Re: INTERNET SECURITY RISKS FOR CONSUMERS OVERBLOWN

>  "If someone wanted to steal a credit card number, all they would
>  have to do is go to any gas station and look on the ground around
>  the pumps," says the CTO at Internet security firm Terisa Systems.

Sure, if you wanted to steal a card number or two the ground around a  
gas-station would probably be a good choice.  However, if you wanted to steal  
a thousand card numbers (or maybe even thirty thousand), just sniff packets  
off a hub near a large Web site that accepts unencrypted (or weakly  
encrypted) card transactions or hack your favorite ISP's machines.

It really bothers me that officers at companies writing net commerce software  
are regularly quoted in the trade rags comparing the relatively little risk  
of a single net card transaction vs. a transaction at a restaraunt or gas  
station.  We aren't talking about a crooked clerk who handles at most a few  
hundred cards per day or an unlocked dumpster with maybe the same number of  
carbons in it.  We are talking about potentially hundreds of thousands of  
card numbers whizzing through a single point that could be easily (and  
undetectably) monitored and recorded with off-the-shelf-equipment for later  
analysis.  Even if the transactions are encrypted, a single exploitable  
weakness discovered after widespread deployment could compromise massive  
numbers of cards.  The stakes are much higher and this will invite much more  
sophisticated crooks to attempt to defraud the system.


andrew

Andrew Loewenstern writes:
>>  "If someone wanted to steal a credit card number, all they would
>>  have to do is go to any gas station and look on the ground around
>>  the pumps," says the CTO at Internet security firm Terisa Systems.
>
>Sure, if you wanted to steal a card number or two the ground around a  
>gas-station would probably be a good choice.  However, if you wanted to steal 
>a thousand card numbers (or maybe even thirty thousand), just sniff packets  
>off a hub near a large Web site that accepts unencrypted (or weakly  
>encrypted) card transactions or hack your favorite ISP's machines.

Duh.  The point of the article the original poster quoted was that
there's little risk to individual *consumers*.  If someone sniffs
thirty thousand credit cards from a poorly secured web-site, the
consumers are still only liable for $50.  Of course, the card company
gets a big bill, and probably will try to sue the site to recover, and
both will pass those costs back to the consumer, assuming they
survive.  The total cost is still pretty small to the individual.