Schneier Attacks

Schneier says in a March SciAm brief on Kocher's timing
   attack: "In theory there are other attacks. You can measure
   power consumption or heat dissipation of a chip; timing is
   just one way."

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>>>>> "John" == John Young <jya@pipeline.com> writes:

    John>    Schneier says in a March SciAm brief on Kocher's timing
    John> attack: "In theory there are other attacks. You can measure
    John> power consumption or heat dissipation of a chip; timing is
    John> just one way."

And you could measure emissions, without even getting close to the
chip itself.

Andreas


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John Young writes:

>   Schneier says in a March SciAm brief on Kocher's timing
>   attack: "In theory there are other attacks. You can measure
>   power consumption or heat dissipation of a chip; timing is
>   just one way."

You could also count the number of electrons, as well as their direction
across the chips.

I dare say that it would be easier to look over the target's shoulder 
than to accurately measure differential amounts of heat dissapaiting out 
of a chip, covertly.