opinions on RSA Secure?

c'punks:

RSA Secure appears to be a neat commercial package: it loads easily, runs fast, and
and generates an 80-bit key using Rivest's RC4. It has an "emergency access"
feature (splittable key escrow) which can, however, be disabled by the user.
Has anyone checked out the innards? Hoe secure is it in industrial/commercial
usage?; against the TLAs?; any hidden trapdoors?
Thanks in advance for your views.

Bill Nugent
Library of Congress
(a personal, not an institutional, query)

Bill, et. al.,

>and generates an 80-bit key using Rivest's RC4. It has an "emergency access"
>feature (splittable key escrow) which can, however, be disabled by the user.
	.
	.
	.
>Bill Nugent
>Library of Congress
>(a personal, not an institutional, query)

To clarify, the Emergency Access (EA) feature's owner (e.g., the Site Security
Officer (SSO)) can determine whether to *allow* users to disable EA. A 
possible way one brings RSA Secure to the(ir) masses of users is as follows:

	The SSO (or some equivalent) gets the software and configures EA 
	(i.e., generates EA keys) on their PC. An important part of
	the EA config is the creation of a User Disk which is distributed
	to the users of the package. On that disk goes the cryto-stuff
	that lets EA work in the future, plus the config data (including
	whether or not the EA can be overridden).

	The users, on getting the User disks from the SSO, then configure
	their PC's to encrypt/decrypt their files. If the SSO hasn't
	allowed EA disabling, when the users encrypt, the "Disable EA"
	checkbox is greyed out (missing? I forget; I would prefer it to
	be missing if not available).

The important thing here is that the ability to control the RSA Secure 
"policy" is in the same hands as the responsiblity for creating the org's 
security policy, if any.

Personally, I find RSA Secure to be quite a nice package, from a usage point 
of view. The way it blends into FileManager is really convenient. The less I 
have to "work at" security, the more likely it is that I'll use it. The crypto
is satisfactory for my needs and I'm not going to rehash (no pun intended) the
arguments over RC4-40, etc.


					Karl A. Siil
					AT&T Bell Labs
					Holmdel, NJ

On Thu, 31 Aug 1995, William R. Nugent wrote:

> Date: Thu, 31 Aug 1995 09:18:18 -0400
> From: William R. Nugent <wnug@loc.gov>
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: opinions on RSA Secure?
> 
> 
> c'punks:
> 
> RSA Secure appears to be a neat commercial package: it loads easily, runs fast, and
> and generates an 80-bit key using Rivest's RC4. It has an "emergency access"
> feature (splittable key escrow) which can, however, be disabled by the user.
> Has anyone checked out the innards? Hoe secure is it in industrial/commercial
> usage?; against the TLAs?; any hidden trapdoors?
> Thanks in advance for your views.

The fact that the key is only 80 is *major* compromise.  I would 
recommend that package to no-one.   With only a 80 bit key you dont 
*need* trapdoors, granted they may be more "convienient" but the fact is 
the 80 key *can* [and certainly will] be broken...

Summary: Don't used it.


Btw, this is not an opposition to RSA, RSA is very good - it is an 
opposition to the length of the key...

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> The fact that the key is only 80 is *major* compromise.  I would 
> recommend that package to no-one.   With only a 80 bit key you dont 
> *need* trapdoors, granted they may be more "convienient" but the fact is 
> the 80 key *can* [and certainly will] be broken...
I disagree.  If we assume that RC4 and DES can be run at the same speed
(I don't know how true this is) then 80 bit RC4 is 2^24 times harder
to break than DES.  That's 16 million.  A machine that will crack
DES in one day is of the order of one million dollars.  It would take
50,000 years to crack 80-bit RC4.  Alternativly, a one-day crack
would cost 16 trillion dollars.  I feel safe with those numbers.

Certainly, for the most paranoid 128 bit IDEA is better than an
80 bit RC4.  However, to say that it is unsuitable for anyone is
a vast stretch.  Considering it probably has a better user-interface
than SecureDrive, it may be more suitable for the average person.

On Thu, 31 Aug 1995, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N wrote:
> 
> > The fact that the key is only 80 is *major* compromise.  I would 
> > recommend that package to no-one.   With only a 80 bit key you dont 
> > *need* trapdoors, granted they may be more "convienient" but the fact is 
> > the 80 key *can* [and certainly will] be broken...
> I disagree.  If we assume that RC4 and DES can be run at the same speed
> (I don't know how true this is) then 80 bit RC4 is 2^24 times harder
> to break than DES.  That's 16 million.  A machine that will crack
> DES in one day is of the order of one million dollars.  It would take
> 50,000 years to crack 80-bit RC4.  Alternativly, a one-day crack
> would cost 16 trillion dollars.  I feel safe with those numbers.
> 
> Certainly, for the most paranoid 128 bit IDEA is better than an
> 80 bit RC4.  However, to say that it is unsuitable for anyone is
> a vast stretch.  Considering it probably has a better user-interface
> than SecureDrive, it may be more suitable for the average person.
> 

I am a user of SecureDrive, and strongly support it.   There is *no* 
interface required, once you log into the drive, *everything* operates 
totally transparent to the user.

Always keep in mind that when the gov't doesn't mind the software being 
exported, they alrady know how to compromise it...Trust PGP, Hpack & 
SecureDrive...you won't be disappointed.

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> I am a user of SecureDrive, and strongly support it.   There is *no* 
> interface required, once you log into the drive, *everything* operates 
> totally transparent to the user.
I used to use it too.  Sure, once you've got it set up and automated,
it's transparent.  But can you see J. Random User installing it?

> Always keep in mind that when the gov't doesn't mind the software being 
> exported, they alrady know how to compromise it...Trust PGP, Hpack & 
> SecureDrive...you won't be disappointed.
When last I looked, your government didn't allow the export of 80-bit
cryptosystems.  There is no argument that the 40-bit export version
is breakable.

[..]
> 
> Certainly, for the most paranoid 128 bit IDEA is better than an
> 80 bit RC4.  However, to say that it is unsuitable for anyone is
> a vast stretch.  Considering it probably has a better user-interface
> than SecureDrive, it may be more suitable for the average person.
> 
So why not a user-friendly Windows or GUI interface for SecureDrive as well?

How hard is it to adapt LOGIN for Windows?