NODE 8b663f4cHack Microsoft?
Ray Cromwell <rjc@clark.net>Tue, 26 Sep 95 06:10:22 PDT
Microsoft recently got C2-security status approved for Windows NT by
the National Computer Security Center, a division of the NSA. They
are supposed to put systems through "laborious testing and review" before
they approve C2. So, if one can find bugs in NT's security, one can
toss a little more egg on the NSA's face and the sham that part of
their activies to *help* to secure american computers. A simple
violation of NT's C2 status would be to demostrate a flaw in it's
memory protection implementation. Personally, I think NT is
*riddled* with bugs waiting to be discovered. Hell, even the
NT "service pack" is included in the C2 status, which I bet
has plenty of holes.
If Cypherpunks can find flaws that the NSA can't, or won't divulge,
what does that say about their so-called COMSEC ability.
-Ray
NODE bff7ec92Re: C2 Evaluation of Win NT (was: Hack Microsoft?)
futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex)Mon, 2 Oct 95 01:11:28 PDT
Ray writes:
> Microsoft recently got C2-security status approved for Windows NT by
> the National Computer Security Center, a division of the NSA.
Do you have a pointer to a source for this information ? I've been searching
through NCSC Orange Book stuff and M$'s web server, to no avail.
http://www.microsoft.com/BackOffice/techbriefs/tech4000.htm, the Win NT Server
3.5 Technology Brief, only says that NT was in the final evaluation phase as
of June 1995.
I haven't been able to find on-line copies of any NCSC Product Evaluation
Bulletins, or a current Evaluated Products List. The closest I've seen is
http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil:80/ITD/5540/xtp1/epl.html, which lists items
evaluated or under evaluation, at the A and B levels.
The status of NT's evaluation for C2 is a recurrent topic on the firewalls
list, so I'm surprised I haven't seen the final approval mentioned there.
-Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>
NODE 0207876cRe: Hack Microsoft?
Tim Scanlon <tfs@vampire.science.gmu.edu>Tue, 26 Sep 95 07:45:11 PDT
It should be possible to FOIA the evaluation that
led to the C2 status on this. That would be one good
avenue to start looking at it.
At the end of the process there should be a document
that shows how the OS meets each of the C2 requirments
and what aspects of the software were considered as
well.
Things like the state the OS was running under at the
time, (network vs. non-network etc.) are important
considerations in evaluations.
And I would not be too surprised at all if the "C2"
designation was relativly bogus. This sort of thing
can get much like the anti-crypto crowds arguments.
Highly political with little basis in rationality.
Since I've seen stuff like a ported version of Unix's
"ps" utility, and know NT runs a microkernel, I can think
of a hell of allot of ways it'd be possible to fail
it right out of the box... Considering that it has the
cpacity to do all sorts of network stuff, including FTP
& the like, I wonder how the hell they passed any audit
requirements. Probably a "Well it runs in a single user model,
we don't need to have strong audit requirments".
My point basicly being that I would consider the C2 designation
for this to be broken coming out of the box unless I saw
proof that it was otherwise. To operate it in a C2 required
environment without consideration of how & under what
conditions the rating was achived would be criminaly
irresponsible.
Tim Scanlon
________________________________________________________________
tfs@vampire.science.gmu.edu (NeXTmail, MIME) Tim Scanlon
George Mason University (PGP key avail.) Public Affairs
I speak for myself, but often claim demonic possession
NODE c4d81dfbRe: Hack Microsoft?
hallam@w3.orgTue, 26 Sep 95 13:46:55 PDT
> Microsoft recently got C2-security status approved for Windows NT by
>the National Computer Security Center, a division of the NSA. They
>are supposed to put systems through "laborious testing and review" before
>they approve C2.
Well yes and no, C2 is not a particularly high security rating. It is also a
fairly obsolete set of requirements. So if anyone is to claim a breach of a C2
system it had better be one within the C2 assurances, not something that is only
covered in the B series criteria. What really matters is the combined criteria
which should have/would have emerged from NIST had the issue of harmonising the
US/Canadian criteria with the European ones turned up.
As a cypherpunks aside we reviewed the orange book criteria in a reading group
here at MIT a few months back. One point that was made was that Orange Book does
not consider cryptographic security systems which was generally considered a
disappointment.
Obviously Windows NT is "fair game" for analysis. Remember however that it is an
established operating system and that there are many people who rely on it. I
think that if people want to go down that route they should start by
establishing a contacts with CERT and Microsoft in order to make sure that
people whose businesses depend on the security of their O/S are not compromised.
You may well find that Microsoft is willing to give you free copies of WNT to do
this type of work on.
I think that this would be a really good project. The more independent analysis
of an operating system that takes place the more confidence people can place in
it. Windows NT is in many ways a descendent of VMS which has a very good
security record. There is no reason why Windows NT should not mature to that
level of security. It was built with security in mind after all, unlike UNIX
sitation security was never more than an afterthought and often merely wishfull
thinking.
There are an awful lot of WNT seats out there already. I expect them to
outnumber UNIX very soon. The only thing that is holding it back is the
relatively small size of the userbase compared to windows and the resources
required to run it. WNT requires similar CPU and memory to UNIX which is hardly
suprising since it is doing very much the same thing.
I would suggest however that the project is structured and coordinated in some
fashion. Someone should keep a list of security concerns that have been
addressed and checked. That list should have some structure such as a division
into the main risk categories (Authenticity, confidentiality, Service) so that
people can get a feel for how thoroughly the space is being searched. Later on
that list is likely to be one of the most valuable end results of such a
project.
Phill