terrorist FORTRESS SLEUTH remailers & FORTRESS lists

THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY & DOES NOT ADVOCATE BREAKING
ANY LAWS.


          TERRORIST FORTRESS SLEUTH REMAILERS & FORTRESS LISTS

   Todd Masco makes a good point about sleuth remailers. For the last
two issues of the CEB in chapter 7. Current problems in crypt, I have
pointed out the need for them. I invented the name FORTRESS REMAILERS
to describe them. I also invented the term FORTRESS MAILING LIST as
well.

   We are in a time window now. In a few years at most, remailers &
lists like Cypherpunks & newsgroups like Sci.crypt may be outlawed.
We may then have two of our most important communications tools taken
away from us in our development of electronic communications privacy
tools. Some will infer from this that if they want secure Internet
communications, then they had better start writing in a hurry. The
State has not consolidated its power enough yet to take away these
"privileges". When they do, these will seem like the good old
careless days of privacy building & possibly even seem like an historic
anomaly. Privacy Freedom Fighters of the future may feel very grateful
to today's Cypherpunks for writing FORTRESS remailers, lists, &
newsgroups so that may continue their work.

   ON THE MATTER OF SECURITY THRU OBSCURITY
   I think that the idea of security thru obscurity is much like having
a strong crypt system that is handicapped by allowing only one password.
The method is limited from becoming popular due to the fact that
popularity would likely disclose the key & then make the system         s
dangerous & useless. Possibly, disastrous to all using it. Due to that
reason, FORTRESS REMAILERS & FORTRESS LISTS & NEWSGROUPS would have to
avoid security thru obscurity.

   It is hard to figure out how to do a FORTRESS remailer or list.
Possibly, a WAN using radio communications as a starting point?
                                                SPECULATIVELY Yours,
                                                Gary Jeffers

We are in a time window now. In a few years at most, remailers &
   lists like Cypherpunks & newsgroups like Sci.crypt may be outlawed.

Outlawed where?  In every jurisdiction in the world?

I would prefer to deal with this situation when it appears likely to
happen and concentrate on achievable results now.  Focusing on the
harder problems of greater repression will prevent useful progress
from being made.

Eric

On Sat, 17 Sep 1994, Gary Jeffers wrote:

> THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY & DOES NOT ADVOCATE BREAKING
> ANY LAWS.
> 
> 
>           TERRORIST FORTRESS SLEUTH REMAILERS & FORTRESS LISTS
> 
>    Todd Masco makes a good point about sleuth remailers. For the last
> two issues of the CEB in chapter 7. Current problems in crypt, I have
> pointed out the need for them. I invented the name FORTRESS REMAILERS
> to describe them. I also invented the term FORTRESS MAILING LIST as
> well.
> 
>    We are in a time window now. In a few years at most, remailers &
> lists like Cypherpunks & newsgroups like Sci.crypt may be outlawed.
> We may then have two of our most important communications tools taken
> away from us in our development of electronic communications privacy
> tools. Some will infer from this that if they want secure Internet
> communications, then they had better start writing in a hurry. The
> State has not consolidated its power enough yet to take away these
> "privileges". When they do, these will seem like the good old
> careless days of privacy building & possibly even seem like an historic
> anomaly. Privacy Freedom Fighters of the future may feel very grateful
> to today's Cypherpunks for writing FORTRESS remailers, lists, &
> newsgroups so that may continue their work.
> 
>    ON THE MATTER OF SECURITY THRU OBSCURITY
>    I think that the idea of security thru obscurity is much like having
> a strong crypt system that is handicapped by allowing only one password.
> The method is limited from becoming popular due to the fact that
> popularity would likely disclose the key & then make the system         s
> dangerous & useless. Possibly, disastrous to all using it. Due to that
> reason, FORTRESS REMAILERS & FORTRESS LISTS & NEWSGROUPS would have to
> avoid security thru obscurity.
> 
>    It is hard to figure out how to do a FORTRESS remailer or list.
> Possibly, a WAN using radio communications as a starting point?
>                                                 SPECULATIVELY Yours,
>                                                 Gary Jeffers
> 

I am a novice, but in discussing some of the issues, i.e.; wiretap bill 
with my dad, Col (ret) from the Green Berets, he said we would have to 
return to short wave, if this happens.  Imangine pgp shortwave!  Of 
course, they would have to be mobile to evade trangulation or satellite 
pin pointing of transmission, which isn't yet available, will be some 
day. Some advice from a guerilla warfare fighter...

Dave
___
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|No Guts, No Glory, No Honor, No Victory, Pillage, Plunder, and Take Heads!|
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| Dave M. Harvey                            PGP 2.61 Public Key available. |
| PO Box 151311              	            Finger warrior@infinet.com.us  |
| Columbus, OH 43215-8311    	            dharvey@freenet.columbus.oh.us |
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