public accounts / PGP / passphrases

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Hal writes:
> Just create a special key for your netcom account.  Use no pass phrase;
> using one would give a misleading sense of security IMO.  Just pass your
> mail through "pgp -saft" or equivalent and you've got it.  It is easy to
> do this from most editors.

Could someone please elaborate on the foolishness of using PGP with a 
passphrase on a public machine (as I do) ?  Am I wrong in thinking that my
secret key is useless to an intruder until she guesses my passphrase ?  I
have no net access except via an account on a public machine, so I'm not
about to start storing my secret key elsewhere, but I'll change my passphrase
to <null> if it's irrelevant anyway.  I just reviewed the PGP docs a bit and
Phil says "Nobody can use your secret key file without this pass phrase.",
which seems to contradict what many people on the list have said.

- - -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server
"Don't say my head was empty, when I had things to hide...." --Men at Work

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To: lmccarth@ducie.cs.umass.edu
cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: public accounts / PGP / passphrases 

> Could someone please elaborate on the foolishness of using PGP with a 
> passphrase on a public machine (as I do) ?  Am I wrong in thinking that my
> secret key is useless to an intruder until she guesses my passphrase ?  I
> have no net access except via an account on a public machine, so I'm not
> about to start storing my secret key elsewhere, but I'll change my passphrase
> to <null> if it's irrelevant anyway.  I just reviewed the PGP docs a bit and
> Phil says "Nobody can use your secret key file without this pass phrase.",
> which seems to contradict what many people on the list have said.

For someone to use your secret key, they need two things:
	1) Access to your secring.pgp file, and
	2) Your passphrase

On a public system, 1) is easy (relatively speaking).  2) is more
difficult, but someone could theoretically listen in to the line
anywhere between your keyboard and the CPU.  What do you know about
what's going on on the other end of the phone line?

My rule of thumb (for me) is to only use PGP when I have direct
control over everything between the keyboard on which I am typing, and
the CPU on which PGP is running. 

This doesn't mean that you _can't_ run PGP on a public machine.  It
also doesn't mean that you _shouldn't_, either.  It is a matter of
security -- how secure do you want your key to be.  If you really
don't mind it being insecure, you might as well generate a 384-bit key
(which has been proven by RSA-129 to be insecure to an amateur attack).

What do you use to contact your public machine?  Do you dial in from
home?  What kind of machine do you have at home?  You might consider
running PGP at home if that is at all possible.

It would be nice to integrate PGP into terminal emulators, too, like
kermit or seyon or red ryder or whatever, so that you could easily use
PGP locally to sign/encrypt things on the remote end.  Wishful
thinking, I guess...

Does this help?

- -derek

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Derek wrote:

| What do you use to contact your public machine?  Do you dial in from
| home?  What kind of machine do you have at home?  You might consider
| running PGP at home if that is at all possible.
| 
| It would be nice to integrate PGP into terminal emulators, too, like
| kermit or seyon or red ryder or whatever, so that you could easily use
| PGP locally to sign/encrypt things on the remote end.  Wishful
| thinking, I guess...

	I think terminal emulators are the wrong layer for PGP
integration.  PGP support is needed in document editors and viewers,
rather than in network layers.

	With direct ip connectivity becoming commonplace, we're seeing
PGP integrated into mail & news tools, which is a great thing.  (There
is also a use for encrypting networks, but I think it is different
from the use for PGP, which is a document oriented system.)

Adam


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
						       -Hume

lmccarth@ducie.cs.umass.edu writes:

 > Could someone please elaborate on the foolishness of using
 > PGP with a passphrase on a public machine (as I do) ?

It is not secure to use your private key on a machine that you do
not have physical control over.  It is probably secure to store a
passphrase-protected private key on such a machine, as long as
you do not feed it into a program which decrypts it.

 > Am I wrong in thinking that my secret key is useless to an
 > intruder until she guesses my passphrase ?

Or monitors your keystrokes as you type in your passphrase, or
watches your address space as PGP uses the key, etc etc...

Given the state of Unix security, I would certainly not want to
type my passphrase into a Unix box unless I was the only user,
was directly connected to the box through a wire I could see, and
had just done a fresh boot after verifying the MD5 hash on all
the OS binaries.

Not likely to be the case at your average public installation.

 > I have no net access except via an account on a public
 > machine, so I'm not about to start storing my secret key
 > elsewhere, but I'll change my passphrase to <null> if it's
 > irrelevant anyway.

Having a passphrase will protect against casual acquisition of
your private key, but only physical security when the key is used
will protect you against a determined opponent.

---

As long as I am typing, permit me to add my two cents to the
"digital signatures on the list" flame war.

Like many proponents of strong cryptography, I rarely use it in
everyday life.  I occasionally encrypt personal mail to friends
overseas when I know it is going to take numerous hops over
insecure links en route, and I will digitally sign mail or Usenet
articles if I want to say something that I consider important in
a way that cannot be altered or spoofed.  This happens rarely.

I would consider having to digitally sign everything I post to
the list, no matter how frivilous, the moral equivalent of being
allowed to speak only while under sworn oath.  Now oaths and
notaries are certainly useful things in appropriate places, like
courtrooms and lawyers offices, but I don't think any of us would
care to live our lives having our every utterance subject to
their certification.

It would certainly not aid our cause to have the government be
able to point and say - "Even the cypherpunks make people
digitally identify themselves when posting messages to their
list" - while at the same time attempting to explain to people
why we aren't happy with Chaum's less than anonymous ECash or Web
sites that require registration and personal information before
permitting access to privacy-related material.

The Net, like life, offers a certain plausable deniability in
what has been said, and who has said it.  Some of the best
messages on the list in past years have been Tim's witty and
entertaining spoofs of his ideological opponents.  Let's save
absolute certainty about the real or pseudo-anonymous identities
of speakers in this forum for times when, in the sole opinion of
the person posting, such certainty is deemed necessary.

-- 
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd@netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $