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FBI Files on Clipper Releas

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NODE 5ff30ab9FBI Files on Clipper Releas
FOR RELEASE:  August 16, 1995, 2:00 p.m. EST

CONTACT: David Sobel (202) 544-9240

               FBI FILES: CLIPPER MUST BE MANDATORY


	WASHINGTON, DC - Newly-released government documents show 
that key federal agencies concluded more than two years ago that 
the "Clipper Chip" encryption initiative will only succeed if 
alternative security techniques are outlawed.  The Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) obtained the documents from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Freedom of Information 
Act.  EPIC, a non-profit research group, received hundreds of 
pages of material from FBI files concerning Clipper and 
cryptography.

	The conclusions contained in the documents appear to conflict 
with frequent Administration claims that use of Clipper technology 
will remain "voluntary."  Critics of the government's initiative, 
including EPIC, have long maintained that the Clipper "key-escrow 
encryption" technique would only serve its stated purpose if made 
mandatory.  According to the FBI documents, that view is shared by 
the Bureau, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ).

	In a "briefing document" titled "Encryption: The Threat, 
Applications and Potential Solutions," and sent to the National 
Security Council in February 1993, the FBI, NSA and DOJ concluded 
that:

     Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if 
     they are incorporated into *all* encryption products.  
     To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the 
     use of Government-approved encryption products or 
     adherence to Government encryption criteria is required.

	Likewise, an undated FBI report titled "Impact of Emerging 
Telecommunications Technologies on Law Enforcement" observes that 
"[a]lthough the export of encryption products by the United States 
is controlled, domestic use is not regulated."  The report 
concludes that "a national policy embodied in legislation is 
needed."  Such a policy, according to the FBI, must ensure "real-
time decryption by law enforcement" and "prohibit[] cryptography 
that cannot meet the Government standard."

	The FBI conclusions stand in stark contrast to public 
assurances that the government does not intend to prohibit the use 
of non-escrowed encryption.  Testifying before a Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on May 3, 1994, Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann 
Harris asserted that:

     As the Administration has made clear on a number of 
     occasions, the key-escrow encryption initiative is a 
     voluntary one; we have absolutely no intention of 
     mandating private use of a particular kind of 
     cryptography, nor of criminalizing the private use of 
     certain kinds of cryptography.

 	According to EPIC Legal Counsel David Sobel, the newly-
disclosed information "demonstrates that the architects of the 
Clipper program -- NSA and the FBI -- have always recognized that 
key-escrow must eventually be mandated.  As privacy advocates and 
industry have always said, Clipper does nothing for law 
enforcement unless the alternatives are outlawed."

	Scanned images of several key documents are available via the 
World Wide Web at the EPIC Home Page:

		http://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/



                              -30-



_________________________________________________________________________
Subject: FBI Files on Clipper Released
_________________________________________________________________________
David Banisar (Banisar@epic.org)        *  202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center   *  202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301     *  HTTP://epic.org
Washington, DC 20003                    *  ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org
NODE 709b0d2bRe: FBI Files on Clipper Release
Dave Banisar quotes FBI documents obtained via the FOIA:
>      Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if 
>      they are incorporated into *all* encryption products.  
>      To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the 
>      use of Government-approved encryption products or 
>      adherence to Government encryption criteria is required.

...meanwhile...
> Testifying before a Senate Judiciary 
> Subcommittee on May 3, 1994, Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann 
> Harris asserted that:
> 
>      As the Administration has made clear on a number of 
>      occasions, the key-escrow encryption initiative is a 
>      voluntary one; we have absolutely no intention of 
>      mandating private use of a particular kind of 
>      cryptography, nor of criminalizing the private use of 
>      certain kinds of cryptography.

By exactly what mechanism are appointed (hired ?) officials such as AAG Harris
supposedly accountable to the public ?  Can they be brought up on perjury
charges ?  Just what real legal recourse do we have against lying scum in the
bureaucracy ?  Are we stuck unless we can get some Congresscritter to cry
foul on the floor of the House or Senate ?

-Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>
"you said too much; and what you said, it was a lie" -EMF
NODE 817e31beRe: FBI Files on Clipper Release
On Wed, 16 Aug 1995, Futplex wrote:

> Dave Banisar quotes FBI documents obtained via the FOIA:
> >      Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if 
> >      they are incorporated into *all* encryption products.  
> >      To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the 
> >      use of Government-approved encryption products or 
> >      adherence to Government encryption criteria is required.
> 
> ...meanwhile...
> > Testifying before a Senate Judiciary 
> > Subcommittee on May 3, 1994, Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann 
> > Harris asserted that:
> > 
> >      As the Administration has made clear on a number of 
> >      occasions, the key-escrow encryption initiative is a 
> >      voluntary one; we have absolutely no intention of 
> >      mandating private use of a particular kind of 
> >      cryptography, nor of criminalizing the private use of 
> >      certain kinds of cryptography.
>        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
> By exactly what mechanism are appointed (hired ?) officials such as AAG Harris
> supposedly accountable to the public ?  Can they be brought up on perjury
> charges ?  Just what real legal recourse do we have against lying scum in the
> bureaucracy ?  Are we stuck unless we can get some Congresscritter to cry
> foul on the floor of the House or Senate ?

You sure are anxious to prosecute government officials.  What is untrue 
about her statement.  Maybe she meant it's OK to use ROT-13 but nothing 
else ...

And you guys complained about the Jake Baker prosecution!

BTW, Harris is no longer AAG-Criminal Division.  She went back to 
teaching, keeping a commitment she made to her family.  And yes, she was 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.


 
> -Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>
> "you said too much; and what you said, it was a lie" -EMF
> 

EBD
NODE add6d23eRe: FBI Files on Clipper Release
A FBI document reads:
# To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the 
# use of Government-approved encryption products or 
# adherence to Government encryption criteria is required.

Ex-AAG Jo Ann Harris told a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in 1994:
$ we have absolutely no intention of mandating private use of a particular
$ kind of cryptography, 

I ranted:
% Just what real legal recourse do we have against lying scum in the
% bureaucracy ?  

Brian Davis writes:
> You sure are anxious to prosecute government officials.  

You're damn right I'm anxious to prosecute government officials who appear
to have willfully lied about public policy in testimony before Congress !

Look, plenty of people here are honest-to-[insert your higher power of
choice here] anarchists. I happen to be at most an anarchogroupie ;) and
I'm reasonably comfortable with the U.S. version of representative democracy.

[Note to the list: I'm not looking to spark any sort of debate about political
philosophy, on or off the list. I'm not interested in arguing semantics, so 
don't bother trying.]

For representative democracy to be even vaguely democratic at all, the
representatives need to level with their constituents as much as possible.
I certainly intend to hold public officials speaking in an official
capacity about official business to a high standard of conduct. 

> What is untrue about her statement.  Maybe she meant it's OK to use
> ROT-13 but nothing else ...

How could that be compatible with "no intention of mandating...a particular
kind of cryptography" ?

> And you guys complained about the Jake Baker prosecution!

Non-sequitur. How is the Baker case relevant to this ?

-Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>
"Say goodbye to the clowns in Congress" -Elton John/Bernie Taupin
NODE 10f2b91fRe: FBI Files on Clipper Release
On Wed, 23 Aug 1995, Futplex wrote:

> A FBI document reads:
> # To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the 
> # use of Government-approved encryption products or 
> # adherence to Government encryption criteria is required.
> 
> Ex-AAG Jo Ann Harris told a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in 1994:
> $ we have absolutely no intention of mandating private use of a particular
> $ kind of cryptography, 
> 
> I ranted:
> % Just what real legal recourse do we have against lying scum in the
> % bureaucracy ?  
> 
> Brian Davis writes:
> > You sure are anxious to prosecute government officials.  
> 
> You're damn right I'm anxious to prosecute government officials who appear
> to have willfully lied about public policy in testimony before Congress !

You must realize that there can be a difference between what agencies say 
is necessary and what policy ultimately becomes on that issue.  It is 
because of that distinction that campaigns, such as the ongoing campaign 
to allow exportation of strong encryption software, are important.  The 
FBI may say they want X, but the policymakers may take the FBI's 
arguments (always with a grain, or a bucket, of salt), consider other 
agencies views, public opinion, the persuasiveness of everyone's 
reasoning, and *then* adopt a policy that satisfies no one completely.
 
> For representative democracy to be even vaguely democratic at all, the 
> representatives need to level with their constituents as much as possible.
> I certainly intend to hold public officials speaking in an official 
> capacity about official business to a high standard of conduct.  

As you, and we all, should.  That doesn't mean prosecution necessarily.  
It may mean private protest (letter to Clinton, Reno, et al.), public 
protest, voting the bastards out, etc.


> > What is untrue about her statement.  Maybe she meant it's OK to use 
> > ROT-13 but nothing else ... 
> > How could that be compatible with "no intention of mandating...a 
    particular  kind of cryptography" ? 

> > > And you guys complained about the Jake Baker prosecution! 

> > Non-sequitur. How is the Baker case relevant to this ? 

I disagree that it is a non sequitur.  

Baker indicted for speech which, to some, constituted a threat.

You seek to prosecute former AAG Harris for speech which, to some, was a lie.

> > -Futplex
<futplex@pseudonym.com> > "Say goodbye to the clowns in Congress" -Elton
John/Bernie Taupin
> 

Sorry I didn't respond sooner -- email got backed up and I'm not reading 
chronologically (for some unknown reason).