``(2) Activities protected by the first
        amendment.--An investigation may not be initiated or
        continued under this section based on activities
        protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution,
        including expressions of support or the provision of
        financial support for the nonviolent political,
        religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or
        beliefs of any person or group.''.
    (b) Technical Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 113A of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding the
following new item:

``2339A. Providing material support to terrorists.''.

    *----------*          *----------*          *----------*

    In the U.S. Title 18 Code, terrorism is defined as "engaging in
 any act or conspiring to engage in any act intended to intimidate
 or coerce the civilian population or the government" or close words
 to that effect. What does this mean? Suppose you organize a militia
 and some little jot or tittle is just that much off -- and the thugs
 at the BATF or FBI or NatPol decide that your militia is an "armed
 group"? They can now seize your house, your car, your bank account
 and anything else even remotely connected with the maintenance or
 support of the militia, and make *you* prove your innocence before
 the Federal thugs will grudgingly return your life to you. Suppose
 you participate in a demonstration against abortion and just one
 member of the peaceful demonstration gets into a fistfight with
 an escort. You had given a ride to this demonstrator -- is the
 fistfight "terrorism" and you a collaborator in this "terrorism"
 to be arrested and thrown in jail and your car seized until you
 can prove that you did not know that the other demonstrator did
 intend to fight with an escort? Suppose you demonstrate against
 national health care and you yell that Clinton should be thrown
 out of office and make a threatening gesture -- will the thugs
 treat this as an "attempt to intimidate the government" and take
 your car and perhaps your home if you used it to prepare materials
 for the demonstration? Suppose you quote Thomas Jefferson's words
 about a revolution being due every twenty years -- will you be
 thrown into jail for that? Note that the above section does not
 allow anything but "NON-violent" goals. This is another direct
 attack upon the First Amendment and deeply disturbing in its
 implications when considered as part of a set of other federal
 statutes scattered across Title 18 criminal law.


***end of quoted section***

--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
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subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay




-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo@toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay

In article <199409171745.KAA03257@netcom8.netcom.com>,
Timothy C. May <tcmay@netcom.com> wrote:
>I think the recently-passed Crime Act has implications for what some
>are calling "terrorist speech" and that Cypherpunks remailers may be
>construed as "PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS" in the
>context of being "communications equipment."

I don't see why anonymous remailers are singled out: as written,
it seems that *any* electronic service could be singled out for
this (for example, netcom doesn't require proof-of-identity
credentials).

(Shudder)

"Envision burning police cars."

In any case, perhaps a way around this can be found: what we may
need is "stealth remailers," software that will behave as a remailer
through non-obvious "security holes" with correct cooperation from
software the original user runs.  

For example, hack sendmail so that it never wants to reverse-lookup DNS
and given a particular set of commands (saying "EHDR" for 'enhanced
headers') will operate as an anonymous remailer.  Such sendmail-hackage
could be distributed with other changes that give enhanced security
(for example, that turn off EXPN and VRFY) so that people could claim
that they had no idea that they were operating an anonymous remailer.

To add encryption to this model, perhaps changes to sendmail could be
fashioned that incorporate encryption in such a way that it appears to be
purely intended for protection of mail going to the machine, but a
side affect could be that every so hacked sendmail becomes a remailer.

This has one problem, though: so far, you can't chain with this model.
You could fashion a way to cross information from message content
to envelope: but that's not a change to sendmail that can be lightly
made -- you'll get random lossage from people whose messages unwittingly
almost fit your protocol.

So, what's further needed is a comment field in the message envelope
that can be chained.  This would be fairly trivial to add to the
RFC822 protocol, and "extra stealth code" could take care of 

Advantage?  A lot of people, I think, would like to add encryption to
the MTA layer of mail if it could be done seamlessly.  If these
changes allowed the hacked sendmail to negotiate with the destination
sendmail to determine whether or not it is also hacked, falling back
to standard operation if the other one is not, then it's seamless.
This is a good feature to have generally available: a fair number of
people would install it just on these merits.

Of course, the existence of these "stealth features" would be an open
secret: however this would lend, to take a phrase from the crytofascists,
"plausible deniability."  'Sorry, I just heard about a more secure
sendmail and ftp'd it.  Didn't say anything anywhere about this in
the README files....'

Everybody still with me?  Anybody?  Sound like work people are willing
to do/think is worth doing?  I'd certainly be willing to do some work
on this -- might even be able to justify it as part of my real job,
which does involve designing and implementing encrypted protocols.
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | "A man would simply have to be as mad as a hatter, to try and
cactus@bb.com  |  change the world with a plastic platter." - Todd Rundgren

> In article <199409171745.KAA03257@netcom8.netcom.com>,
> Timothy C. May <tcmay@netcom.com> wrote:
> >I think the recently-passed Crime Act has implications for what some
> >are calling "terrorist speech" and that Cypherpunks remailers may be
> >construed as "PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS" in the
> >context of being "communications equipment."
> 
> I don't see why anonymous remailers are singled out: as written,
> it seems that *any* electronic service could be singled out for
> this (for example, netcom doesn't require proof-of-identity
> credentials).

I didn't they *are* singled out, just that the Crime Act has some
implications for remailers, should the authorities seek to apply the
law. And as for Netcom and similar services not requiring proofs of
identity, I expect this to change over the next few years (a
combination of the Crime Act, the upcoming immigration legislation,
and fears that the Net is too unregulated).

> In any case, perhaps a way around this can be found: what we may
> need is "stealth remailers," software that will behave as a remailer
> through non-obvious "security holes" with correct cooperation from
> software the original user runs.  

Any port 25 in a storm? Exploitation of holes is a classic case of
"security through obscurity," useful only for short periods of time,
and never very certain.


> Of course, the existence of these "stealth features" would be an open
> secret: however this would lend, to take a phrase from the crytofascists,
> "plausible deniability."  'Sorry, I just heard about a more secure
> sendmail and ftp'd it.  Didn't say anything anywhere about this in
> the README files....'
> 
> Everybody still with me?  Anybody?  Sound like work people are willing
> to do/think is worth doing?  I'd certainly be willing to do some work
> on this -- might even be able to justify it as part of my real job,
> which does involve designing and implementing encrypted protocols.

Stealth remailers is a good thing to work on, I agree. I'd first
settle for having more offshore remailers. 

There are all sorts of other schemes, too.

Under the Crime Act and RICO statutes, we may be committing consiracy
merely by talking amongst ourselves. (Maybe this is an exaggeration,
as I'm not a lawyer and have no desire to become one.)

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo@toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay

Timothy C. May writes:
 > I didn't they *are* singled out, just that the Crime Act has some
 > implications for remailers, should the authorities seek to apply the
 > law.

Didn't mean to imply you were: I was just thinking that this is the
first legal manifestation of using the threat of a Horseman against
anonymity on the net, of any sort.

 > > In any case, perhaps a way around this can be found: what we may
 > > need is "stealth remailers," software that will behave as a remailer
 > > through non-obvious "security holes" with correct cooperation from
 > > software the original user runs.  
 > 
 > Any port 25 in a storm? Exploitation of holes is a classic case of
 > "security through obscurity," useful only for short periods of time,
 > and never very certain.

Well, "security holes" is a bit loose of a term;  I was thinking out loud,
as it were.  The concept, as evolved later, is to distribute a set of
features to be added to the RFC-822 protocol that will allow security,
including remailer support (though not stated as such).

This isn't really an STO: it's more the providing a suite of features:
including features that we want along with features that will help spread
the whole set. 

 > Stealth remailers is a good thing to work on, I agree. I'd first
 > settle for having more offshore remailers. 

Sure.  But that doesn't help the channel between inside the US and 
outside -- IE, the channels that the NSA is chartered to eavesdrop
on (yes, as Eric likes to say: the NSA and the FBI are different.  But
imagine that at some point in the future the NSA, hard pressed to justify
its existence, starts passing data to other agencies).  Right now, there
aren't that many IP channels to outside the country, so they're pretty
easy to tap.

 > Under the Crime Act and RICO statutes, we may be committing consiracy
 > merely by talking amongst ourselves. (Maybe this is an exaggeration,
 > as I'm not a lawyer and have no desire to become one.)

That thought crossed my mind, too, but since we aren't talking about any
illegal activities, merely protocols that might facilitate the same while
also facilitating privacy, I think we're fine.  Of course, given the
stretches made by Law Enforcement for civil forfeitures, the E911
Neidorf thing, and others, perhaps it's time to start seriously
looking at hacking list software to create mailing lists that are fully
anonymous and encrypted.  Has anybody started on such a project?
--
L. Todd Masco  | "A man would simply have to be as mad as a hatter, to try and
cactus@bb.com  |  change the world with a plastic platter." - Todd Rundgren

[...] perhaps it's time to start seriously
   looking at hacking list software to create mailing lists that are fully
   anonymous and encrypted.  Has anybody started on such a project?

I'd suggest that a much more productive avenue of approach would be to
improve the aliasing facilities of a remailer provider to allow a
pseudonym to look like a fully normal name.

Ownership of root is not necessary for this.  I know that Matt Ghio's
mail delivery set up allows this.  At his site there's this
'name+extra' syntax which delivers mail to 'name', but because of a
special sendmail version 8 macro in the Received: field both the
'name' and the 'extra' can be recovered.  The 'extra' is then an input
into a remailer as a pseudonym.

The aliasing has to happen somewhere.  It can happen at the mailing
list exploder or at the remailer.  Since the mapping at the remailer
is of much more general use, and since it allows one to leverage _all_
forms of mail communication and not just mailing list, it seems like a
much better place for that mapping to exist.  Implementation inside a
remailer is a duplication of function--almost always a bad thing.

Eric

> 
> I'd suggest that a much more productive avenue of approach would be to
> improve the aliasing facilities of a remailer provider to allow a
> pseudonym to look like a fully normal name.

it's done. omega.c2.org
	http://www.c2.org/services/blindserver.html
	http://www.c2.org/services/blindclient.html

> 
> Ownership of root is not necessary for this.  I know that Matt Ghio's
> mail delivery set up allows this.  At his site there's this
> 'name+extra' syntax which delivers mail to 'name', but because of a
> special sendmail version 8 macro in the Received: field both the
> 'name' and the 'extra' can be recovered.  The 'extra' is then an input
> into a remailer as a pseudonym.
> 
> The aliasing has to happen somewhere.  It can happen at the mailing
> list exploder or at the remailer.  Since the mapping at the remailer
> is of much more general use, and since it allows one to leverage _all_
> forms of mail communication and not just mailing list, it seems like a
> much better place for that mapping to exist.  Implementation inside a
> remailer is a duplication of function--almost always a bad thing.
> 
> Eric
> 


-- 
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Network Administrator				Pager:	 510-321-1014
Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley		Dialin:  510-549-1383
http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest")			sameer@c2.org

In article <9409172331.AA12848@ah.com>, Eric Hughes <hughes@ah.com> wrote:
>   [...] perhaps it's time to start seriously
>   looking at hacking list software to create mailing lists that are fully
>   anonymous and encrypted.  Has anybody started on such a project?
>
>I'd suggest that a much more productive avenue of approach would be to
>improve the aliasing facilities of a remailer provider to allow a
>pseudonym to look like a fully normal name.

I'm not sure that's a good solution.  When the Bad Guys go to the site
that originated the message and say "we want Alfred E. Neuman at
your site" (for publication of plans of some sort of machine), the
remailer operator could get busted for aiding & abetting.  Sure, Alf's
real life human will be safe, but it'd be nice to protect the remailer
operator, too.

True, the "identity stripping" can be done by a remailer as well;
However, it's trivial enough to do at the mailing list software level
(simply not including information) that it seems like it's not a bad
thing to do.  

Now, this won't give protection from traffic analysis;  In was suggestion,
I was really blurring two seperate lines of thought (I'm interested in 
PGPified mailing list software for content-hiding reasons; I'm trying to
set up a "distributed business" that I'd like to keep secure). 
Also, though, I'm not sure I want to count on anonymous remailers being
available.  If people want to effectively "chain" them, that's fine.

>Ownership of root is not necessary for this.  I know that Matt Ghio's
>mail delivery set up allows this.  At his site there's this
>'name+extra' syntax which delivers mail to 'name', but because of a
>special sendmail version 8 macro in the Received: field both the
>'name' and the 'extra' can be recovered.  The 'extra' is then an input
>into a remailer as a pseudonym.

Sure.  I'm familiar with AMS (in fact, one of my business partners is
one of the current news/postmasters at CMU, and is helping design and
produce IMAP, its replacement).  Another, better I think, possibility is
to add headers and let the MUA sort it out: you don't have to depend upon
non RFC-822 features in the MTA.  Nonstandardness is not a game you want
to get into for things like e-mail unless you have the sort of clout that
CMU/Andrew does.

>The aliasing has to happen somewhere.  It can happen at the mailing
>list exploder or at the remailer.  Since the mapping at the remailer
>is of much more general use, and since it allows one to leverage _all_
>forms of mail communication and not just mailing list, it seems like a
>much better place for that mapping to exist.  Implementation inside a
>remailer is a duplication of function--almost always a bad thing.

I'm not sure I buy that duplication of function is a bad thing in this
case: throwing information away more than once can't be worse than
only throwing it away once, can it?
  -----
I do have a couple questions that aren't terribly related:

	- Are there any known PK message formats that commute?  It seems
	 clear to me that PGP and RIPEM do not, since that makes no
	 sense for private key ciphers like DES/3DES and IDEA.

	- What I want (for other purposes) is a mailing list that has
	 its own public key; Material is encrypted to it, it decrypts it,
	 and then the material is encrypted with each recipient's public
	 key (I'm assuming a PGP base here).   Probably simply to do,
	 but has anybody done it?  No pretense of protection from
	 traffic analysis here: just to keep prying 3rd parties' eyes
	 off it.
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | "A man would simply have to be as mad as a hatter, to try and
cactus@bb.com  |  change the world with a plastic platter." - Todd Rundgren

>I'd suggest that a much more productive avenue of approach would be to
   >improve the aliasing facilities of a remailer provider to allow a
   >pseudonym to look like a fully normal name.

   I'm not sure that's a good solution.  

Todd, Todd, Todd.  You can run a remailer and the mailing list on the
_same_ machine and do the aliasing in the remailer.  You can even
restrict operation of the remailer to work only with the mailing list,
if that's what you want.

The issue here is clean separation of abstraction.

   >At his site [that's CMU--EH] there's this
   >'name+extra' syntax which delivers mail to 'name', but because of a
   >special sendmail version 8 macro in the Received: field both the
   >'name' and the 'extra' can be recovered.  The 'extra' is then an input
   >into a remailer as a pseudonym.

   Sure.  I'm familiar with AMS [...]

This doesn't require AMS.  I've done the same hack myself in ruleset 0
of sendmail.  Then you tweak the HReceived line to add the $u macro,
which under sendmail v8 includes the whole address which caused
delivery.

   Another, better I think, possibility is
   to add headers and let the MUA sort it out: you don't have to depend upon
   non RFC-822 features in the MTA.

That's exactly how it works now.  The Received field is rfc822
compliant, and the remailer, which is a part of the MUA, is where it
gets parsed.

Eric

In article <9409191742.AA15343@ah.com>, Eric Hughes <hughes@ah.com> wrote:
>   >I'd suggest that a much more productive avenue of approach would be to
>   >improve the aliasing facilities of a remailer provider to allow a
>   >pseudonym to look like a fully normal name.
>
>   I'm not sure that's a good solution.  
>
>Todd, Todd, Todd.  You can run a remailer and the mailing list on the
>_same_ machine and do the aliasing in the remailer.  You can even
>restrict operation of the remailer to work only with the mailing list,
>if that's what you want.
>
>The issue here is clean separation of abstraction.

Well *excuse me* for being clinically thick...

I shouldn't post after more than 20 hours w/out sleep.  You're right, 
of course.  Though the remailer and the mailing list software would
probably require some hacking to make the coupling tighter, in the
process giving both limited-use remailers (probably undesirable in
the generic case, but I can think of special uses) and access-controlled
mailing list software (definitely uses for this, as some exist).

>This doesn't require AMS.  I've done the same hack myself in ruleset 0
>of sendmail.  Then you tweak the HReceived line to add the $u macro,
>which under sendmail v8 includes the whole address which caused
>delivery.

Could you send me what you've done on this?  I think it's a desirable
feature to have, though requiring that people hack their sendmail.cfs
is not a big boost to the "popularity of package" indicator.
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | "A man would simply have to be as mad as a hatter, to try and
cactus@bb.com  |  change the world with a plastic platter." - Todd Rundgren

[...] giving both limited-use remailers 

Limited use remailers are exactly what a subscription service does.

   Could you send me what you've done on this?  I think it's a desirable
   feature to have, though requiring that people hack their sendmail.cfs
   is not a big boost to the "popularity of package" indicator.

Admittedly, sendmail.cf hacking is not for the light of heart.  I've
appended a little tutorial I wrote a few months ago on how to do this.
The only correction I have on rereading is that version 8 sendmail
doesn't use frozen configuration files.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------


How to add + to your email syntax
---------------------------------

Ever wanted one of those cool <user+@domain> addresses?  So you can
use <user+loud_mailing_list@domain> and get a filter to easily move
the list out from your regular mail?  Now you can.

This tutorial works if you're running a fairly standard version of
sendmail.  It requires some hacking to sendmail.cf, so you need the
permission to do that; that's usually root.  The modifications are
fairly straightforward.

I.  Add + to the list of operator symbols.

The sendmail 'o' macro determines how to break up strings in
sendmail.cf rules into tokens.  In order to be able to recognize +
specially, you'll have to add to the operator symbols to make it
separately recognizable.

So, first do a 

	% grep -n ^Do sendmail.cf
	116:Do.:%@!^=/[]

Now, go in and edit line 116 and add a + sign at the end:

	Do.:%@!^=/[]+

That's all.  Now sendmail will not include + inside of its tokens.


II.  Duplicate local delivery rules to accept + syntax.

Sendmail is a delivery multiplexer.  You want to change the syntax for
local deilvery, so all you need to change is the local mail
specifications.  First, make sure your local mailer is called 'local'.
You can search for the mailer definition as follows:

	% grep ^Mlocal sendmail.cf
	Mlocal,	P=/usr/libexec/mail.local, F=lsDFMmn, [...]

I've elided the tail end of the line, because all you really need to
ascertain is that the local mailer has the right name.

Now you want to search for all the delivery rules that deliver mail to
the local mailer:

	% grep -n '#local' sendmail.cf
	563:R$-<@$w>		$#local$:$1
	585:R$-<@$D>		$#local$:$1			user@ah.com
	614:R$+			$#local$:$1			everything else

I have three rules for local delivery.  (The second one is custom, and
allows for delivery to a domain address for which no IP address
exists.)  All you do now is to add a rule for '+' delivery for each
kind of existing local delivery.  After I changed mine, it said:

	% grep -n '#local' sendmail.cf
	563:R$-<@$w>		$#local$:$1
	564:R$-+$*<@$w>		$#local$:$1
	586:R$-<@$D>		$#local$:$1			user@ah.com
	587:R$-+$*<@$D>		$#local$:$1			user@ah.com
	616:R$-+$*		$#local$:$1			everything else
	617:R$+			$#local$:$1			everything else

Rules that matched "$-", a single token, I changed to match "$-+$*", a
single token followed by "+" followed by zero or more tokens.

Rules that matched "$+", one or more tokens, I changed to match
"$-+$*", same as above.  I added the changed rule _before_ the
original rule because otherwise the $+ would swallow up everything.

The $1 in the second column refers to the first macro to match in the
pattern in column one.  That's the username the mail gets to delivered
to.  If you have more complicated usernames, you're likely already a
seasoned sendmail trooper.


III.  Install and Test

You should probably increment the version number when you make the
change.  It's in the 'Z' macro, do

	% grep -n ^DZ sendmail.cf
	104:DZ2.06

Freeze the sendmail configuration with

	sendmail -bz

otherwise your changes won't take effect.  Now send yourself some test
mail and make sure it works.


Eric Hughes
hughes@ah.com
17 February 1994

| Admittedly, sendmail.cf hacking is not for the light of heart.  I've
| appended a little tutorial I wrote a few months ago on how to do this.
| The only correction I have on rereading is that version 8 sendmail
| doesn't use frozen configuration files.

While Eric's way of doing things works, I reccomend asking your
systems manager to look at installing procmail as the Mlocal agent.
Its easy to do, and provides everyone with procmail support without
needing a .forward.  (Procmail is a mail processing agent that allows
you to sort your mail based on criterion of your choice.)

Adam

While Eric's way of doing things works, I reccomend asking your
   systems manager to look at installing procmail as the Mlocal agent.

This is good advice, for different reasons.  I do realize that the
stated reasons in the little tutorial were for mail sorting, but I
really worked it out for remailer addressing.  Installing procmail for
local delivery does make filtering easier.

The idea is that I could, for example, take an address, for example
hughes+SOLONg@ah.com, which is really addressed to someone else, and
map it in my own mail filter, at the user level, to the real
recipient.  This address is a real first class address, not just a
comment in an address field, and is guaranteed to work wherever
email is supported.

Now as far as politics go, I wrote that tutorial in such a way that
you could give it to your sysadmin and have them do the work.  The
"explanation" at the beginning is a prepackaged excuse for why you
want it. ;->

Eric

L. Todd Masco wrote:
>Could you send me what you've done on this?  I think it's a desirable
>feature to have, though requiring that people hack their sendmail.cfs
>is not a big boost to the "popularity of package" indicator.

You can find this file at the gopher site (chaos.bsu.edu) in the Misc
directory, as "Sendmail and + in addressing".  Or something like that,
the Misc directory will be reorganized soon, and the file name may
change.

Also, I split Tim's large FAQ into 20 chapters and placed it in
FAQs/Cypherpunks/Cyphernomicon, if that makes it easier for some
people to digest ;)

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
2.3: 5AD633;   D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 
2.6: 088C8F21; 97 73 9E 8B 98 3E DD B5  E8 97 64 7E 20 95 60 D9
"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - K. Cooper

WHAT IS THE FTP ADDRESS???????????????

On Mon, 19 Sep 1994, Karl Lui Barrus wrote:

> L. Todd Masco wrote:
> >Could you send me what you've done on this?  I think it's a desirable
> >feature to have, though requiring that people hack their sendmail.cfs
> >is not a big boost to the "popularity of package" indicator.
> 
> You can find this file at the gopher site (chaos.bsu.edu) in the Misc
> directory, as "Sendmail and + in addressing".  Or something like that,
> the Misc directory will be reorganized soon, and the file name may
> change.
> 
> Also, I split Tim's large FAQ into 20 chapters and placed it in
> FAQs/Cypherpunks/Cyphernomicon, if that makes it easier for some
> people to digest ;)
> 
> --
> Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu
> 2.3: 5AD633;   D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32
> 2.6: 088C8F21; 97 73 9E 8B 98 3E DD B5  E8 97 64 7E 20 95 60 D9
> "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - K. Cooper
>

JOHNKC wrote:

> 
> WHAT IS THE FTP ADDRESS???????????????
> 

> > You can find this file at the gopher site (chaos.bsu.edu) in the Misc
> > directory, as "Sendmail and + in addressing".  Or something like that,
> > the Misc directory will be reorganized soon, and the file name may
> > change.
> > 
> > Also, I split Tim's large FAQ into 20 chapters and placed it in
> > FAQs/Cypherpunks/Cyphernomicon, if that makes it easier for some
> > people to digest ;)

I first want to thank Karl Barrus for making my Cyphernomicon FAQ
available in separate chapters.

And to answer question raised above by JOHNKC, either of the following
will get you to Karl's files (I found them by gopher, but anonymous
ftp showed various files, but nothing obvious to me as the files that
gopher showed...but I didn't look too hard):

gopher chaos.bsu.edu 

ftp chaos.bsu.edu


--Tim 


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo@toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay

Timothy C. May wrote:
>I first want to thank Karl Barrus for making my Cyphernomicon FAQ
>available in separate chapters.

Sure thing, you're welcome!  I'll try to keep on top of future
versions as well.

>gopher chaos.bsu.edu 
>ftp chaos.bsu.edu

About retreiving the gopher files via ftp: I'm not sure it is set up
for that yet.  Chael has put in quite a bit of work over the summer,
including updating gopher daemon, and he did mention he would like to
make the heirarchy available via anonymous ftp, or perhaps move the
gopher directory (currently a subdirectory of my home) into the
anonymous ftp area.  However, I'm not sure if this has been done yet,
or is doable, etc.

If there is sufficient interest though, I could place the chapters of the
FAQ into the cypherpunks/incoming directory for the time being.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
2.3: 5AD633;   D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 
2.6: 088C8F21; 97 73 9E 8B 98 3E DD B5  E8 97 64 7E 20 95 60 D9
"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - K. Cooper

In article <35gl4b$qtn@bb.com>, I blathered:
>I do have a couple questions that aren't terribly related:
>
>	- Are there any known PK message formats that commute?  It seems
>	 clear to me that PGP and RIPEM do not, since that makes no
>	 sense for private key ciphers like DES/3DES and IDEA.

I have no idea why I phrased so badly: clearly, commuting makes
sense with DES and IDEA.  What I meant was "since it doesn't
make sense for compound message formats where the private keys
are encrypted in public key ciphers, as IDEA is in PGP and
DES/3DES are in RIPEM.

Serves me right for posting after being awake for so long.
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | "A man would simply have to be as mad as a hatter, to try and
cactus@bb.com  |  change the world with a plastic platter." - Todd Rundgren

> Under the Crime Act and RICO statutes, we may be committing consiracy
> merely by talking amongst ourselves. (Maybe this is an exaggeration,
> as I'm not a lawyer and have no desire to become one.)

Just talking about it doesn't constitute conspiracy - you have to take one
active step towards the goal.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG    			Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com

Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key		an88744@anon.penet.fi
                       ** PGP encrypted email preferred! **

"What's the use of distant travel if only to discover - you're homeless in
your heart."  --Basia, "Yearning"

> > Under the Crime Act and RICO statutes, we may be committing consiracy
> > merely by talking amongst ourselves. (Maybe this is an exaggeration,
> > as I'm not a lawyer and have no desire to become one.)
> 
> Just talking about it doesn't constitute conspiracy - you have to take one
> active step towards the goal.
> -- 
> Ed Carp, N7EKG    			Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com

I probably wasn't clear. I didn't mean just talking, with no actions,
but talking about new remailer features designed to thwart law
enforcement, and then implementing the features.

(In this interpretation, the remailers that many of us have talked
about, designed, written software, run on our systems, etc., could be
considered to be part of a conspiracy, should Bidzos, Mykotronx,
ClariNet, the Feds, etc., choose to focus on remailers as "a
continuing criminal enterprise.")

We've done more than just talk, you'll have to agree.

--Tim may


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo@toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay

Something that just occurred to me is that chaining is a justifiable
standard feature for hosts that hold other hosts' MX records.  

I think I'll start hacking on a protocol proposal (Request For
Cypherpunks?);  The more I think about it, the more easy this should
be to implement and distribute as a security suite.

(How's this towards furthering the "everybody a remailer" idea?)
--
L. Todd Masco  | "A man would simply have to be as mad as a hatter, to try and
cactus@bb.com  |  change the world with a plastic platter." - Todd Rundgren