Surveillance a Growing Problem

(I've changed the thread name from "Fuhrman...." to the topic being
discussed here.)

At 10:56 PM 9/1/95, Buford Terrell wrote:

>If you've ever watched Not_at_all_Funny Home Videos or any of the
>American Urinal school of tabloid television, you soon start feeling
>that the real threat to privacy is not the guvmint, but all of
>the yoyos with their little cam corders running around pointing them
>at people.
>
>Security cameras in ATMS and at airline ticket counters do more
>to threaten you privacy than do FIBBIE wiretaps, and PGP won't
>protect you from them. (and usually neither will the courts).

I absolutely agree with this, though this doesn't mean I'll stop worrying
about the government's plans for key escrow (GAK), about limits on key
lengths, or about other efforts to thwart strong security.

But clearly the "technologies of surveillance," ranging from
massively-cross-correlated mailing lists to smaller and cheaper and more
ubiquitous video cameras, are very nearly an equal threat.

(Lots of issues, from the nearly universal requests for Social Security
Numbers, to the growing powers of courts to compel the disclosure of
private documents, to, well, you folks all know the trends.)

Folks like us should not be lobbying for limitations on what other private
individuals or companies are doing, but should concentrate first, on
technological alternatives (encryption, unlinkable credentials, digital
money, that sort of thing) and second, on educating others that security
and privacy is best self-arranged and is rarely accomplished by government
assuming the role of protector.

--Tim May

---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Corralitos, CA              | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^756839      | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

On Fri, 1 Sep 1995, Timothy C. May wrote:

> At 10:56 PM 9/1/95, Buford Terrell wrote:
> 
> >If you've ever watched Not_at_all_Funny Home Videos or any of the
> >American Urinal school of tabloid television, you soon start feeling
> >that the real threat to privacy is not the guvmint, but all of
> >the yoyos with their little cam corders running around pointing them
> >at people.
> >
> >Security cameras in ATMS and at airline ticket counters do more
> >to threaten you privacy than do FIBBIE wiretaps, and PGP won't
> >protect you from them. (and usually neither will the courts).
> 
> I absolutely agree with this, though this doesn't mean I'll stop worrying
> about the government's plans for key escrow (GAK), about limits on key
> lengths, or about other efforts to thwart strong security.

I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here.  I am curious to know, 
however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under 
any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat 
and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the 
judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it).

In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of 
non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable??

EBD

On Sun, 3 Sep 1995 21:25:26 -0400 (EDT),
Brian Davis <bdavis@thepoint.net> wrote:
} 
} I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here.  I am curious to know, 
} however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under 
} any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat 
} and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the 
} judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it).
 
You leave out something here when you say `the judge "cheating"'.
Most of the proposals and draft legislation include words like
"or by other lawful authority" along with the provisions empowering
judges to grant access to keys.  Some versions will list various 
combinations of the Attorney General, Director of {TLA}, etc, as
explicitly empowered.  Other versions don't explicate the phrase,
perhaps trusting that those with the need will already know where
their lawful authority lies -- maybe in an anti-terrorist Executive
Order; maybe in legislation authorizing military support in drug
interdiction; perhaps in their organization's charter to protect
"national security".

Part of the concern is that spooks will have routine access to keys
without any cheating -- no stealing or bent judges will be required.
The War on Drugs, the War on Firearms, the War on Terrorists
(on Money Lauderers, on Pedophiles, on Spies) are just too important.

} In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of 
} non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable??

This would not be acceptable to the government.  Very many sincere,
patriotic government agents believe they currently have the right 
and the responsibility to monitor the civilians' possibly-illegal 
activities.  Your hypothetical review board of cypherpunks would 
unacceptably limit their established right to gather evidence and
intelligence.  Investigations too sensitive to mention here, would
be crippled.  Unless of course, you intended that "or by other lawful
authority" would be included in your scheme?

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:: Lou Poppler <lwp@mail.msen.com> | "Understanding is a three-edged      ::
::    http://www.msen.com/~lwp/    | sword..."-- Ambassador Kosh, Babylon5::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

> In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of 
> non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable??
> 
> EBD

Speaking for myself only, of course, mandatory key escrow under *any*
circumstances is a Bad Thing.  I don't want anyone to have my secret
key/passphrase, even if 'anyone' consists of n respected cypherpunks.
(How are we supposed to tell whether they're LE, anyway?  I possess
a high degree of confidence, for example, that Tim May is not an
undercover spook.  But that doesn't stop various tentacles^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H
anonymous posters from expressing assertions to the contrary.)

If I *give* my key to an escrow agent, of course, that's a different
story.  ("Mr. Cheatem, in the event of my death or disappearance, please
decrypt this file with the enclosed key and fax it to the Washington
Post.")  But I certainly don't want to allow my key to reside with an
agent who could be forced to turn it over on the basis of a court order.

Sorry if I'm repeating an earlier discussion.

Mark

-- 
Mark Contois * The Lenox Group * Boston, MA * http://www.lenox.com/~mark/
Finger for PGP public key * Stellar Crisis: http://www.lenox.com/games/sc
Cypherpunks: Share and deploy ********* NSA: Go stick your head in a pig.

Brian,

Your question is very hard to answer as poised.  How is access granted?  To 
whom?  In what period of time?, etc.

The details are very important here as this is a very detail-oriented list.  
Also the details of implementation are where you may find the objections.  
Many plans sound grand when loosely described but fail due to small details.

My personal belief is that any mandatory key escrow system will be open to 
abuse by authority figures.  A solidly implemented key escrow service operated 
by smart privacy oriented private firms would have benifit corperations and 
others engaged in cooperative development or other cooperative operations.  
Key escrow would keep the accountants and lawyers happy.  

Just my $0.02.
djw

On Sep 3,  9:25pm, Brian Davis wrote:
> Subject: Re: GAK
[stuff deleted]
> I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here.  I am curious to know, 
> however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under 
> any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat 
> and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the 
> judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it).
> 
> In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of 
> non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable??
> 
> EBD
> 
>-- End of excerpt from Brian Davis



-- 
Duncan J Watson                            Email:Duncan@hasp.com
Tech Support Manager/Sys Admin             Ph#:  +1 212 564 5678
Aladdin Software Security Inc              Fax#: +1 212 564 3377
:::finger Duncan@hasp.com for PGP key:::   http://www.aks.com/

On Sun, 3 Sep 1995, Brian Davis wrote:

> I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here.  I am curious to know, 
> however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under 
> any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat 
> and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the 
> judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it).

...or "somebody else" (ie commercial competitor, personal or political 
rival, etc) paying off somebody to obtain it.  I don't trust the gvm't to 
only get access when they should, either.

> In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of 
> non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable??

Not necessarily; the members of the review board can be bribed, 
blackmailed, lied to, etc.  I don't believe there's a competent review 
board available...nor do I think such a thing could be created.

Jon
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jon Lasser                <jlasser@rwd.goucher.edu>            (410)494-3072 
          Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/
  You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key.

In article <Pine.D-G.3.91.950903212120.8430B-100000@dg.thepoint.net>,
bdavis@thepoint.net (Brian Davis) wrote:

>I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here.  I am curious to know, 
>however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under 
>any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat 
>and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the 
>judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it).

Speaking only for myself, I would resist government access to my data or
property. Court orderd warrant or not. I firmly believe that the majority
of "lawful" acts the goverment in its various incarnations commits every
day is in violation of not only the US Constitution, but of the natural
rights given to me as part of my humanity. I therefore hold that I have
right, if not the duty, to resists these acts in anyway possible, upto and
including the use of lethal force. The number of citizens who share this
opininon are growing every day.

--anon, due to the denoucement of the Bill of Rights by the criminals in
high office.

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Brian Davis writes:
 > I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here.  I am curious to know, 
 > however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under 
 > any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat 
 > and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the 
 > judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it).

     Since you're sure to get a number of long responses to this
question, I'll keep mine short.

     I don't want to give anyone my keys.  I do not harm anyone by
refusing to do so.  Therefore, anyone using force to take my keys is
acting immorally.*

 > In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of 
 > non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable??

     No.  I don't choose to give Louis Freeh my keys.  I don't choose
to give Brian Davis my keys.  I don't choose to give Tim May my keys.
Any use of force to compel me to yield my keys is unacceptable.

Regards,

Patrick May

* Insert standard Objectivist and Libertarian arguments regarding
  morality, government, and force here.

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Brian Davis writes:
 > I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here.  I am curious to know, 
 > however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under 
 > any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat 
 > and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the 
 > judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it).

     Since you're sure to get a number of long responses to this
question, I'll keep mine short.

     I don't want to give anyone my keys.  I do not harm anyone by
refusing to do so.  Therefore, anyone using force to take my keys is
acting immorally.*

 > In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of 
 > non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable??

     No.  I don't choose to give Louis Freeh my keys.  I don't choose
to give Brian Davis my keys.  I don't choose to give Tim May my keys.
Any use of force to compel me to yield my keys is unacceptable.

Regards,

Patrick May

* Insert standard Objectivist and Libertarian arguments regarding
  morality, government, and force here.