Is the book Network Security any good?

Has anyone read the book "Network Security Private Communication in a 
PUBLIC World" yet?  It's by Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman, and Mike
Speciner, and has a copyright date of this year.

Is it good?  What's the level?

Patrick
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Patrick Horgan writes:
> Has anyone read the book "Network Security Private Communication in a 
> PUBLIC World" yet?  It's by Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman, and Mike
> Speciner, and has a copyright date of this year.
> 
> Is it good?  What's the level?

I know a bit Charlie and have met Radia and they are both quite
smart. Word from third parties is that the book is good. I haven't
read it myself, though

Perry

>Has anyone read the book "Network Security Private Communication in a 
>PUBLIC World" yet?  It's by Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman, and Mike
>Speciner, and has a copyright date of this year.

Its pretty good on security and structure of protocols. Makes a good companion to 
the Schneier book. I use it frequently.

It does have some very irritating assertions concerning ASN.1 however, 
specifically concerning its use in Kerberos. I consider Kerberos's use of ASN.1 
to be far superior than the alternative suggested which is pure lossage. 
Lambasting the use of ASN.1 is fair game but arguments over wasted bytes miss the 
point of ASN.1 and the BER encoding entirely.

It would make a usefull course book. 

	Phill

hallam@w3.org writes:
> It does have some very irritating assertions concerning ASN.1
> however, specifically concerning its use in Kerberos. I consider
> Kerberos's use of ASN.1 to be far superior than the alternative
> suggested which is pure lossage.

I've heard people associated with the decision to use ASN.1 in
Kerberos V say it was a mistake. Frankly, I think ASN.1 is a blight
which should be exterminated from the planet.

But we agree that the book in question is mostly good...

Perry