// COMPLETE THREAD

Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)

7 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child

NODE aabdf8d4Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
First of all, those who have looked over the MT Bank stuff all
know that they are clearly off to a very shaky start. I know of
three guys that could have done a _much_ more professional job,
almost a year ago. Unfortunately we were rejected by Chaum as
insufficiently respectable. So now we get a service that is
lame, confusing and expensive -- at least at the bank end.

Chaum apparently continues to suffer from the belief that he
needs a real bank to issue e-cash. Well, MT Bank is a real bank,
but they have managed to violate at least one major Federal Reserve
requirement (accounts in the ECash mint are clearly demand deposit
accounts -- it would have been trivial to define them differently
but somebody apparently wasn't thinking.) A technically-oriented NBFI
could have done a much better job, without a lot of the "real bank"
baggage, such as minimum deposits ($250, not $2,500, but still
pretty steep for someone wanting to spend $.10 on something.) My
understanding is that the _bank account_ is FDIC insured, but not
the ECash. I could be wrong -- their materials are extremely confusing
and hard to follow.

As one of my co-workers said today, "It will be interesting to sit
back and watch them take regulatory mortar fire." Indeed.

I'm really hoping that they pull their act together -- I've already
sent in my account application -- but things look really grim at
the moment. There are certainly a lot of projects list members are
working on that would be greatly enhanced by functioning, popular
e-cash. I encourage everyone to give them lots of helpful feedback
so that they can turn this around.

On another note, I'm hoping that some of you will also bite the
bullet, get accounts, and join me attempting to win valuable
prizes in Sameer's "Hack Digicash" promotion. I'd rather see one
of us find holes in this than see the whole thing melt into the
ground.

This extremely unprofessional, bungled launch does, I admit, make
Mondex (with scads of beautiful marketing literature) look better all
the time, although based on some conversations on Sunday, it appears
that they may have _extremely serious_ architectural security problems.
We'll see how things play out.

Later,

Doug

>        With the release of digicash I hope that we can soon make this
>stuff for-pay and much of the spam problem will be fixed. (Not all of
>it, of course.)
>        (I am rather hesitatnt to setup an account with Mark Twain
>though.. $2,500 min balance and not FDIC insured?)
NODE f42a5b6dRe: Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
On Mon, 23 Oct 1995, Douglas Barnes wrote:

> This extremely unprofessional, bungled launch does, I admit, make
> Mondex (with scads of beautiful marketing literature) look better all
> the time, although based on some conversations on Sunday, it appears
> that they may have _extremely serious_ architectural security problems.
> We'll see how things play out.
> 

MT Bank could clearly benefit from a Linux-type of advocacy and support.  
There are oodles of people out there with Desk Top Publishing equipment 
and graphics talents that could help MT/Digicash out.  Why should they?  
Simply, for the benefit of the net (remember that???).

Im sure some of the folks on the WEBS mailing list could start with a 
rehaul of their Web Page.  Lets see if we can get at least some pro bono 
design work for marketing materials for real ecash.  Talk it up in the 
newsgroups and whatever lists you are on.  Add it to your already to 
lengthy <g> .signature.

It does appear a clumsy announcement, but nonetheless, congrats to the 
folks at MT and Digicash for doing their best to make e-commerce a bit 
more safe.


> Later,
> 
> Doug
> 

Matt
--
Go to http://www.digicash.com/ecash.html
then to Mark Twain
then open account
then *spend, spend, spend*
NODE c3b788cbRe: Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
cman@communities.com (Douglas Barnes) writes:

>A technically-oriented NBFI
>could have done a much better job, without a lot of the "real bank"
>baggage, such as minimum deposits ($250, not $2,500, but still
>pretty steep for someone wanting to spend $.10 on something.)

I don't believe this is correct.  The $250 refers to foreign currency
accounts and is not relevant for ecash users.  The ecash account has an
account opening fee of $11 and a monthly fee of $5 for the low volume
user.  That is all the minimum there is, as I read it.  You can reduce
the per-month fee by paying more up front, but it isn't a net savings
until you've had the account open for about two years.

>My
>understanding is that the _bank account_ is FDIC insured, but not
>the ECash. I could be wrong -- their materials are extremely confusing
>and hard to follow.

It seems that there are three places "your" money can be: in the "World
Currency Access" account, where it is insured; in the "ecash mint", a
separate account at the bank, where it is not insured and in fact is
considered withdrawn (?); and in your ecash wallet on your computer disk.
You can transfer funds back and forth between your wallet and the "mint"
freely, but transfers are limited between the World Currency account and
the "mint" account.  It does seem like an odd approach, but perhaps there
are some legal reasons for doing it like this.

Hal
NODE dd45a994Re: Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
Someone writes:

 >My
 >understanding is that the _bank account_ is FDIC insured, but not
 >the ECash. I could be wrong -- their materials are extremely confusing
 >and hard to follow.

I read the entire lengthy contract and found quite a few things
which appear to be designed to cover the bank's posterior.

1.  Both parties stipulate that their relationship is a 
    business relationship and not a fiduciary relationship.

2.  Your account is not FDIC insured. 

3.  The bank accepts no liability for anything going wrong, 
    although it may, at its sole option, attempt to make
    ammends.

4.  Parties agree to wave a jury trial.

5.  Parties agree to binding arbitration. 

6.  General waffling to the effect that the tiny fees collected
    imply an equally tiny responsiblity and potential liability
    on the part of the bank.  

Now most of this language also appears in the fine print of the
First Virtual agreement, so it is not like you have an option
of trading on the Internet under the rules which govern your
ordinary checking account. 

One wonders whether signing away all responsibilty on the part of
the bank is going to be the standard for using digital money
on the Internet, or whether consumers will demand protection
when using these new services.  

One has to be careful that when new technology replaces old, the 
privacy protection which applied to the old also applies to the
new.  Good examples of this in the past are the ways in which the 
rights you have to the privacy of paper mail generally fail to 
be extended to Email, and of course "regulation E", which exempted
bank accounts which were capable of Electronic Funds Transfer from
a great deal of the protection which used to govern users of
ordinary checking accounts. 

On the brighter side, Dr. Chaum's success in convincing someone
to back DigiCash with actual US dollars certainly makes advances
in breaking public key cryptography worth a great more than the
tiny prizes currently offered by RSADSI. 

It will be interesting to see how this all works out in the
next few months.  Arjen Lenstra is planning on factoring RSA-130
on the Web for a high performance computing conference later this
year.  This should lead to some very robust estimates for the
amount of computing power needed for GNFS to break 512 bit PGP
keys.  

Does anyone know the details of the DigiCash protocol, or how
much computing power it would take someone to make counterfeit coins?  

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd@netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $
NODE 23ff79e4Re: Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
>1.  Both parties stipulate that their relationship is a 
>    business relationship and not a fiduciary relationship.

Perhaps someone with US legal experience might care to comment 
on the enforceability of such a clause. Surely the nature of
the relationship is defined by its character and not soley by 
a contract disclaimer.

>2.  Your account is not FDIC insured. 

Good luck then!

>3.  The bank accepts no liability for anything going wrong, 
>    although it may, at its sole option, attempt to make
>    ammends.

Wouldn't it be convenient if such clauses were enforcable?

>4.  Parties agree to wave a jury trial.
>
>5.  Parties agree to binding arbitration. 

These seem pretty dangerous to me if enforcable. They would 
effectively usurp the power of the courts as arbiter. Although
I have less confidence in the competence of a jury than that
of judges I'm pretty sure that the UK courts would consider
such contract clauses in a dim light.

>6.  General waffling to the effect that the tiny fees collected
>    imply an equally tiny responsiblity and potential liability
>    on the part of the bank.  

Hmm, wana bet?


This is not a commercial contract between buisnesses it is clearly 
offering a consumer service. It is not the result of informed
negotiation between sides armed with lawyers, it is a very one sided
contract. This brings up a major problem with Chaum's schemes,
there has to be trust in the financial institution. Contracts such
as this do not inspire confidence. Mark Twain bank have a
confidence problem in any case, when I mentioned their name
as DigiCash licensees to an audience yesterday they laughed.

>One wonders whether signing away all responsibilty on the part of
>the bank is going to be the standard for using digital money
>on the Internet, or whether consumers will demand protection
>when using these new services.  

Consumers have votes, they are not afraid of regulation. Forget
the pap you see spouted by politicians about deregulation, they
simply mean remove the regulations that negatively affect our 
interests, their supporters are likewise. 

It is ironic that the Credit card cos biggest advantage in 
cyberspace and other mail order turns out to be the $50 limit 
on consumer exposure to loss. This is another side of regulation
E that people don't mention so often.

Lets wait a while and see how long it takes for the Fed to ring
up "dear boy, we have a few questions....".


		Phill
NODE c72d5725Re: Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 An entity calling itself "Phil <hallam@w3.org>" allegedly wrote:
>
> Perhaps someone with US legal experience might care to comment 
          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> on the enforceability of such a clause.


That's not me, but I have some things to say anyway.  If I could
figure out how to make DigiCash's SunOS client write money into
ASCII files I would attach 2 cybercents to the end of this.


> Surely the nature of
> the relationship is defined by its character and not soley by 
> a contract disclaimer.


I prefer to think that contractual relationships are defined by
the explicit stipulations the contract, and the implicit understandings
between the two parties (which are unavoidable, since they begin at
the semantic or even cognitive level and cannot be described
explicitly with our current science/tech, but which should be made
explicit wherever possible), and are completely *un*-influenced by
the arbitrary opinion of some third organization which happens to
own lots of big guns in their geographical regions.


> >3.  The bank accepts no liability for anything going wrong, 
> >    although it may, at its sole option, attempt to make
> >    ammends.
> 
> Wouldn't it be convenient if such clauses were enforcable?


Wouldn't be nice if whatever clauses two competent entities agreed
to were enforceable?  (non-repudiation, reputations, Nick
Szabo's "liens"...)


> >4.  Parties agree to wave a jury trial.
> >
> >5.  Parties agree to binding arbitration. 
> 
> These seem pretty dangerous to me if enforcable. They would 
> effectively usurp the power of the courts as arbiter.


Indeed they do usurp that power, don't they?  :-)  <I smile happily.>
And it's only going to get worse(/better).  ((anon)nymity, e-cash, tax 
evasion, black markets...)


> Although
> I have less confidence in the competence of a jury than that
> of judges I'm pretty sure that the UK courts would consider
> such contract clauses in a dim light.


And I, by way of contrast, consider such clauses, which remove
business relationships from the realm of violence and into the realm
of mutually consensual, organizationally emergent social structures, 
in a very positive light.


> Consumers have votes, they are not afraid of regulation. Forget
> the pap you see spouted by politicians about deregulation, they
> simply mean remove the regulations that negatively affect our 
> interests, their supporters are likewise. 


And I'm of the opinion that any "regulation" (i.e. threat of force
against peaceful parties) negatively affects my interests (all of
ours) in the long run.  And I too have a vote.


Crypto relevance?  Much!  The overview is that crypto tech will
ultimately enable my view of ideal social structure rather than
yours.  Non-repudiation, e-cash, Nick Szabo's "liens", tax evasion,
black markets, (anon)nymity, reputations and (hopefully hopefully) 
the education/enlightenment of the populace because of powerful
non-censorable information access all point this way.


Of course, it will be a long, twisted road from here to there (we
live in interesting times), but I am ultimately hopeful.


I hope this rant is not wholely without value.  I do it rarely, so 
you are safe for another few months now that I have it out of my 
system.


Regards,

Bryce

signatures follow


            "To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield."   
    <a href="http://ugrad-www.cs.colorado.edu/~wilcoxb/Niche.html">

                          bryce@colorado.edu                   </a>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.01

iQCVAwUBMI6P9/WZSllhfG25AQHl9wQAmOWc0PiNbeKaT0Ow1d63g5bdQ2A0417D
nXlv3T4olwymwTiB3oWv4t28LPIkKwl2dCm6xLduk1+8z5t7rwZCUYRc91t7ro58
8y6yZOvSRvupKm9IUu5l/Nhmd2uv4TpHQKq11UfCaxUmXdxeZ8AS5RrB1uq51BUM
ctATwNuH08c=
=WJ/H
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

rom owner-cypherpunks  Wed Oct 25 12:30:03 1995
Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks>
Received: by toad.com id AA28197; Wed, 25 Oct 95 12:30:03 PDT
Received: from larry.infi.net by toad.com id AA28174; Wed, 25 Oct 95 12:29:42 PDT
Received: by larry.infi.net (Infinet-S-3.3)
	id PAA04999; Wed, 25 Oct 1995 15:29:21 -0400
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 1995 15:29:20 -0400 (EDT)
From: Alan Horowitz <alanh@infi.net>
To: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Cc: Ian Goldberg <iang@cory.EECS.Berkeley.EDU>, cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mandatory ID in California?
In-Reply-To: <199510251617.MAA23789@panix.com>
Message-Id: <Pine.SV4.3.91.951025152409.3136C-100000@larry.infi.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Sender: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com
Precedence: bulk

"States may not authorize arrest...for failing to produce identification..."
       Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352 (1983)

"...may not compel an answer and they must allow the person to leave 
after a reasonable brief period of time...."  - - ibid


California is the Ninth Circuit, no?  See, inter alia,  Martinelli v. 
City of Beaumont, 820 F.2nd 1491 (1987).

Alan Horowitz
alanh@infi.net
NODE 9211b7a9Mondex flaws? Re: Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
Hi,

	You mention architectural problems in Mondex. Do you have any hard info 
on the specs? I'm trying to find someone who does who is willing/able to talk.

	One thing that struck me was that each Mondi would need to have both the 
secret and public parts of a public key incorporated (if thats what they are 
doing) hence what is the advantage of public key? Yet they have an on chip 
modular exponentiation device on the new silicon rev...

	Looking at the secrecy stuff on Mondex, I suspect I would take the same 
approach, not to protect the core protection but so as to permit a gradual 
approach to penetration detection. I would expect some type of tripwire to be 
built into the device such that a fraud attempt apparently succeeds but 
indicates that there is a problem. 

		Phill