// COMPLETE THREAD

Re: BofA+Netscape

2 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child

NODE dd66bf39Re: BofA+Netscape
At 3:08 PM 12/11/94, James A. Donald wrote:
>Amanda complained that Netscape pisses all over the
>standardization committees.
>
>Well guys, the victor has room to move.  It must come as a big
>shock to Apple, Microsoft, and IBM, but reality is that Netscape
>can set WWW standards and they cannot.
>
>If they indulge the standardization committees by listening to 
>them first, and then deciding to ignore them, the committee
>should be thoroughly greatful.

For the record, we're not trying to set standards -- we're trying
to build products with functionality that our customers want and
need.  We'll succeed or fail on the basis of whether we do that,
not whether or because we set standards.  We fully realize that
being proprietary or isolated from existing or future standards
only locks us out of our market, which does us no good at all.
That doesn't mean that we're not going to innovate when we need
to, but it means we're not going to be anything other than
totally open and standards-compliant.  To that end, we aggressively
support all current standards (HTML, HTTP, URLs, NNTP, Gopher, SOCKS,
FTP, you name it), are a charter member of W3O (with a concomitant
$150K commitment), and from day 1 have made SSL available to the broader
community and have given it to the W3O security working group (of
which we are a full participant) exactly in parallel with SHTTP and the
three or four other proposals that have been submitted for
consideration by other companies and third parties.

I fully expect we'll be supporting other security standards and
approaches as they emerge, and we certainly welcome realistic suggestions 
on what we should do, when, and how.

Cheers,
Marc


--
Marc Andreessen
Netscape Communications Corporation
Mountain View, CA
marca@mcom.com
NODE 4ba30101Re: BofA+Netscape
Marc Andreessen says:
> I fully expect we'll be supporting other security standards and
> approaches as they emerge, and we certainly welcome realistic suggestions 
> on what we should do, when, and how.

I told you in Email, Mr. Andreessen, that new transport level security
protocols are useless now that IPSP has come near to standardization
and now that prototype implementations are nearly available. Many
people at IETF in other groups expressed far less interest in
proceeding with new security protocols now that there will be a
network layer security protocol. However, you did not appear to be
remotely interested. I suppose that you considered the comment I made
"unrealistic".

Personally, I consider to be unrealistic the notion that the same
group of programmers who a year or two ago thought that the way to
remove files on a Unix system was to use system(3) to call rm via the
shell will be standardizing security -- after all, they couldn't
produce a secure piece of software to begin with.

My current presumption is that since the same programmers who produce
Mosaic produced Netscape that, although pretty looking on the outside,
it is just as bad on the inside: like a beautful marble skyscraper
that is held together on the inside with chewing gum, toothpicks and
rusty bailing wire. I have discouraged clients from using Netscape in
the absense of source because there is no way to look for the security
holes that are surely lurking within it; unfortunately, the product is
just too pretty looking.

By all means, of course, work on any security system you like. The
burden will be on you to convince people to use it.


Perry