NODE 2b4bfdfcRe: "and two forms of ID"
rah@shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)Wed, 21 Feb 96 21:45:11 PST
>I'm sufficiently impressed with the arguments against name credentials
>that Carl Ellison has made that I'm looking seriously into systems
>that don't do any sort of conventional certificate binding at all...
... and I bet, Wei Dai's contentions to the contrary, that they'll be
*cheaper* to use than those which do certificate binding, all other things
being equal.
Cheers,
Bob Hettinga
-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah@shipwright.com)
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell
The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/
NODE 5edc7d70Re: "and two forms of ID"
Jeff Weinstein <jsw@netscape.com>Sat, 24 Feb 1996 01:04:30 +0800
Wei Dai wrote:
> The natural state of the Net seems to be a kind of semi-anonymity.
> Trying to push it in either direction (complete traceability or
> anonymity) is costly.
Given that verisign and others will soon begin issuing large numbers of
certificates that do not guarantee the identity of the key holder, it seems
that this tradition will continue even with the wide deployment of X509 certs.
--Jeff
--
Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist
Netscape Communication Corporation
jsw@netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw
Any opinions expressed above are mine.
NODE e3c08331Re: "and two forms of ID"
Wei Dai <weidai@eskimo.com>Thu, 22 Feb 96 00:39:41 PST
On Thu, 22 Feb 1996, Robert Hettinga wrote:
> >I'm sufficiently impressed with the arguments against name credentials
> >that Carl Ellison has made that I'm looking seriously into systems
> >that don't do any sort of conventional certificate binding at all...
>
> ... and I bet, Wei Dai's contentions to the contrary, that they'll be
> *cheaper* to use than those which do certificate binding, all other things
> being equal.
You got my position completely backward on this. I've always supported
Carl's arguments in the past on this issue (for example see the tread
"subjective names..."). You may be thinking of what I said about the
cost of defeating traffic analysis.
The natural state of the Net seems to be a kind of semi-anonymity.
Trying to push it in either direction (complete traceability or
anonymity) is costly.
Wei Dai