Re: Virtual assasins and lethal rema

TJHARDIN@delphi.com writes:

>Adam is absolutely right.... Even if a killer is so anonymous that she can't
>be linked to a given crime by the employer who will talk  99.9% of the time
>any pressure is applied, she must still continue to accept various
>contracts.
>The police would then set up one of their stings & "hire" her anonymously
>for another job & snatch the killer up when she attempts to fullfill this
>contract. Likewise, the very first offer of employment may well be of this
>sort.

Once again (and hopefully for the last time!), I reiterate that it is the
person *placing* the contract who is at zero risk (except for the risk of
losing their digital cash).  Stings can be set up to catch the killer, but
providing the person doing the hiring trusts no one but himself, there is
no risk to him.  To the extent that there is *any* risk to this person, the
goals of crypto anarchy have not been met.  This pertains to every
conceivable security leak that might affect the person placing the
contract.

Doug

___________________________________________________________________
Doug Cutrell                    General Partner
doug@OpenMind.com               Open Mind, Santa Cruz
===================================================================

> Once again (and hopefully for the last time!), I reiterate that it is the
> person *placing* the contract who is at zero risk (except for the risk of
> losing their digital cash).  Stings can be set up to catch the killer, but
> providing the person doing the hiring trusts no one but himself, there is
> no risk to him.  To the extent that there is *any* risk to this person, the
> goals of crypto anarchy have not been met.  This pertains to every
> conceivable security leak that might affect the person placing the
> contract.

> Doug Cutrell                    General Partner

And the risk of losing the digital cash can be made vanishingly small
by use of anonymous escrow services, which act solely as holders of
the digital cash.

They will arise to fill two market needs:

1. The contract killers will not take the "word" of a contract
purchaser, who has nothing to lose by renegging after the deed is
done. A "reputatble" third party (obviously untraceable, of course)
will be desired.

2. Likewise, the purchaser will not make the payment to the contract
killer and then just "hope for the best." She, too, will want
protection from renegging, various excuses, etc.

Anonymous escrow services are an essential part of the ecology of
digital assassinations.

The thread we had on this a few weeks ago may be useful to those
interested. And my FAQ has some stuff on reputations, anonymous
escrow, etc.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo@toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay