RE: Commercial Mixmaster

nelson@crynwr.com (Russell Nelson) wrote:

> There *will* always be a free version of the client with source
> code, but the proprietary improvements will probably not be merged
> into the free version.  Lance, and only Lance, as copyright holder,
> has the publish the code under a different copyright.  It's the same
> thing that Phil Z. did with ViacryptPGP.

It's not the same thing, though.  PGP 2.6.2 and PGP 2.7 are
compatible.  You can compile 2.6.2 from the sources and have it
interoperate with Viacrypt 2.7.

The concern is not "commercialization", per se, but rather the use
of "commercialization" as an excuse to build in "proprietary"
features (Back doors?) for which no corresponding source code is
involved.

Since no one has made a good case for there even being a COMMERCIAL
market for Mixmaster, could there be other motives?  Without
building an anonymous e-$ infrastructure first, there's no way to
even charge for the use of a remailing service without sacrificing
anonymity, even if people were willing to pay to have messages
anonymously remailed.

No, I'm not accusing Lance.  But if he no longer has the time to
support Mixmaster, then perhaps some other crypto-friendly group
should take over the task and keep it an OPEN system, with source
code available.  In fact, even freezing Mixmaster as is would be
preferable to "improvements" that people don't/can't trust.

True, they *COULD* provide source code, but how many commerical
products come with complete source code?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

   Date: Sat, 16 Sep 1995 12:21:04 -0700
   From: "syrinx@c2.org (Syrinx Anonymous Remailer)" <syrinx@c2.org>

   The concern is not "commercialization", per se, but rather the use
   of "commercialization" as an excuse to build in "proprietary"
   features (Back doors?) for which no corresponding source code is
   involved.

And the chief concern with the Clipper chip?  That it was secret.  In
the crypto world, secret == untrustable.  Who would use a remailing
network that was not trustable?  Who would use it when every
cypherpunk says not to?

   Since no one has made a good case for there even being a COMMERCIAL
   market for Mixmaster, could there be other motives?

Value is created by seeing a market that no one else sees.  Obvious
markets have low margins, and they're getting lower and lower as
computers help implement the obvious.

   Without building an anonymous e-$ infrastructure first, there's no
   way to even charge for the use of a remailing service without
   sacrificing anonymity, even if people were willing to pay to have
   messages anonymously remailed.

Maybe someone *does* see a way to create system?  If *you* knew,
would you tell everyone about it?  Or would you implement it, and rake
in the bucks?

   No, I'm not accusing Lance.  But if he no longer has the time to
   support Mixmaster, then perhaps some other crypto-friendly group
   should take over the task and keep it an OPEN system, with source
   code available.  In fact, even freezing Mixmaster as is would be
   preferable to "improvements" that people don't/can't trust.

Since you have no reputation to impugn, I feel free to be rude: "Put
up or shut up."  If you have the resources to improve Mixmaster so
that it's easy to use, do it.  If not, please don't stand in the way
of people who *do* have the resources.

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-- 
-russ <nelson@crynwr.com>    http://www.crynwr.com/~nelson
Crynwr Software   | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | PGP ok
11 Grant St.      | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX)  | America neither a Christian,
Potsdam, NY 13676 |  Jewish, Islamic, nor atheist (etc&) nation.  This is good.

Its worth noting that the source code to Julf's Penet remailer
is not public (AFAIK).  People use it becuase they trust Julf, or
trust people who trust Julf.

	There is clearly a market for anonymizing services in various
forms.  Hopefully, whoever is putting up cash is also looking at
building a web proxy service, a pseudononymous system, and a mail
drop/data haven type of operation (although the last might not fit in
as well.)

	If you don't see a market, I suggest you drop a line offering
services to the friendly folks at presiednt@whitehouse.gov.  I'm sure
they'd prefer a bit of privacy.

	Why pay for remailers when there are free ones?  Speed and
lawyers pop right up as damn good answers.  Putting up a couple of
p120s on a T1 in the Carribean isn't cheap, nor is making sure you
have a good lawyer who'll protect the machines when the bad guys show
up with warrants.  I'd be much happier to use a fast system on good
legal ground than a freebie.

Adam


Russ Nelson wrote:

|    The concern is not "commercialization", per se, but rather the use
|    of "commercialization" as an excuse to build in "proprietary"
|    features (Back doors?) for which no corresponding source code is
|    involved.
| 
| And the chief concern with the Clipper chip?  That it was secret.  In
| the crypto world, secret == untrustable.  Who would use a remailing
| network that was not trustable?  Who would use it when every
| cypherpunk says not to?
| 
|    Since no one has made a good case for there even being a COMMERCIAL
|    market for Mixmaster, could there be other motives?
| 
| Value is created by seeing a market that no one else sees.  Obvious
| markets have low margins, and they're getting lower and lower as
| computers help implement the obvious.


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume

Adam Shostack writes:
> 	Its worth noting that the source code to Julf's Penet remailer
> is not public (AFAIK).  People use it becuase they trust Julf, or
> trust people who trust Julf.

Yeah, but remember -- there is very little that Julf's code could do
to "cheat". Julf's system maintains a mapping of users to aliases
anyway, so he has no need to "pervert" the system -- he can do
all the bad things we worry about with it working correctly. We
therefore need not see the code to trust the system, because the only
way that the system is trustworthy is if Julf is trustworthy.

Other systems based on cryptography might not be in this position.

Perry