NODE 2dd1644eRe: Hack Lotus?
"Peter Trei" <trei@process.com>Sat, 20 Jan 1996 10:28:21 +0800
Phill writes:
>
> I've been thinking about how I would do the lotus hack. I certainly would not be
> wanting to do a public key operation for the benefit of the government on every
> message. How about the following:
>
> During installation of program:
> Select a random key ER, encrypt it under the govt. public key to give Eg(ER).
> To start encrypting,
>
> chose a random value R, encrypt under destination public key to give Ek(R)
> set 40 bits of R to 0 to produce R'
> Encrypt R' under ER to give E-ER(R')
> Hash R, E-ER(R') and Eg(ER) with a one way function (MDMF like) to produce the
> actual key.
> Send across Ek(R), E-ER(R'), Eg(ER)
> To decrypt the message one needs the information for the escrow authority.
>
> Phill
Wouldn't this interoperate only with other systems which had a similar setup? I suspect
the Lotus wants the US-Domestic and the International versions to interoperate
transparently, including with their older versions.
Kaufman describes the encryption setup of Notes in moderate detail on pages 448-454
of 'Network Security'. It's a typical mixed system, with a secret key encrypted under the
recipient's Public key (a short one or a long one, depending on the local of the
recipient and/or sender).
I suspect that Lotus has not completely reworked it's security system for the
international version, and that they are in fact doing a second public key operation on
the 3 bytes of GAK'd data.
If they're nasty, they'll check on the receiving side as well, to ensure that the LEAF
and/or the espionage-enabling key have not been patched in the sending 'International'
version.
Peter Trei
trei@process.com
Peter Trei
Senior Software Engineer
Purveyor Development Team
Process Software Corporation
http://www.process.com
trei@process.com
NODE bfa7efafRe: Hack Lotus?
"Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>Sat, 20 Jan 1996 10:58:12 +0800
"Peter Trei" writes:
> I suspect that Lotus has not completely reworked it's security
> system for the international version, and that they are in fact
> doing a second public key operation on the 3 bytes of GAK'd data.
Likely.
> If they're nasty, they'll check on the receiving side as well, to
> ensure that the LEAF and/or the espionage-enabling key have not been
> patched in the sending 'International' version.
Nearly impossible. Why? Because they can only include the public key,
and not the private key, of the GAK authority in the code. You can
encrypt the three bytes of key, but it is very hard for a receiver
other than the govvies to read them. There is no shared secret
information or private information available, ergo, they can't check
their LEAF equivalent.
This is likely where the flaw in the scheme is -- it should be trivial
to drop another public key in place of the government one and foil the
entire thing with minimal effort. All will look normal until someone
tries to use the GAK private key.
Of course, I'll point out that 64 bit RC4 keys are still not
particularly heartwarming...
Perry
NODE 31a5c416Re: Hack Lotus?
Mike Fletcher <fletch@ain.bls.com>Sun, 21 Jan 1996 21:29:03 +0800
> > If they're nasty, they'll check on the receiving side as well, to
> > ensure that the LEAF and/or the espionage-enabling key have not been
> > patched in the sending 'International' version.
>
> Nearly impossible. Why? Because they can only include the public key,
> and not the private key, of the GAK authority in the code. You can
> encrypt the three bytes of key, but it is very hard for a receiver
> other than the govvies to read them. There is no shared secret
> information or private information available, ergo, they can't check
> their LEAF equivalent.
If the 3 GAK bytes are derived from the key & the secret key,
couldn't it be done this way:
* sender creates 64-bit session key K
* sender encrypts K with recepient's public key (say P_r(K))
* sender encrypts top 3 GAK bytes w/GAK key
The recipent can verify the GAK bytes by using it's copy of
the GAK key on the top bytes of the session key. If the encrypted
GAK bytes match what was sent, then they're valid. No need to have
the secret key.
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