Re: Is ths legal?.. (fwd)

This is the reference I couldn't find for my previous post. It would seem 
to have some relevance here

 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) (18 U.S.C. ss 2510
et seq.).  "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of
a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire *or
electronic* communication service, whose facilities are used in the trans-
mission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that
communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any
activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or
to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the
public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for
mechanical or service quality control checks."  18 USC section
2510(2)(a)(i). 

Doesn't seem to leave much room for snooping on contents of messages. 


Jay Holovacs <holovacs@ios.com>
PGP Key fingerprint =  AC 29 C8 7A E4 2D 07 27  AE CA 99 4A F6 59 87 90 
 (KEY id 1024/80E4AA05) email me for key

On Sun, 17 Dec 1995, Jay Holovacs wrote:

> 
> 
> This is the reference I couldn't find for my previous post. It would seem 
> to have some relevance here
> 
>  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) (18 U.S.C. ss 2510
> et seq.).  "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of
> a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire *or
> electronic* communication service, whose facilities are used in the trans-
> mission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that
> communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any
> activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or
> to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
> service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the
> public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for
> mechanical or service quality control checks."  18 USC section
> 2510(2)(a)(i). 
> 
> Doesn't seem to leave much room for snooping on contents of messages. 

I disagree.  Instead it implies that interception and administrative 
review of content will be tolerated where it is "a necessary incident to 
the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service."  Note that it will be the 
provider who makes the definition in the ex ante application.

Even worse, the protection that is given is for "a provider of wire 
communication service to the public."

I would be very surprised if, 1> "provider" was anything but a narrowly 
drawn definition, 2> provider to the public is not specifically narrowed 
as well.

> Jay Holovacs <holovacs@ios.com>
> PGP Key fingerprint =  AC 29 C8 7A E4 2D 07 27  AE CA 99 4A F6 59 87 90 
>  (KEY id 1024/80E4AA05) email me for key
> 
> 

---
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"In fact, had Bancroft not existed,       potestas scientiae in usu est
Franklin might have had to invent him."    in nihilum nil posse reverti
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On Sun, 17 Dec 1995, Black Unicorn wrote:
> 
> I disagree.  Instead it implies that interception and administrative 
> review of content will be tolerated where it is "a necessary incident to 
> the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or 
> property of the provider of that service."  Note that it will be the 
> provider who makes the definition in the ex ante application.
> 
The provider is allowed access ONLY for QC purposes. Getting back to thhe 
original point, the provider's ability to interpret the contents of the 
message is in no way required to monitor the system and cannot be used as 
a justification in itself for prohibiting use of crypto. 

Also, what if someone outside the system emails encrypted messages to the 
user. What authority would the sys admin have there??

Jay Holovacs <holovacs@ios.com>
PGP Key fingerprint =  AC 29 C8 7A E4 2D 07 27  AE CA 99 4A F6 59 87 90 
 (KEY id 1024/80E4AA05) email for key

On Sun, 17 Dec 1995, Jay Holovacs wrote:

> 
> On Sun, 17 Dec 1995, Black Unicorn wrote:
> > 
> > I disagree.  Instead it implies that interception and administrative 
> > review of content will be tolerated where it is "a necessary incident to 
> > the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or 
> > property of the provider of that service."  Note that it will be the 
> > provider who makes the definition in the ex ante application.
> > 

> The provider is allowed access ONLY for QC purposes.

This is only explicit with regards to public providers.

 Getting back to thhe 
> original point, the provider's ability to interpret the contents of the 
> message is in no way required to monitor the system and cannot be used as 
> a justification in itself for prohibiting use of crypto. 

Oh?  What if I say that I need to monitor e-mail for data corruption?
Also, you might consider the definition of "intercept."  I suspect it's a 
bit wider than you are accounting for.


> Also, what if someone outside the system emails encrypted messages to the 
> user. What authority would the sys admin have there??

Entirely unrelated to the statute you cite.

> Jay Holovacs <holovacs@ios.com>
> PGP Key fingerprint =  AC 29 C8 7A E4 2D 07 27  AE CA 99 4A F6 59 87 90 
>  (KEY id 1024/80E4AA05) email for key
> 
> 

---
My prefered and soon to be permanent e-mail address: unicorn@schloss.li
"In fact, had Bancroft not existed,       potestas scientiae in usu est
Franklin might have had to invent him."    in nihilum nil posse reverti
00B9289C28DC0E55  E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information