Broadcasts and the Rendezvous Problem

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Seems to me that one of the fundamental building blocks necessary to
a host of anonymous services is a means of rendezvousing in a manner that
is not vulnerable to traffic analysis.

The obvious solution to this is through the use of a broadcast medium.
Has anybody created an alt.* group purely for remailer-associated
rendezvous?

If not, it seems like that would be a very worthwhile direction to pursue:
with such a mechanism, nodes of a "remailer net" can surface and disappear
with minimal disruption to the net.

Folks spend a lot of time bemoaning the transience of specific instances
of remailer nodes: why not turn this into an advantage by architecting
a network of system that is resilient against the destruction and/or
compromise of individual nodes?
- -- 
Todd Masco     | "'When _I_ use a word,' Humpty-Dumpty said, in a rather
cactus@hks.net |  scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -
cactus@bb.com  |  neither more nor less.'"   - Lewis Carroll
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L. Todd Masco wrote:

> Seems to me that one of the fundamental building blocks necessary to
> a host of anonymous services is a means of rendezvousing in a manner that
> is not vulnerable to traffic analysis.
> 
> The obvious solution to this is through the use of a broadcast medium.
> Has anybody created an alt.* group purely for remailer-associated
> rendezvous?

Isn't this what "alt.anonymous.messages" is all about?

(It's been at my Netcom site for many months now...I don't recall who
created it, but it seems to me it was one of us.)

Miron Cuperman ran a message pool for a while....I don't know the
current status.

Other options exist, but all are lightly-trafficked. When more users
are using them, expect more such places.

> Folks spend a lot of time bemoaning the transience of specific instances
> of remailer nodes: why not turn this into an advantage by architecting
> a network of system that is resilient against the destruction and/or
> compromise of individual nodes?

I'm not sure what you mean by this. More remailers are always a good
thing, and offshore sites are especially good, but I'm not sure what
you mean by your last point.

--Tim May



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