Re: Council of Europe proposes to outlaw strong encryption (fwd)

>The proposal would make telecoms operators responsible for decrypting         
>traffic and supplying it to governments when asked.  It would also             
>`change national laws to enable judicial authorities to chase hackers          
>across borders'.                                                               
>                                                                               
>However, `it remains possible that cryptography is available          
>to the public which cannot be deciphered,' his document says. `This            
>might lead to the conclusion to put restrictions on the possession,            
>distribution, or use of cryptography.'                
                         
This should prove about as effective as the current French or Russian bans.
What are they going to do when they figure out that there need no longer be
such a thing as a telecoms operator.  We do most of the message packaging
ourselves.  It will be a bit difficult for any connectivity supplier to tell
what's going out via one of our encrypted IP sessions.

Question for Perry -- I'm assuming that it will soon be possible to
originate encrypted TCP/IP sessions with a distant "process" somewhere.  Do
you see technical problems with a TCP/IP laundry being established
"somewhere" that strips trace info from one of my processes and prevents
back tracing beyond the mouth of this encrypted pipe?

Also Perry, what did you think of the article "How Anarchy Works" in the
latest Wired on the IETF?

DCF

I'll jump into this conversation for a second. I been wanting to set up
and IP proxy using Linux. It was support for IP over IP tunnels, and IP
Masquareding. Only thing is needed is to encrypt to IP over IP tunnel.
Just my $0.02.

Aleph One / aleph1@dfw.net
http://underground.org/
KeyID 1024/948FD6B5 
Fingerprint EE C9 E8 AA CB AF 09 61  8C 39 EA 47 A8 6A B8 01 

On Fri, 22 Sep 1995, Duncan Frissell wrote:

> This should prove about as effective as the current French or Russian bans.
> What are they going to do when they figure out that there need no longer be
> such a thing as a telecoms operator.  We do most of the message packaging
> ourselves.  It will be a bit difficult for any connectivity supplier to tell
> what's going out via one of our encrypted IP sessions.
> 
> Question for Perry -- I'm assuming that it will soon be possible to
> originate encrypted TCP/IP sessions with a distant "process" somewhere.  Do
> you see technical problems with a TCP/IP laundry being established
> "somewhere" that strips trace info from one of my processes and prevents
> back tracing beyond the mouth of this encrypted pipe?
> 
> Also Perry, what did you think of the article "How Anarchy Works" in the
> latest Wired on the IETF?
> 
> DCF
>

Duncan Frissell writes:
> Question for Perry -- I'm assuming that it will soon be possible to
> originate encrypted TCP/IP sessions with a distant "process" somewhere.  Do
> you see technical problems with a TCP/IP laundry being established
> "somewhere" that strips trace info from one of my processes and prevents
> back tracing beyond the mouth of this encrypted pipe?

It can be done (in some sense its just an extension of the Socks
protocol), but I'm not sure how easy it will be to prevent all traffic
analysis on the thing. Also, if this gets done frequently, it sort of
screws up our attempts to keep up the efficiency of traffic in the network.

> Also Perry, what did you think of the article "How Anarchy Works" in the
> latest Wired on the IETF?

I haven't read it, although the IETF is certainly (whether it knows it
or not) an organization run on anarchist lines.

Perry