Re: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"

Rich, 
 
 
  On 01 26 96 you say: 
 
    ...the US might have received credible reports that Pearl 
    Harbor was going to be bombed. But they also received cred- 
    ible reports to the contrary, and decisions were made. 
 
 
  Bamford's 1983 The Puzzle Palace, page 57: 
 
    In December 1941 American COMINT [communications intelli- 
    gence] more closely resembled a medieval feudal state than 
    the empire it is today. 
 
 
  P 58: 
 
    The system was a hodgepodge.  No one was responsible for a 
    continuous study of all material. *** Though the technical 
    side of COMINT, particularly in the breaking of Purple, had 
    been performed with genius, the analytical side had become 
    lost in disorganization. 
 
 
  That's the background.  Then Bamford step by step follows the 
  events 
 
            of the first Sunday in December 1941 
 
 
  FROM (p 58) interception of the Japanese government reply to the 
  US government "diplomatic note" [=declaration of war] sent 11 days 
  before calling "on Japan to withdraw all its forces from China and 
  Indochina in return for a U.S. promise to release Japanese funds 
  and resume trade" 
 
  TO (p 61): 
 
    At 7:55 A.M. [Hawaii time], the first bomb smashed into a sea- 
    plane ramp on Ford Island in Pearl Harbor.  Before the last bomb 
    whistled down through the black and orange sky two hours later, 
    Americans would give their lives at the rate of almost thirty a 
    minute. 
 
 
  A note accompanying the Japanese government reply included these 
  prophetic words (p 59): 
 
    Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Govern- 
    ment (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the 
    United States [breaking off negotiations] at 1:00 P.M. on the 
    7th, your time. 
 
 
  1 PM Washington time = 7:30 AM Hawaii time. 
 
 
  Bamford, p 60 (my emphasis): 
   
    It was now about 11:00 A.M. [in Washington], almost six hours 
    after the giant ear on Bainbridge Island had first snared the 
    prophetic message, and ALL OF WASHINGTON'S SENIOR ELITE HAD 
    READ IT. 
 
 
 
  P 61: 
 
    At 2:40 P.M. [Hawaii time] the [Ft Shafter] signal officer 
    passed [Army Chief of Staff Marshall's warning] message to 
    the decoding officer, and twenty minutes later,...Marshall's 
    warning at last reached a devastated General Short. 
 
 
  The credible report was received at 7:55 AM Hawaii time. 
 
  The incredible report was received at 3 PM Hawaii time. 
 
  One decision was made 11 days earlier.  Another was finalized 
  10 days later.
 
  Bamford dryly concludes (p 62): 
 
    Disorganization and divided responsibility had cost America 
    dearly. 
 
 
  Cordially, 
 
  Jim

There is a story floating around XXXXXX circles that The Japanese carrier
approaching Pearl was spotted on the recently-installed (Navy) land radar
in Hawaii. The target was reported out of the ops room, but ignored by the
same situation room that screwed up (years later) the response to the
Pueblo's distress calls in international waters just offshore from North
Korea. 

Don't even ask me about the screwups I saw them make when I was stationed 
at a XXXXXX base  in XXXXXX

Alan Horowitz
alanh@norfolk.infi.net

On Sat, 27 Jan 1996 19:46:52 -0500 (EST), you wrote:

> There is a story floating around XXXXXX circles that The Japanese carrier
> approaching Pearl was spotted on the recently-installed (Navy) land radar
> in Hawaii. The target was reported out of the ops room, but ignored by the
> same situation room that screwed up (years later) the response to the
> Pueblo's distress calls in international waters just offshore from North
> Korea. 

Color me VERY skeptical.  The Japanese ships were WELL over the
horizon from any point on Oahu.  OTH radars are quite difficult to
build effectively, and radar technology at the end of 1941 was quite
primitive.