Re: "Going after Netscape"

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In article <199509231914.MAA01326@infinity.c2.org>, sameer@c2.org (sameer)
wrote:

>> So, keep on "attacking" Netscape (kudos to Ray, by the way, though I've
>> seen Netscape bomb on certain sites, as with the Cypherpunks archive site,
>> as several of us noted a few months ago...probably a different problem, but
>> indicative that Netscape can be corrupted). But let's be careful not to
>> convey any flavor of this being a vendetta.
>
>        I agree. The goal is not to kill Netscape but to make the net
>secure.

Absolutely. We aren't on a vendetta. We want to make the net secure for
privacy. If hacking a Netscape server will help that goal, surely
Netsape's own would be the most appropriate server to try, since it will
generate the largest exposure in the press and thereby the strongest
motivation for Netscape to fix the hole.

- -- 
- -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com>
   PGP encrypted mail preferred.
- ---
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Lucky Green writes:
> >> So, keep on "attacking" Netscape (kudos to Ray, by the way,
> >> though I've seen Netscape bomb on certain sites, as with the
> >> Cypherpunks archive site, as several of us noted a few months
> >> ago...probably a different problem, but indicative that Netscape
> >> can be corrupted). But let's be careful not to convey any flavor
> >> of this being a vendetta.
> >
> >I agree. The goal is not to kill Netscape but to make the net
> >secure.
> 
> Absolutely. We aren't on a vendetta. We want to make the net secure for
> privacy.

Agreed. My main purpose in harrassing Netscape is that I have to live
with customers who insist on using it and I want them to be safe. If
that means having to attack it enough that the the press starts
noticing and management starts paying attention as a result, so be it.

Perry

There's one very important side-effect of the existence of a large number 
of compromised certificates accepted by navigator: the upgraded clients 
must either do CRL processing, or the roots used to sign all possibly 
compromised keys *must*  be rejected by the fixed navigator. 

Simon