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COE Recommendation No. R (95) 13

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NODE 66b112b1COE Recommendation No. R (95) 13
This is that Council of Europe "Ban Crypto" paper. It is of course
nothing like what it is claimed to be 

http://www.privacy.org/pi/intl_orgs/coe/info_tech_1995.html

In particular:

6. The law should permit investigating authorities to avail themselves
of all necessary technical measures that enable the collection of traffic
data in the investigation of crimes. 

"COLLECTION" - not comprehension

8. Criminal procedure laws should be reviewed with a view to making
possible the interception of telecommunications and the collection of
traffic data in the investigation of serious offenses against the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of telecommunications or
computer systems. 

This is simply to fix the German data protection laws and similar, some 
of which might prevent a sysop monitoring a hacker on a system they were 
hacking.


I think the majority of the text is well thought out and very much in
line with what we would want. The piece on encryption is a cop out
to please the French and Dutch. Read it carefully and you will see
it says absolutely nothing.

We have been had again...


Rule number one of politics, always assume that the enemy are 
misrepresenting their case. Council of Europe declarations are almost 
always implemented because they say almost nothing. It is a very
clear statement of some concerns which it would be nice if the 
US authorities understood - separation of search and seizure.

This is not a trend in which Europe is following the US. We are
simply thinking about the effect of technology on law enforcement
rather than reacting to its effects.

Found this written up in cipher, well worth a visit.

http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/ieee/cipher/


--
Phillip M. Hallam-Baker            Not speaking for anoyone else
hallam@w3.org http://www.w3.org/hypertext/WWW/People/hallam.html
Information Superhighway -----> Hi-ho! Yow! I'm surfing Arpanet!
NODE 6a7bcd2dRe: COE Recommendation No. R (95) 13
On Wed, 15 Nov 1995, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote:

> I think the majority of the text is well thought out and very much in
> line with what we would want.

How about this:
________________________________________________________________________
9. Subject to legal privileges or protection, most legal systems permit
investigating authorities to order persons to hand over objects under
their control that are required to serve as evidence. In a parallel
fashion, provisions should be made for the power to order persons to
submit any specified data under their control in a computer system in the
form required by the investigating authority.
________________________________________________________________________

Is this 'what we would want'? It clearly means that one can be ordered
to reveal the password to encrypted data and punished by law if one
refuses. Suppose they suspect you of being a child pornographer and
get a court order to search your encrypted system. You know you are
innocent. Is it acceptable to put you in jail for not giving them access
to your encrypted, very personal diary (in which you describe in detail
your sexual encounters with the wife of the Chief of Police)?

And how about this: 
_______________________________________________________________________
14. Measures should be considered to minimise the negative effects of the
use of cryptography on the investigation of criminal offenses, without
affecting its legitimate use more than is strictly necessary.
_______________________________________________________________________

Is this really just a toothless statement to give to the French?
Couldn't it as easily be interpreted as not wanting to go into
details yet (since no real system is available) but stating that
some form of GAK is on the agenda? Surely, law enforcement
bureaucrats would not consider GAK to affect the 'legitimate
use' of cryptography 'more than is strictly necessary'.

Mats
NODE be71007fRe: COE Recommendation No. R (95) 13
>How about this:
>________________________________________________________________________
>9. Subject to legal privileges or protection, most legal systems permit
>investigating authorities to order persons to hand over objects under
>their control that are required to serve as evidence. In a parallel
>fashion, provisions should be made for the power to order persons to
>submit any specified data under their control in a computer system in the
>form required by the investigating authority.
>________________________________________________________________________

>Is this 'what we would want'? It clearly means that one can be ordered
>to reveal the password to encrypted data and punished by law if one
>refuses. Suppose they suspect you of being a child pornographer and
>get a court order to search your encrypted system. You know you are
>innocent. Is it acceptable to put you in jail for not giving them access
>to your encrypted, very personal diary (in which you describe in detail
>your sexual encounters with the wife of the Chief of Police)?

Well if you want to eliminate all search and seisure powers of the courts
then that is a valid point to make. The point of the directive though
is to point out to the legislatures that they have to consider their
position on this one.

I'm not particularly keen on the idea that we should hope that the 
legislatures let this type of change happen by default. They are not 
going to do that, they may let things slide but they then are more
likely to do something reactionary when they realise they have been
had. And that reaction is likely to be anal.


>_______________________________________________________________________
>14. Measures should be considered to minimise the negative effects of the
>use of cryptography on the investigation of criminal offenses, without
>affecting its legitimate use more than is strictly necessary.
>_______________________________________________________________________

>Is this really just a toothless statement to give to the French?

Parse it carefully, its implications depend heavily on the interpretation
of "legitimate use" and "strictly necessary". 

Point is that it is not a directive to implement a Euro-Clipper program
which is what various spin doctors were claiming. The deputy director of the
NSA tried to use it as evidence to support his claim that other countries
are following the US position.

Mind you I may be wrong about the French. Someone suggested today that
they would prefer there to be no debate on crypto because they don't
want people to find out what they are up to.


		Phill


	Phill