NODE e8b5d220Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis
Carl Ellison <cme@clark.net>Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:27:43 +0800
>Date: Tue, 02 Jan 1996 19:44:53 -0800
>From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
>Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis
>At 20:02 1/2/96, Jon Lasser wrote:
>
>>When the group of packets arrives at a given station, it replaces its
>>current encrypted packet with a new packet;
>All participants in this network are clearly guilty of conspiracy. Their
>assets will be confiscated under RICO.
Sounds like disasterizing to me.
This is merely a technical means for producing anonymous communications.
Anonymity = conspiracy?
- Carl
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| Carl M. Ellison cme@acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
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NODE e3999209Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis
fc@all.net (Fred Cohen)Thu, 4 Jan 1996 01:41:13 +0800
You seem to be missing an important point about foiling traffic
analysis. It is essentially the same problem as the covert channel
problem and its solution has the same challenges - it consumes a great
in the way of resources. In order to eliminate traffic analysis, you
essentially have to always use the full bandwidth available (although
you can have pseudo-random burst behaviors). This in turn means that
instead of gaining the low cost resulting from sharing bandwidth, you
end up having far more utilization and (depending on what portion of the
world does this) increasing the price of the resource. So it costs a
lot more and uses a great deal of bandwidth.
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