SUFFERANCE remailers

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


:Definition of SUFFERANCE REMAILER: A remailer that exists only so
:long as the U.S. Feds get around to outlawing it.; a sitting duck
:remailer. ; a remailer whose physical location may easily be found.;
:a remailer whose operator is vulnerable to the State's gun argument.;
:currently, the only kind of remailer there is.

:   Definition of FORTRESS REMAILER: A remailer whose physical location
:cannot be found. ; a remailer that does not require the consent of
:the State. ; a Freedom remailer.

How about locating it in a recalcitrant country e.g. North Korea, Libya,
Iraq, Iran.  During the Gulf war scuttlebutt has it that Iraq used encrypted
communications on the Internet to keep its C3 functions up. (Command,
Control, Communications) If they can't get at the remailer its pretty hard
to shut it down. Use satellite communications instead of copper and it would
be real hard to shut down.

Disclaimer: This post is hypothetical, it has NO basis in reality, O.K. NSA

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Fido: Sam Kaplin  1:282/1018           | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard
  Compuserve: 75240,131                  | outside a Roman brothel.
  samuel.kaplin@warehouse.mn.org         |
  75240,131@compuserve.com               | Change is the only constant in the
 For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please."
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.1

iQCVAgUBLokcVQpnimeWAf3FAQETQgQAmPmokZfX3N1boq1V8w3hlQBaBCyUmDtY
6n8yMhbEKJULDxr9eGr1N+kqdGfVG5XksgBsIyvyrAsuLyPHRxkYuBokqMd7g38m
pXdN1i63XH/0ZFluDf+QSywgu0hKOuJf1QgvRhMW9IhzalmyvAnWIJfEa/DkvfNY
8U3m5YMsuQQ=
=K7xv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Samuel Kaplin wrote:

> How about locating it in a recalcitrant country e.g. North Korea, Libya,
> Iraq, Iran.  During the Gulf war scuttlebutt has it that Iraq used encrypted
> communications on the Internet to keep its C3 functions up. (Command,
> Control, Communications) If they can't get at the remailer its pretty hard
> to shut it down. Use satellite communications instead of copper and it would
> be real hard to shut down.

Much more important to the survivability of Iraqi C-Cubed I was their
use of Banyan-type networks. Links could be cut by bombs, SEAL
sappers, etc., and then the network would reconfigure and "heal."

Several U.S. companies supplied the technology, according to reports
in EE Times, etc., and export laws may be changed as a result.

(No matter, as plenty of other countries supply similar network
topology software. The Internet is in many countries....)

--Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo@toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay

Timothy C. May says:
> Much more important to the survivability of Iraqi C-Cubed I was their
> use of Banyan-type networks. Links could be cut by bombs, SEAL
> sappers, etc., and then the network would reconfigure and "heal."

This was in fact perfectly normal internet technology. I design
networks like that all the time.

> Several U.S. companies supplied the technology, according to reports
> in EE Times, etc., and export laws may be changed as a result.
> 
> (No matter, as plenty of other countries supply similar network
> topology software. The Internet is in many countries....)

Linux and NetBSD and BSDI and every other version of Unix with
networking in it can act as a router -- therefore, one would imagine
that all 386 computers should be export controlled. (The notion of
trying to control an idea as simple as automatic network routing, full
descriptions of which are in dozens of textbooks and full
implementations of which are available for free, is a joke.)

Perry

Perry E. Metzger wrote:

> Timothy C. May says:
> > Much more important to the survivability of Iraqi C-Cubed I was their
> > use of Banyan-type networks. Links could be cut by bombs, SEAL
> > sappers, etc., and then the network would reconfigure and "heal."
> 
> This was in fact perfectly normal internet technology. I design
> networks like that all the time.
> 
> > Several U.S. companies supplied the technology, according to reports
> > in EE Times, etc., and export laws may be changed as a result.
> > 
> > (No matter, as plenty of other countries supply similar network
> > topology software. The Internet is in many countries....)
                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Which is precisely why I mentioned this.


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo@toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay